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THE SHIFTING SANDS OF COST SHIFTING 
 
ANDREW M. PARDIECK* 
  ABSTRACT 
The cost-shifting analysis employed by the federal courts in ruling on discovery 
disputes is flawed. There is tremendous variability in how courts interpret the factors 
guiding the analysis. There is tremendous variability in the information courts rely on 
in deciding whether to preclude the discovery or shift its costs. The result is waste for 
the litigants, courts, and society as a whole. This Article argues that there is a better 
way: mandate cooperation before cost shifting. The courts should condition 
proportionality and cost-shifting rulings on cooperation. The cooperation should be 
substantive: require disclosure of objective information about the disputed discovery 
and, if costs are shared, share control over the process. Cooperation will not come 
about by exhortation or proclamation; it will come if the cost of discovery, or the 
discovery itself, hangs in the balance. With that comes the possibility of reducing 
costs. Asking “is the discovery unduly burdensome” results in a different answer than 
asking “can it be done more efficiently”? This Article argues that the courts should 
ask the latter question first and require cooperation in answering it. Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 1, with its mandate to construe the rules to seek the “just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action,” demands it.    
 
CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 351 
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK .............................................................................. 355 
A. Rule 26(b)(1) Discovery Scope in General ............................................ 356 
B. Rule 26(b)(2)(B)—Specific Limitations on Electronically Stored 
Information ............................................................................................ 358 
C. Rule 26(c)—Protective Orders .............................................................. 360 
III. COURT APPLICATION ..................................................................................... 361 
A. The Basic Presumption .......................................................................... 361 
B. Rebutting the Presumption – Early Standards ....................................... 362 
C. Rebutting the Presumption – The Marginal Utility Test ....................... 364 
 
* Andrew M. Pardieck, Associate Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of 
Law. With thanks to the participants at the Southeastern Association of Law Schools and Central 
States Law School Association conferences for their helpful feedback on earlier drafts and 
Ethan Campagna for his research assistance.     
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2021
350 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [69:349 
D. Rebutting the Presumption – The Rowe Eight-Factor Test ................... 365 
E. Rebutting the Presumption – The Zubulake “Gold” Standard .............. 366 
F. Rebutting the Presumption – Beyond Accessibility .............................. 369 
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE APPLICATION ............................................................... 375 
A. The Importance of the Issues ................................................................. 375 
B. The Amount in Controversy .................................................................. 378 
C. The Parties’ Relative Access to Information ......................................... 380 
D. The Parties’ Resources ........................................................................... 383 
E. The Importance of the Discovery .......................................................... 387 
F. Whether the Burden Outweighs the Benefit .......................................... 390 
1. Cost of Production – Estimates as Advocacy ................................. 390 
2. Cost of Production – Who Does What Work? ............................... 392 
3. Cost of Production – Choice of Process ......................................... 394 
4. Cost of Production – The Costs of Review .................................... 397 
G. Relative Ability of Each Party to Control Costs .................................... 399 
V. INCREASING OBJECTIVITY ............................................................................. 403 
A. Defining the Importance of the Issues ................................................... 403 
B. Defining the Amount in Controversy .................................................... 404 
C. Defining the Parties’ Relative Access to Information ........................... 405 
D. Defining the Parties’ Resources ............................................................. 406 
E. Defining the Importance of the Discovery ............................................ 406 
1. Sampling and “A Pig in a Poke” .................................................... 407 
2. Sampling and Prevalence Rates ...................................................... 410 
3. Core Discovery ............................................................................... 412 
F. Defining Burden and Benefit ................................................................. 416 
1. Cooperation & Estimates ................................................................ 416 
2. Shared Expenses & Shared Control ................................................ 417 
3. Costs of Review & Other Costs ...................................................... 423 
G. Relative Ability of Each Party to Control Costs .................................... 428 
H. The Factors from A to G ........................................................................ 432 




2021] THE SHIFTING SANDS OF COST SHIFTING 351 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“Equity is a Rogish thing.” Or at least legal historian John Selden thought so.1 He 
went on to describe it, in now famous terms: 
Equity is according to the conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is 
larger or narrower soe is equity. Tis all one as if they should make the 
Standard for the measure wee call A foot, to be the Chancellors foot; what an 
uncertain measure would this be.”2    
John Selden could be describing the pretrial cost-shifting analysis used by the 
courts today. There is remarkable variability in how courts decide when to shift the 
costs of discovery, particularly electronic discovery.3 Some courts consider cost 
shifting only if the electronically stored information (“ESI”) is inaccessible;4 other 
courts consider cost shifting if it is fair.5 Some courts find $35,000 too much to spend 
on discovery of ESI in an employment discrimination case; other courts authorize 
discovery costing ten times that in the same type of case.6 Some courts include the cost 
of attorney review in their cost-shifting analysis; some courts do not.7 Some courts 
include the resources available to the requesting party’s attorney in their analysis; 
some do not. There is a need for clarity as to what the courts are doing, and there is a 
need for increased uniformity and objectivity in the norms the courts apply.   
There is also a need for renewed scholarship on this issue. Scholarly writing on the 
subject reflects an outdated reality. Widely cited scholarship starts with the premise 
that “the presumption in favor of imposing on the producing party the costs necessary 
to respond to its opponent’s requests remains largely intact, if not virtually 
sacrosanct.”8 Other work suggests cost shifting is decreasing.9 Articles after the 2015 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure suggest cost shifting remains 
rare.10   
 
1 H. Jefferson Powell, “Cardozo’s Foot”: The Chancellor’s Conscience and Constructive 
Trusts, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (1993) (citing Edward Fry, Life of John Selden, in TABLE 
TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 177 (Frederick Pollock ed., 1927)). 
2 Id. 
3 Mia Mazza et al., In Pursuit of FRCP 1: Creative Approaches to Cutting and Shifting the 
Costs of Discovery of Electronically Stored Information, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11, 4–5 (2007). 
4 See infra Part III. 
5 See infra Part III. 
6 See infra Part IV. 
7 See infra Part IV. 
8 Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Back to the Future: Discovery Cost Allocation and 
Modern Procedural Theory, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 773, 774 (2011). 
9 Vlad Vainberg, Comment, When Should Discovery Come with a Bill? Assessing Cost 
Shifting for Electronic Discovery, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1523, 1529 (2010). 
10 Charles S. Fax, Cost-Shifting in Discovery after the 2015 Amendments to Rule 26, AM. 
BAR ASS’N (Oct. 12, 2017), 
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Research for this Article, however, suggests that the Supreme Court’s presumption 
“that the responding party must bear the expense of complying with discovery 
requests,”11 while often invoked is now routinely ignored. “Shifting the cost burdens 
of discovery, both for ESI and paper discovery, is no longer rare.”12 Research for this 
Article suggests that courts routinely order some form of cost shifting. In the 178 
judicial decisions analyzed for this research, they do so thirty-nine percent of the time.  
Influential scholarship argues that the current rules externalize the cost of 
discovery. Cost shifting, according to some, is necessary because the disparity 
between the cost of requesting discovery and the cost of responding to discovery 
creates incentives to ask for too much.13 Others argue that cross-party agency in the 
discovery process allows the responding party to create and externalize unnecessary 
costs.14 This scholarship proposes use of predictive coding and allocating the task of 
searching for responsive information to the requesting party.15   
But not every case warrants the use of predictive coding, either because of its cost 
or because the information cannot be found with a text-based search algorithm, and 
few litigants are willing to provide the unfettered access necessary for the requesting 
party to complete the search.16 The scholarship on cost shifting remains incomplete.   
Understanding better how courts decide when to shift costs, what incentives those 
legal norms create, and whether there is a better way is also important because new 
cost-shifting proposals followed the landmark 2015 revisions to the federal rules. The 
 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/publications/litigation-news/civil-
procedure/costshifting-discovery-after-2015-amendments-rule-26/.   
11 Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978). 
12 Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int’l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331, 336 (E.D. Pa. 2012).   
13   See, e.g., Redish & McNamara, supra note 8, at 773; Paul W. Grimm & David S. Yellin, 
A Pragmatic Approach to Discovery Reform: How Small Changes Can Make a Big Difference 
in Civil Discovery, 64 S.C. L. REV. 495, 521 (2013); John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better 
Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547 (2010); Andrew Mast, 
Cost-Shifting in E-Discovery: Reexamining Zubulake and 28 U.S.C. S 1920, 56 WAYNE L. REV. 
1825, 1830 (2010);  Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE 
L.J. 561, 603 (2001); Marnie H. Pulver, Electronic Media Discovery: The Economic Benefit of 
Pay-Per-View, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1379, 1401–05 (2000); Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. 
Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discovery, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 455–56 (1994); 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 638 (1989). 
14 Bruce H. Kobayashi, Law’s Information Revolution as Procedural Reform: Predictive 
Search as a Solution to the In Terrorem Effect of Externalized Discovery Costs, 2014 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1473, 1498 (2014).  
15 Id. at 1516.  
16 See, e.g., Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., No. Civ.A. 99-3564, 2002 WL 
246439, at *2–3 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2002) (reciting objections to producing backup tapes to 
requesting party “it would be highly prejudicial for [the requesting party] to receive e-mail . . . 
that is unrelated” and “which may contain privileged or confidential information.”); William C. 
Dimm, Predictive Coding: Theory & Practice 5–6 (Dec. 8, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www.predictivecodingbook.com/sample.php (noting that files containing few words, e.g., 
spreadsheets, images, audio, video, are difficult to analyze using predictive coding).  
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol69/iss2/7
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Advisory Committee to the Rules of Civil Procedure has continued to receive requests 
to examine “a more radical form of cost-sharing where people requesting discovery 
would have to pay for some or all of the expenses.”17 While that inquiry was tabled, 
the debate continues, with the labels evolving from “cost shifting” to “cost sharing.”18   
This Article suggests that there is a need to look beyond labels and to ask different 
questions. In 2010, the Advisory Committee sponsored “the Duke Conference” to look 
at ways to reduce cost and delay in civil litigation.19 Those at the conference concluded 
that “[w]hat is needed can be described in two words—cooperation and 
proportionality—and one phrase—sustained, active, hands-on judicial case 
management.”20     
Following the 2015 revisions to the federal rules, proportionality now defines the 
scope of discovery in Rule 26(b)(1), and changes to Rule 16 make explicit the inherent 
authority of the courts to guide conversations regarding preservation and privilege.21 
But the rules still make no mention of cooperation.22     
This Article argues that the courts should predicate both proportionality and cost-
shifting analyses on cooperation, defined here to include: first, disclosure of 
information necessary to narrowly tailor discovery and objectively evaluate its cost, 
and, second, if the parties share the costs of discovery, share control over the process 
 
17 Tera Brostoff, Cooperation, Case Management at Forefront of New Rules; Cost-Sharing 
on Horizon?, Feb. 5, 2015, BLOOMBERG BNA EDISCOVERY RESOURCE CENTER (“Cost-Sharing 
as The Committee's Next Hot Topic”).   
18 DISCOVERY SUBCOMMITTEE: REQUESTER PAYS, in ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 
327–29 (Nov. 5–6, 2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2015-11-civil-
agenda_book.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2FV-YPPR]. 
19 JUDICIAL CONF. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES & COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE 2010 CONFERENCE 
ON CIVIL LITIGATION 1–2 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION REPORT], 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/report_to_the_chief_justice.pdf; Grimm & Yellin, 
supra note 13, at 496–97; 2010 Civil Litigation Conference, U.S. CTS., 
https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/records-and-archives-rules-committees/special-
projects-rules-committees/2010-civil (last visited Jan. 10, 2021). 
20 2010 CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION REPORT, supra note 19, at 4. 
21 Memorandum from David G. Campbell, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civ. 
Proc., to Jeffrey Sutton, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc., in SUMMARY OF THE 
REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, at 
rules app. B-7–B-8 (Sept. 2014) [hereinafter 2014 Judicial Conference Summary Report], 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/ST09-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/537S-
B3LH]. 
22 The 2015 Advisory Committee Notes reference cooperation, and even state that it is 
necessary, but a failure to cooperate will not lead to sanctions. Id. at rules app. B-13. Some 
courts have interpreted the revised language of Rule 1, now referencing party responsibility, to 
implicitly impose “a heightened duty of cooperation in procedural matters such as discovery.”  
Solo v. United Parcel Serv. Co., No. 15–1426, 2017 WL 85832, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 10, 
2017). 
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or limit the cost shared. Cooperation will not happen by proclamation or exhortation.23  
Cooperation will happen if it is required as a condition for the requesting party to 
obtain the disputed discovery or the responding party to shift its costs.24   
While this Article argues for mandating cooperation in cost-shifting analyses, it 
also references proportionality, for two reasons: First, the cost-shifting analysis is 
based, in part, on the proportionality standard set out in the federal rules, so there is 
significant overlap in the analysis.25 Second, cost-shifting motions go hand-in-hand 
with motions to preclude the discovery outright based on proportionality principles.26  
Shifting the cost of discovery is often a fallback to precluding it altogether.27     
As a result, Part II of this Article starts with the rule-based framework employed 
by the federal courts in their proportionality and cost-shifting analysis. Part III then 
addresses the courts’ application of these standards, and its evolution from viewing 
discovery costs as “the cost of doing business,” to the marginal-utility analysis in 
McPeek, the multi-factor tests in Rowe and Zubulake, and the proportionality and more 
generalized fairness inquiries found in more recent cases. The discussion here focuses 
on cases involving discovery of ESI, because that is where the costs are.28   
Readers familiar with the legal framework and principal cases addressing cost 
shifting may choose to skip to Part IV, which discusses the problems with these 
judicial standards. Even well-accepted tests like the Zubulake seven-factor test have 
become a Rorschach test applied by the parties and courts in a way that demonstrates 
advocacy rather than principles and objective standards. Finally, Part V asks whether 
it is possible to do better and argues that it is. It offers a series of proposals, partial 
 
23 Hundreds of judges have endorsed the Sedona Conference Cooperation Proclamation. Yet, 
courts continue to find litigants view discovery as a “legal variety of hand-to-hand combat.”  
Compare Judicial Endorsements, SEDONA CONFERENCE, 
https://thesedonaconference.org/cooperation_proclamation?destination=node/51 (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2020), with UnitedHealthCare of Fla., Inc. v. Am. Renal Assocs., No. 16-CV-81180, 
2017 WL 4785457, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 20, 2017). 
24 The UnitedHealthCare of Florida, Inc. court ordered the parties collaborate and threated 
to, inter alia, “strictly utilize cost-shifting” against any party or attorney who “fails to cooperate 
in good faith.” UnitedHealthCare of Fla., Inc., 2017 WL 4785457, at *3. 
25 Some courts now directly apply Rule 26(b)(1) proportionality factors to the cost-shifting 
analysis. See, e.g., Lawson v. Spirit AeroSystems, Inc., No. 18-1100-EFM-ADM, 2020 WL 
3288058, at *10 (D. Kan. June 18, 2020) (“Courts evaluate the Rule 26(b)(1) proportionality 
factors to determine whether discovery imposes undue burden or expense such that allocating 
expenses under Rule 26(c)(1)(B) is warranted.”); Williams v. Angie’s List, Inc., No. 1:16-CV-
00878, 2017 WL 1318419, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 10, 2017) (explaining that courts in the Seventh 
Circuit “have transmuted the rest for whether the discovery is proportional under Rule 26(b)(1) 
to guide the courts discretion in whether to shift discovery costs”).    
26 See, e.g., Martin v. Hapo Cmty. Credit Union, No. CV-04-5109, 2005 WL 8158778, at *3 
(E.D. Wash. Sept. 6, 2005); Mazza et al., supra note 3, at 170–72. 
27 Mazza et. al., supra note 3, at 170–72.    
28  See, e.g., NICHOLAS M. PACE & LAURA ZAKARAS, WHERE THE MONEY GOES: 
UNDERSTANDING LITIGANT EXPENDITURES FOR PRODUCING ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY, at xiii–xv 
(2012). 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol69/iss2/7
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solutions, tied to each factor in the cost-shifting analysis. While varied, they strike a 
common theme: mandating cooperation before cost shifting will improve the process, 
and predicating cost-shifting decisions on objective factors will improve the result.   
In 1930, Justice Cardozo wrote “[i]n equity, as at law, there are signposts for the 
traveler” and “discretion . . . must be regulated upon grounds that will make it 
judicial.”29 The same holds true for proportionality and cost-shifting analyses today.  
This Article is about improving the signposts courts use in determining when to shift 
the costs of discovery.  
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
In 1939, Professor Sunderland described the newly adopted Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure as marking “the highest point so far reached” in eliminating secrecy in civil 
litigation.30 “Each party may in effect be called upon by his adversary or by the judge 
to lay all his cards upon the table, the important consideration being who has the 
stronger hand, not who can play the cleverer game.”31   
In 1947, the Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor stated that the discovery rules 
“are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry 
of ‘fishing expedition’ serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts of his 
opponent’s case.”32 The Court emphasized that “civil trials in the federal courts no 
longer need be carried on in the dark. The way is now clear, consistent with recognized 
privileges, for the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and 
facts before trial.”33   
Courts today continue to cite Hickman v. Taylor for the proposition that “[m]utual 
knowledge of all the relevant facts . . . is essential to proper litigation.”34 Even after 
the 2015 amendments, courts state that “[t]he rules of discovery, including Rule 26, 
are to be given broad and liberal construction.”35 They continue to define relevancy 
 
29 Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Ascension of Snyder v. Sahlem, 172 N.E. 455, 457 
(N.Y. 1930). 
30 Edson Sunderland, Discovery Before Trial Under the New Federal Rules, 15 TENN. L. 
REV. 737, 739 (1939). 
31 Id. 
32 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500–01 (1947). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 507; see also Begay v. United States, No. CV-04-5109-, 2018 WL 557853, at *4 
(D.N.M. Jan. 23, 2018); SEC v. McCabe, No. 2:13–CV–00161, 2015 WL 2452937, at *2 (D. 
Utah May 22, 2015); Hill v. Auto Owners Ins., Civ. No. 14–5037, 2015 WL 2092680, at *11 
(D.S.D. May 5, 2015); United States v. 2121 Celeste Rd. SW, No. CIV 13–0708, 2015 WL 
3540182, at *11 (D.N.M. May 13, 2015). 
35 See, e.g., Black Love Resists in the Rust v. City of Buffalo, 334 F.R.D. 23, 28 (W.D.N.Y. 
2019); Artis v. Murphy-Brown LLC, No. 7:14-CV-237, 2018 WL 3352639, at *2 (E.D.N.C. 
July 9, 2018); State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fayda, No. 14 Civ. 9792, 2015 WL 7871037, 
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2015).  
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broadly “’to encompass any matter that bears on or that reasonably could lead to other 
matter that could bear on’ any party’s claim or defense.”36   
At the same time, both the courts and the federal rules have articulated limits. In 
Hickman v. Taylor, the Supreme Court recognized that discovery has “ultimate and 
necessary boundaries,”37 and modern courts re-affirm the time-honored cry that 
discovery “is not intended to be a fishing expedition.”38 
They do so in their application of three federal rules, which provide separate bases 
for limiting discovery of otherwise relevant, non-privileged information: First, there 
is the proportionality standard, formerly in Rule 26(b)(2)(C) now in Rule 26(b)(1), 
applicable to all discovery.39 Second, Rule 26(b)(2)(B) specifically limits discovery 
of inaccessible ESI.40 Finally, Rule 26(c) codifies the limitations set out in Hickman 
v. Taylor, providing the court with authority to enter protective orders limiting 
discovery and shifting its costs. 41 This Part provides context for each of these rules.   
A. Rule 26(b)(1) Discovery Scope in General 
In 1983, the Advisory Committee sought to discourage “disproportionate” 
discovery, by encouraging courts to consider discovery in light of the “nature and 
complexity” of the case; the importance of the issues at stake; limitations on 
financially weak litigants to withstand discovery, and the significance of the 
substantive issues as measured in philosophic, social, or institutional terms.”42     
To do so, the committee added Rule 26(b)(2)(C) enabling the courts to limit 
discovery when (i) it is cumulative or the information requested could be obtained 
more readily from an alternative source; (ii) the requesting party had already had 
“ample opportunity” to obtain the information; or (iii) the burden of the discovery 
outweighed the benefit considering: 
the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the 
importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the 
discovery in resolving the issues. 43     
 
36 Navajo Nation Hum. Rts. Comm’n v. San Juan Cnty., No. 2:16-CV-00154, 2016 WL 
3079740, at *3 (D. Utah May 31, 2016) (citing Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 
340, 351 (1978)); see also Begay, 2018 WL 557853, at *9; United Healthcare Servs., Inc. v. 
Consumer Class Plaintiffs (In re Epipen (Epinephrine Injection, USP) Mktg., Sales Practices & 
Antitrust Litig.), MDL No. 2785, 2018 WL 2445100, at *2 (D. Kan. May 31, 2018). 
37 Hickman, supra note 32, at 507–08. 
38 E.g., FTC v. Liberty Supply Co., No. 4:15-CV-829, 2016 WL 4272706, at *5 (E.D. Tex. 
Aug. 15, 2016); Tottenham v. Trans World Gaming Corp., No. 00 Civ. 7697, 2002 WL 
1967023, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2002).  
39 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C). 
40 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
41 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
42 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1)(iii) advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendments.  
43 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i)–(iii). 
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On December 1, 2015 the analysis changed. The word “proportional” was added 
to the rule,44 and the concepts of relevancy and proportionality conjoined.45 The 
drafters of the rules incorporated the proportionality factors into the definition of the 
scope of discovery, rather than articulating them as a limit placed on otherwise 
permissible discovery.46   
Rule 26(b)(1) now provides that parties may obtain discovery relevant to claims 
or defenses and proportional to the needs of the case:   
considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in 
controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ 
resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and 
whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely 
benefit.47  
The drafters removed the language permitting “the discovery of sources of 
information” because it was “unnecessary.”48 They eliminated the distinction between 
information relevant to “claims and defenses” and “subject matter,” as well as the 
language allowing the discovery of information “reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence.”49   
Arguably the most significant, and controversial, change was the incorporation of 
the proportionality analysis into Rule 26’s definition of the scope of discovery. At the 
2010 Duke Conference, when there was “no demand . . . for a change to the rule 
language,” the Advisory Committee’s report to Chief Justice Roberts stated:   
[T]here is no clear case for present reform. . . . There is continuing concern 
that the proportionality provisions of Rule 26(b)(2), added in 1983, have not 
accomplished what was intended. Again, however, there was no suggestion 
that this rule language should be changed.50   
Nonetheless, concerns remained that attorneys were not fully cognizant of the 
proportionality requirements found in the rules:   
[I]f you talk to trial judges who are routinely called upon to resolve 
acrimonious discovery disputes, they overwhelmingly will tell you that 
 
44 Lee H. Rosenthal & Steven S. Gensler, From Rule Text to Reality: Achieving 
Proportionality in Practice, 99 JUDICATURE 44, 44 (2015). 
45 Jonathan M. Redgrave & Hon. Elizabeth D. LaPorte, A Practical Guide to Achieving 
Proportionality Under New Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, 9 FED. CTS. L. REV. 20, 51, 53 
(2015). 
46 Rosenthal & Gensler, supra note 44, at 44. 
47 2014 Judicial Conference Summary Report, supra note 21, at rules app. B-30–B-31.   
48 Id. at rules app. B-4. 
49 Id. 
50 2010 CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION REPORT, supra note 19, at 8.   
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lawyers seem to be comprehensively ignorant of the significant limitations 
that Rule 26(b)(2)(C) imposes on the scope of discovery.51   
The Advisory Committee sought to correct this. Those favoring the revision 
asserted that discovery costs are often disproportionate to the issues at stake, and those 
costs bar access to the courts.52   
Opponents saw the proposal as uniformly favoring defendants in litigation and the 
factors identified as so “subjective and so flexible as to defy uniform application.”53  
They voiced concerns that “proportionality” will become a new blanket objection to 
all discovery requests and impose a new burden on the requesting party to justify each 
and every request.54   
The Committee sought to address both concerns by modifying the order of the 
proportionality factors to consider first “the importance of the issues at stake” and then 
“the amount in controversy.”55 According to the Report of the Judicial Conference:  
This rearrangement adds prominence to the importance of the issues and 
avoids any implication that the amount in controversy is the most important 
concern. The Committee Note was also expanded to emphasize that courts 
should consider the private and public values at issue in the litigation – values 
that cannot be addressed by a monetary award. 56  
The Committee also added a factor, “the parties’ relative access to relevant 
information,” in order to acknowledge “the reality that some cases involve an 
asymmetric distribution of information” and “recognize that proportionality in 
asymmetric cases will often mean that one party must bear greater burdens in 
responding to discovery.”57 Chief Justice Roberts describes these changes as 
“crystaliz[ing] the concept of reasonable limits on discovery through increased 
reliance on the common-sense concept of proportionality.”58 
 
B. Rule 26(b)(2)(B)—Specific Limitations on Electronically Stored 
Information 
Since 2006, the Federal Rules have stated in Rule 26(b)(2)(B) that a party need not 
produce ESI from sources that the responding party shows are not “reasonably 
 
51 Grimm & Yellin, supra note 13, at 516.   
52 2014 Judicial Conference Summary Report, supra note 21, at rules app. B-5.   
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at rules app. B-8. 
56 Id.  
57 Id. 
58 JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2015 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 6 (2015), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2015year-endreport.pdf. 
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accessible because of undue burden or cost,” unless the requesting party shows “good 
cause.”59     
The 2006 Advisory Committee defined accessibility in terms of “sources” and 
“electronic information systems,” not the cost of review.60 The focus in the notes is on 
the burden of discovering ESI from machines and media: While ESI is often easier to 
locate and retrieve than paper documents, some “sources” of ESI can only be 
“accessed” with substantial burden and cost.61 “It is not possible to define in a rule the 
different types of technological features that may affect the burdens and costs of 
accessing [ESI].”62 The systems may be “designed to provide ready access to 
information,” or a “system” may “retain information on sources that are accessible 
only by incurring substantial burdens or costs.”63   
According to the notes, the parties are expected to turn to technologically 
accessible sources first.64 If discovery is then sought from inaccessible sources and 
disputed, the responding party has the burden of proof. The responding party “must 
show the identified sources of information are not reasonably accessible because of 
undue burden or cost,” and sampling, inspection, or depositions may be necessary to 
test the assertion.65   
The rules do not define “good cause” for the requesting party to obtain inaccessible 
information, but the Advisory Committee Notes consider the following factors:  
(1) the specificity of the discovery request; (2) the quantity of information 
available from other and more easily accessed sources; (3) the failure to 
produce relevant information that seems likely to have existed but is no 
longer available on more easily accessed sources; (4) the likelihood of 
finding relevant, responsive information that cannot be obtained from other, 
more easily accessed sources; (5) predictions as to the importance and 
usefulness of the further information; (6) the importance of the issues at stake 
in the litigation; and (7) the parties’ resources.66 
This good cause inquiry is coupled with the court’s “authority to set conditions for 
discovery,” including shifting the reasonable costs of obtaining information from 
sources that are not reasonably accessible to the requesting party.67   
 
59 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
60 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendments. 
61 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendments; see also Chen-
Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 285 F.R.D. 294, 301–03 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).   
62 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendments.   
63 Id. 
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C. Rule 26(c)—Protective Orders 
The above proportionality and good cause factors provide guidance for an inquiry 
that has long been conducted under Rule 26(c), the oldest of the general limitations on 
discovery.68 Rule 26(c) provides that a court may “for good cause” protect a party 
from “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense” by, inter 
alia, forbidding the discovery; specifying its terms; prescribing another method; or 
limiting its scope.69   
Part-in-parcel of the court’s authority to protect a party from “undue burden or 
expense” is its discretion to condition discovery on the requesting party’s payment of 
the costs of that discovery.70 In determining whether to do so, the courts have long 
considered the proportionality factors now set out in Rule 26(b)(2).71 After the 2015 
amendments, Rule 26(c) now expressly provides that a court may also protect a party 
from “undue burden or expense” by “specifying terms, including time and place or the 
allocation of expenses, for the disclosure or discovery.”72   
Scholars suggest the initial drafters of the federal rules “widely—if only 
implicitly—assumed that the discovery costs were to remain where they fell.”73 The 
current federal rules retain that presumption: while there is no express statement in the 
rules that the responding party pays, the rules describe exceptions when costs are 
shifted to the requesting party.74    
According to Judge David Campbell, former chair of the Advisory Committee, the 
2015 revisions were not intended to “work . . . any sort of significant change” to this 
presumption. 75 The Rule 26(c) amendment was not intended to signal a change to 
requestor pays: “In virtually all cases, if discovery is relevant and proportional to the 
 
68 8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 
2035 (3d ed. 2020). 
69 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1). 
70 Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978); Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 
108 F.R.D. 459, 462 (D. Utah 1985). 
71 See, e.g., Foreclosure Mgmt. Co. v. Asset Mgmt. Holdings, LLC, No. 07–2388, 2008 WL 
3822773, at *6–7 (D. Kan. Aug. 13, 2008); Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630, 633 
(D. Kan. 2006). 
72 2014 Judicial Conference Summary Report, supra note 21, at rules app. B-33–B-34. 
73 Redish & McNamara, supra note 8, at 774. The drafters expressly rejected language 
requiring the requesting party to pay for discovery at least once. Professor Sunderland’s first 
draft of the rule permitting interrogatories required the requesting party tender to the witness “a 
fee of two dollars plus one dollar for every question in excess of twenty.” That language was 
deleted before adoption. Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical 
Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 723 (1998).   
74 Grimm & Yellin, supra note 13, at 520 (“Implicitly . . . the rules establish a presumption 
that this burden and expense falls upon the responding or producing party.”).   
75 Judicial Roundtable, The Nuts and Bolts, 99 JUDICATURE 26, 30 (2015).  
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needs of the case, the party producing the information will pay for the cost of 
production . . . . Cost shifting is now and should be in the future a rare occurrence.”76   
At the same time, the rules have evolved to provide the courts with clear authority 
to limit discovery and guidelines for doing so. Regardless of the rule, the guidelines, 
over thirty years of rule-making, have been remarkably consistent: examine the 
importance of the issues at stake; the importance of the discovery in question, its 
specificity and cost, and whether the information is readily available elsewhere; the 
amount in controversy and the parties’ resources; and the parties’ relative access to 
information and role in preserving it in accessible form.   
In sum, litigants and the courts are instructed to examine whether the burden of 
discovery outweighs its likely benefit. The problem is that, despite the consistency in 
the rules, there is tremendous variability in how the courts have applied these factors.   
III. COURT APPLICATION 
A. The Basic Presumption 
In 1978, the Supreme Court in Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders gave voice to 
the implicit presumption that the responding party bears its own expenses: “The 
presumption is that the responding party must bear the expense of complying with 
discovery requests.”77 Courts have accepted this as the starting point since.78 But it is 
just that, a starting point for an analysis determining if and when to shift costs.     
The analytical framework used by the courts in determining whether to rebut the 
presumption has evolved. Early on, courts adopted norms that rarely resulted in cost 
shifting, apart from copying costs. More recently, courts have expanded the scope and 
frequency of cost shifting.79 Courts asked to engage in a proportionality analysis to 
preclude discovery or shift its costs now routinely shift a portion of the costs to the 
requesting party.80 They do so regardless of the rule applied: Rule 26(b)(1), Rule 
26(b)(2)(B), or Rule 26(c). They do so regardless of the factors considered. They do 
so where the information is relevant but inaccessible, and, more recently, where the 
information is relevant and accessible but costly to produce. The following Part 





76 Id. at 31. 
77 Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978).  
78 See, e.g., Lawson v. Spirit AeroSystems, Inc., No. 18-1100-EFM-ADM, 2020 WL 
3288058, at *8 (D. Kan. June 18, 2020); United States ex rel. Carter v. Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., 
305 F.R.D. 225, 236 (S.D. Cal. 2015); Novick v. AXA Network, LLC, No. 07 Civ. 7767, 2013 
WL 5338427, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2013); Rundus v. City of Dallas, 634 F.3d 309, 315–16 
(5th Cir. 2011); Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 97 (D. Md. 
2003). 
79 See infra Part IV.   
80 See infra Part IV. 
13Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2021
362 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [69:349 
B. Rebutting the Presumption – Early Standards 
Early decisions from the 1970s and 1980s addressed copying ESI, i.e. copying 
computer tapes or creating digital copies of previously produced computer printouts.81  
With the exception of one court refusing to shift the cost of duplicating computer 
tapes, finding it “a reasonable cost of doing business,”82 courts regularly compelled 
production and assessed the costs of creating copies of computer tapes or digital copies 
of earlier paper productions.83    
The first decision to set out a legal framework for analyzing cost shifting for 
electronic discovery beyond copying costs came in 1985, in Bills v. Kennecott Corp.84  
In Bills, and the cases that followed, the courts routinely rejected cost shifting.  
Plaintiffs in Bills alleged age discrimination and requested information regarding 
defendant’s reduction in force.85 Pursuant to Rule 26(c), defendant sought an order 
requiring plaintiffs to pay its costs to produce a “computer printout.”86 The court 
denied the motion, holding it “axiomatic that electronically stored information is 
discoverable” if relevant.87 And if relevant, “the expense and burden to the responding 
party should not only be balanced against the relative expense and burden to the 
requesting party, but also should be scrutinized for possible excessiveness.”88   
The court rejected “ironclad formulas” for determining “undue burden,”89 and 
analyzed factors including (1) the cost of the request; (2) the relative expense and 
burden in obtaining the data; (3) the burden on the requesting party to obtain the 
information otherwise; and (4) the benefit to the responding party from producing the 
data in question.90 In Bills, the court put ESI on equal footing with paper, and 
conducted a cost-benefit analysis, acknowledging that the responding party is 
 
81 See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport on Aug. 16, 1987, 130 F.R.D. 
634, 636 (E.D. Mich. 1989) [hereinafter In re Detroit Air Crash Disaster].  
82 United States v. Davey, 543 F.2d 996, 1001 (2d Cir. 1976). 
83 In re Detroit Air Crash Disaster, supra note 81, at 636; Williams v. E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., 119 F.R.D. 648, 651 (W.D. Ky. 1987); Nat’l Union Elec. Corp. v. Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1257, 1262 (E.D. Pa. 1980). 
84 Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 460 (D. Utah 1985). 
85 Id. 
86 Id.  
87 Id. at 461.   
88 Id. at 463. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 464.  
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generally in the best position to evaluate how to produce their own ESI, but courts 
must assess allegations of burden for excessiveness.91   
Subsequent courts acknowledged both the “ordinary and foreseeable” burden 
associated with producing ESI and the need to cooperate. In 1986, a court held in 
Daewoo Electronics Co. v. United States: 
The normal and reasonable translation of electronic data into a form usable 
by the discovering party should be the ordinary and foreseeable burden of a 
respondent . . . Similarly, a normal and reasonable degree of direct 
communication and assistance to the discovering party is the unavoidable 
burden of the respondent, in the absence of a showing of extraordinary 
hardship.92 
Even in this early decision, the court sought to require the producing party to 
transmit the data “in a reasonably usable way with a modicum of cooperation.”93 
In 1995, in In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, a federal 
court again rejected cost shifting, finding the expense inevitable; best controlled by 
the producing party; and best mitigated through cooperation.94 Here, the court declined 
to shift the costs of producing email from backup tapes, holding “the mere fact that 
the production of computerized data will result in a substantial expense is not a 
sufficient justification for imposing the costs of production on the requesting party.”95   
As in Daewoo, the court held that “if a party chooses an electronic storage method, 
the necessity for a retrieval program or method is an ordinary and foreseeable risk.”96    
Equally important, the court found that the burden of searching the email system 
resulted from the limitations of the software defendant chose to use—a burden that 
other defendants in the litigation did not have or claim.97 Where “the costliness of the 
discovery procedure involved is . . . a product of the defendant’s record-keeping 
scheme over which the [plaintiffs have] no control,”98 it would be unreasonable to 
 
91 See Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Principles, Third Edition: Best Practices, 
Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic Document Production, 19 SEDONA 
CONF. J. 1, 118 (2018). 
92 Daewoo Elecs. Co. v. United States, 650 F. Supp. 1003, 1006 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1986); see 
also Kaufman v. Kinko’s, Inc., No. Civ.A. 18894, 2002 WL 32123851, at *2 (Del. Ch. Apr. 16, 
2002); Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., No. 97-2307, 1999 WL 462015, at *6 (Mass. Super. June 
16, 1999); Hurt v. Dime Sav. Bank, 151 F.R.D. 30, 31–32 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). 
93 Daewoo Elecs. Co., 650 F. Supp. at 1006.  
94 In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, Nos. 94 C 897, MDL 997, 1995 
WL 360526, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995).   
95 Id. 
96 Id.  
97 Id.  
98 Id. (citing Kozlowski v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 73 F.R.D. 73 (D. Mass. 1976)); see also 
Kozlowski, 73 F.R.D. at 75–76 (“[D]efendant may not excuse itself from compliance . . . by 
utilizing a system of record-keeping which conceals rather than discloses relevant records, or 
makes it unduly difficult to identify or locate them, thus rendering the production of documents 
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shift costs of searching the records to plaintiff. The court, instead, required the parties 
to cooperate, “to consult with each other and agree upon meaningful limitations on the 
scope of any e-mail search.”99   
These early cost-shifting cases involving ESI drew upon well-established law. The 
“mere fact” that producing documents was “burdensome and expensive” and “would 
interfere with a party’s normal operations was not inherently a reason to refuse an 
otherwise legitimate discovery request.”100 Size did not matter; organization did: “The 
fact that defendant’s size requires it to keep a great amount of records cannot give it 
immunity . . . Nor can the lack of an adequate filing system insulate a party from 
discovery.”101 What mattered were the choices that the responding party made prior to 
the litigation regarding storing the information. Courts “will not shift the burden of 
discovery onto the discovering party where the costliness of the discovery procedure 
involved is entirely a product of the defendant’s record-keeping scheme.”102   
Filing systems and the information filed, however, change. As the volume of 
potential discovery “once thought of in terms of numbers of pages” grew to terabytes, 
this “explosion of information has brought along with it an explosion of costs.”103 This 
increase in costs brought cost-shifting motions, and with it a change in the legal norms.   
C. Rebutting the Presumption – The Marginal Utility Test 
Subsequent case law criticized In re Brandname Prescription Drugs, often 
omitting discussion of its emphasis on cooperation and disclosure and focusing instead 
on the language suggesting that the cost of producing ESI is a foreseeable cost of using 
computers.104 Subsequent cases labeled the test applied in In re Brandname 
Prescription Drugs the “cost of doing business” test, and they rejected it.105    
 
an excessively burdensome and costly expedition.”); Kaufman v. Kinko’s Inc., No. Civ.A. 
18894, 2002 WL 32123851, at *2 (Del. Ch. Apr. 16, 2002); Delozier v. First Nat’l Bank of 
Gatlinburg, 109 F.R.D. 161, 164 (E.D. Tenn. 1986). 
99 In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, 1995 WL 360526, at *3. 
100 Baine v. Gen. Motors Corp., 141 F.R.D. 328, 331 (M.D. Ala. 1991); see also Keco Indus., 
Inc. v. Stearns Elec. Corp., 285 F. Supp. 912, 914 (E.D. Wis. 1968); Speedrack, Inc. v. Baybarz, 
45 F.R.D. 254, 257 (E.D. Cal. 1968); Technograph, Inc. v. Tex. Instruments, Inc., 43 F.R.D. 
416, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Rockaway Pix Theatre, Inc. v. Metro–Goldwyn–Mayer, Inc., 36 
F.R.D. 15, 17 (E.D.N.Y. 1964). 
101 Baine, 141 F.R.D. at 331; see also Delozier v. First Nat’l Bank, 109 F.R.D. 161, 164 
(E.D. Tenn. 1986); Baxter v. Travenol Lab’ys, Inc. v. LeMay, 93 F.R.D. 379 (S.D. Ohio 1981); 
All. to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 441, 447 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Kozlowski, 73 F.R.D. 
at 76. 
102 Delozier, 109 F.R.D. at 164.   
103 Grimm & Yellin, supra note 13, at 511. 
104 See, e.g., Rowe Ent., Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002); McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 33 (D.D.C. 2001); Kemper Mortg., Inc. v. Russell, 
No. 3:06-CV-042, 2006 WL 2319858, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 18, 2006). 
105 See cases cited supra note 104. 
16https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol69/iss2/7
2021] THE SHIFTING SANDS OF COST SHIFTING 365 
In 2001, Judge Facciola, in McPeek v. Ashcroft, proposed an alternative, now 
applied expressly or impliedly in most cases.106 In McPeek, plaintiff alleged retaliation 
following a sexual harassment claim and sought production of email from defendant’s 
backup systems.107 Judge Facciola flatly rejected arguments that the producing party 
pay the costs of restoration as a cost of its “choice” to use computers: “It is impossible 
to walk ten feet into [an office] without seeing a network computer . . . What 
alternative is there? Quill pens?”108    
While Judge Facciola rejected “the cost of doing business argument,” he also 
rejected the converse, simply making the requesting party pay.109 He articulated an 
alternative, a marginal utility test, for determining whether to shift the costs of 
restoring and searching inaccessible ESI.110   
A fairer approach borrows, by analogy, from the economic principle of 
“marginal utility.” The more likely it is that the backup tape contains 
information that is relevant to a claim or defense, the fairer it is that the 
government agency search at its own expense. The less likely it is, the more 
unjust it would be to make the agency search at its own expense. The 
difference is ”at the margin.”111    
In other words, Judge Facciola focused on the importance of the discovery in 
resolving the issues. More importantly, he required objective proof to decide this, i.e., 
sampling and a sworn certification of the costs and results of the search.112   
D. Rebutting the Presumption – The Rowe Eight-Factor Test 
In the year following McPeek, Judge Francis sought to define marginal utility more 
precisely.113 In Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., plaintiffs 
alleged racial discrimination and sought email from both active servers and backup 
 
106 McPeek, 202 F.R.D. at 31–33; see also Sophia & Chloe, Inc. v. Brighton Collectibles, 
Inc., No. 12CV2472, 2014 WL 12642170, at *5 (S.D. Cal. May 28, 2014); Hagemeyer N. Am., 
Inc. v. Gateway Data Scis. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594, 602 (E.D. Wis. 2004); Certain Network 
Interface Cards & Access Points, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-455, 2001 WL 1217233, at *1–2 
(U.S.I.T.C. Oct. 12, 2001) (admin. law judge order). 
107 McPeek, 202 F.R.D. at 31–32.   
108 Id. at 33; see also Certain Network Interface Cards & Access Points, 2001 WL 1217233. 
109 McPeek, 202 F.R.D. at 33–34. 
110 Id. at 34. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 34–35. 
113 Rowe Ent., Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 428–29 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002).   
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tapes.114 Defendants sought a protective order precluding discovery or shifting 
costs.115   
Judge Francis rejected plaintiff’s “cost of doing business” argument “because the 
costs of storage are virtually nil.”116 He also rejected defendants’ “requestor-pays” 
arguments, finding that “it flies in the face of well-established legal principle . . . [and] 
it places a price on justice that will not always be acceptable: it would result in the 
abandonment of meritorious claims by litigants too poor to pay for necessary 
discovery.”117 
In lieu of both, Rowe articulated a balancing approach considering eight factors: 
(1) “the specificity of the discovery requests;” (2) “the likelihood of discovering 
critical information” or “the likelihood of a successful search;” (3) “the availability of 
such information from other sources;” (4) “the purposes for which the responding 
party maintains the requested data;” (5) “the relative benefit to the parties of obtaining 
the information;” (6) “the total cost associated with production;” (7) “the relative 
ability of each party to control costs and its incentive to do so;” and (8) “the resources 
available to each party.”118    
Many courts adopted the Rowe standard,119 and, in contrast to early cost-shifting 
decisions, almost always ordered cost shifting.120   
E. Rebutting the Presumption – The Zubulake “Gold” Standard 
Recognizing this bias towards cost shifting, Judge Scheindlin modified the Rowe 
test in her seminal opinions in Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC.121 In response to 
defendant’s request to shift the cost of email discovery from backup tapes, Judge 
 
114 Id. at 424–28. 
115 Id. at 423. 
116 Id. at 429. 
117 Id.; see also U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. GreenPoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., 94 A.D.3d 58, 
64–65 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012). 
118 Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 429–30. 
119 See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); 
see also Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Quest Software, Inc., No. 02 C 4721, 2003 WL 21277129, 
at *1–2 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2003); In re Livent, Inc. Noteholders Sec. Litig., No. 98 Civ. 7161, 
2003 WL 23254, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2003); Byers v. Ill. State Police, No. 99 C 8105, 2002 
WL 1264004, at *10–12 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2002); Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 
No. Civ.A. 99–3564, 2002 WL 246439, at *3–8 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2002).    
120 See Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 320; Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 
F.R.D. 280, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 2002 WL 246439, at *7–9; Byers v. 
Ill. State Police, No. 99 C 8105, 2002 WL 1264004, at *12 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2002); In re Bristol-
Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 437, 444 (D.N.J. 2002). 
121 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 317–20; see Sedona Conference, Cooperation Proclamation: 
Resources For The Judiciary, Third Edition 39 (2020) [hereinafter Sedona Conference, 
Resources for the Judiciary] (“Cost-shifting came to eDiscovery with the iconic Zubulake 
decision.”). 
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Scheindlin articulated a three-step, seven-factor test that has become, according to 
some, the “gold standard.”122  
The first step examines whether cost shifting must be considered in every case 
involving ESI.123 According to Zubulake, given that ESI is no less discoverable than 
paper, the answer is “no.”124 Instead, “whether production of documents is unduly 
burdensome or expensive turns primarily on whether it is kept in an accessible or 
inaccessible format.”125   
ESI is inaccessible if the data “must be restored or otherwise manipulated to be 
usable.”126 If the ESI is inaccessible, the second step examines whether cost shifting 
is warranted.127 Just as in McPeek, reliable information based on sampling is 
necessary: “When based on an actual sample, the marginal utility test will not be an 
exercise in speculation—there will be tangible evidence of what the backup tapes may 
have to offer.”128  
Finally, based on this objective evidence, Zubulake suggests the following 
analysis: First, in order to maintain the presumption that the responding party pays, 
“the cost-shifting analysis must be neutral; close calls should be resolved in favor of 
the presumption.”129 In order to ensure neutrality, Zubulake modified the Rowe 
standard to address “the amount in controversy” and “the importance of the issues at 
stake in the litigation.”130 It then omitted, as irrelevant, an inquiry into the purpose for 
which the data is maintained.131 The result is a seven-factor test examining:   
 
1. The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover relevant 
information;  
 
122 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 317–20, 323; see also Price v. Synapse Group, No. 16CV1524-
BAS(BLM), 2018 WL 9517276, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2019); Tierno v. Rite Aid Corp., 
No. C 05-02520 TEH, 2008 WL 3287035, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 31, 2008); Maria Perez Crist, 
Preserving the Duty to Preserve: The Increasing Vulnerability of Electronic Information, 58 
S.C. L. REV. 7, 15 (2006); Redish & McNamara, supra note 8, at 781; Mast, supra note 13, at 
1827; James M. Evangelista, Polishing the “Gold Standard” on the E-discovery Cost-Shifting 
Analysis: Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 9 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1 (2004). 
123 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 317. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 318.  Zubulake identifies five types of data: (1) active, online; (2) near-line; (3) 
offline storage/archives; (4) backup tapes; and (5) erased, fragmented or damaged data, and 
determines that the first three categories are typically accessible, while the latter two are not.”  
Id. at 319–20.   
126 Id. at 320.   
127 Id. at 323.     
128 Id. at 324. 
129 Id. at 320.   
130 Id. at 321.    
131 Id. 
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2. The availability of such information from other sources;  
3. The total cost of production, compared to the amount in controversy;  
4. The total cost of production, compared to the resources available to each party;  
5. The relative ability of each party to control costs and its incentive to do so; 
6. The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and  
7. The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the information.132   
 
According to Zubulake, these factors are not a checklist. The focus must be: “does 
the request impose an ‘undue burden or expense’ on the responding party” and “how 
important is the sought-after evidence in comparison to the cost of production?”133 In 
answering these questions, the first two factors—the marginal utility factors—are 
most important and the last two factors least. 134 “[T]he importance of the litigation” 
will “only rarely come into play” and “the relative benefits of the production” will 
generally benefit the requesting party, but “in the unusual case” may also benefit the 
responding party and that fact “may weigh against shifting costs.”135 
The Zubulake decisions provided the basis for the 2006 revisions to the federal 
rules.136 As discussed supra, Rule 26(b)(2)(B) now distinguishes between accessible 
and inaccessible ESI, as defined by whether the ESI requires restoration. If 
inaccessible information is sought and restoration required, the 2006 Advisory 
Committee Notes consider the factors discussed in both Rowe and Zubulake.    
In the years since, courts have tweaked the standard. The Seventh Circuit modified 
the Zubulake factors to expressly include an eighth factor, one identified in Rule 
26(b)(2)(C), “the importance of the requested discovery in resolving the issues of the 
litigation.”137 But, whether in whole or part, federal courts have adopted the Zubulake 
standard widely, referring to Zubulake as the “leading opinion” on the subject.138   
 
132 Id. at 322. 
133 Id. at 322–23. 
134 Id. at 323. 
135 Id. 
136 Jacob Smith, Electronic Discovery: The Challenges of Reaching into the Cloud, 52 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 1561, 1567 (2012).  
137 Clean Harbors Env’t Servs., Inc. v. ESIS, Inc., No. 09-CV-3789, 2011 WL 1897213, at 
*2 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2011); Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 572–73 (N.D. 
Ill. 2004).   
138 See Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int'l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331, 336 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (describing 
Zubulake as “undoubtably” the “leading opinion” on the subject). Courts adopting Zubulake 
include Zeller v South Central Emergency Med. Servs., Inc., No. 1:13–CV–2584, 2014 WL 
2094340 (M.D. Pa. May 20, 2014); Cochran v. Caldera Med., Inc., No. 12–5109, 2014 WL 
1608664 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2014); W Holding Co., Inc. v. Chartis Ins. Co. of P.R., 293 F.R.D. 
68 (D.P.R. 2013); Novick v. AXA Network, LLC, No. 07 Civ. 7767, 2013 WL 5338427 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2013); Juster Acq. Co. v. N. Hudson Sewerage Auth., No. 12–3427, 2013 
WL 541972 (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 2013); Fleisher v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., No. 11 Civ. 8405, 2012 
WL 6732905 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2012); Clean Harbors Env’t Servs., Inc. v. ESIS, Inc., No. 09-
CV-3789, 2011 WL 1897213, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2011); Couch v. Wan, No. CV08–1621, 
2011 WL 2971118 (E.D. Cal. July 20, 2011); Couch v. Wan, No. CV08–1621, 2011 WL 
20https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol69/iss2/7
2021] THE SHIFTING SANDS OF COST SHIFTING 369 
F. Rebutting the Presumption – Beyond Accessibility 
Zubulake and its progeny make clear that “cost-shifting does not even become a 
possibility unless there is first a showing of inaccessibility.”139 The “obvious negative 
corollary” to this is that “accessible data must be produced at the cost of the producing 
party.”140   
But this limitation is ignored by a growing number of courts.141 In these decisions, 
definitions of “undue burden or expense” based on the technical accessibility of the 
 
2551546 (E.D. Cal. June 24, 2011); Johnson v. Neiman, No. 09-CV-00689, 2010 WL 4065368 
(E.D. Mo. Oct. 18, 2010); Radian Asset Assur., Inc. v. Coll. of the Christian Bros. of N.M., No. 
09CV00689, 2010 WL 4928866 (D.N.M. Oct. 22, 2010); Rodriguez-Torres v. Gov’t Dev. Bank 
of P.R., 265 F.R.D. 40, 44 (D.P.R. 2010); Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, No. 05-3091, 2009 WL 
3446761 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2009); Mikron Indus., Inc. v. Hurd Windows & Doors, Inc., No. C07-
532, 2008 WL 1805727 (W.D. Wash. 2008); Haka v. Lincoln Cnty., 246 F.R.D. 577 (W.D. 
Wis. 2007); PSEG Power N.Y., Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., No. 05-CV-657, 2007 WL 
2687670 (N.D.N.Y. 2007); Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630, 633 (D. Kan. 2006); 
Hagemeyer N.A., Inc. v. Gateway Data Scis. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594 (E.D. Wis. 2004); Wiginton 
v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 572–73 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Multitechnology Servs., 
L.P. v. Verizon Sw., No. 02–CV–702, 2004 WL 1553480 (N.D. Tex. July 12, 2004); OpenTV 
v. Liberate Techs., 219 F.R.D. 474, 476–79 (N.D. Cal. 2003); Xpedior Creditor Tr. v. Credit 
Suisse First Bos. (USA), Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
139 Peskoff v. Faber, 240 F.R.D. 26, 30–31 (D.D.C. 2007); see also Almont Ambulatory 
Surgery Ctr., LLC v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc, No. CV 14-03053, 2018 WL 5816108, at *6–7 
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2018); Nehad v. Browder, No. 15-CV-1386, 2016 WL 3769807, at *3 (S.D. 
Cal. July 15, 2016); United States ex rel. Guardiola v. Renown Health, No. 12–CV–00295, 2015 
WL 5056726, at *9 (D. Nev. Aug. 25, 2015); Hausman v. Holland Am. Line-USA, No. 
13cv00937, 2015 WL 11234152, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 17, 2015); Cochran v. Caldera Med., 
Inc., No. 12–5109, 2014 WL 1608664, at *2–3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2014); Lindsay v. Clear 
Wireless, LLC, No. 13–834, 2014 WL 813875, at *2 (D. Minn. Mar. 3, 2014); Laethem Equip. 
Co. v. Deere & Co., 261 F.R.D. 127, 145 (E.D. Mich. 2009); Juster Acq. Co. v. N. Hudson 
Sewerage Auth., No. 12–3427, 2013 WL 541972, at *3–6 (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 2013); Novick v. 
AXA Network, LLC, No. 07 Civ. 7767, 2013 WL 5338427, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2013); 
Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 285 F.R.D. 294, 301–03 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Nogle v. 
Beech St. Corp., No. 10–CV–01092, 2012 WL 3687570, at *8 (D. Nev. Aug. 27, 2012); Adair 
v. EQT Prod. Co., No. 10cv00037, 2012 WL 1965880, at *3–5 (W.D. Va. May 31, 2012); 
Helmert v. Butterball, LLC, No. 08CV00342, 2010 WL 2179180, at *10 (E.D. Ark. May 27, 
2010); Cason-Merenda v. Detroit Med. Ctr., No. 06-15601, 2008 WL 2714239, at *3 (E.D. 
Mich. July 7, 2008); Mikron Indus., Inc. v. Hurd Windows & Doors, Inc., No. C07-532, 2008 
WL 1805727, at *1–2 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 21, 2008); Io Grp. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., No. C06-
03926, 2007 WL 1113800, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2007); Wachtel v. Health Net, Inc., 239 
F.R.D. 81, 91 n.23 (D.N.J. 2006); OpenTV v. Liberate Techs., 219 F.R.D. 474, 476 (N.D. Cal. 
2003). 
140 Peskoff v. Faber, 244 F.R.D. 54, 62 (D.D.C. 2007); see also Hawa v. Coatesville, No. 15-
4828, 2017 WL 1021026, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2017); Zeller v. S. Cent. Emergency Med. 
Servs., Inc., No. 13–CV–2584, 2014 WL 2094340, at *9 (M.D. Pa. May 20, 2014). 
141 See, e.g., Lawson v. Spirit AeroSystems, Inc., No. 18-1100-EFM-ADM, 2020 WL 
3288058, at *9 (D. Kan. June 18, 2020) (“Although the court in Zubulake stated that ‘[a] court 
should consider cost-shifting only when electronic data is relatively inaccessible,’… that 
approach is no longer accepted.”); N. Shore–Long Island Jewish Health Sys., Inc. v. Multiplan, 
Inc., 325 F.R.D. 36, 51–53 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (inviting briefing on shifting the costs of production 
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storage media give way to general inquiries into burden, ESI volume and cost, and 
whether it is fair to shift the costs.142 There are two types of these cases: in the first, 
courts conduct a broad-based proportionality analysis applying either the Zubulake 
factors or the proportionality standard now set out in Rule 26(b)(1).143 In the second, 
courts more generally seek to do what is fair.144 In these latter cases, “[a]ccessibility 
turns largely on the expense of production.”145   
United States ex rel. Carter v. Bridgepoint Education, Inc. provides an often-cited 
example of the first. 146 Plaintiffs, in a qui tam action, sought documents relating to 
recruiter compensation found on defendant’s active servers and backup tapes.147 The 
court ordered production, without cost shifting, from a tape providing access to email 
between key players.148   
 
for accessible database reports); United States ex rel. Carter v. Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., 305 
F.R.D. 225, 240 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (“[C]ost-shifting has been extended beyond merely 
inaccessible ESI.”); United States ex rel. Garbe v. Kmart Corp., 12-CV-881, 2014 WL 
12787823, at *3–4 (S.D. Ill. May 2, 2014) (noting the split); FDIC v. Bowden, No. CV413–
245, 2014 WL 2548137, at *6 (S.D. Ga. June 6, 2014) (“‘inaccessible’ . . . can mean 
prohibitively expensive”). 
142 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Carter v. Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., 305 F.R.D. 225, 239 
(S.D. Cal. 2015); Remy Inc. v. Tecnomatic, S.P.A., 11–CV–00991, 2013 WL 1310216, at *5 
(S.D. Ind. Mar. 27, 2013); Lubber, Inc. v. Optari LLC, No. 11-0042, 2012 WL 899631 (M.D. 
Tenn. Mar. 15, 2012); Pippins v. KPMG LLP, 279 F.R.D. 245 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2012); 
Ameriwood Indus., Inc. v. Liberman, No. 06CV524, 2007 WL 496716, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 
13, 2007); Best Buy Stores, L.P. v. Devs. Diversified Realty Corp., No. 05-2310, 2007 WL 
333987, at *1 (D. Minn. Feb. 1, 2007); Martin v. HAPO Cmty. Credit Union, No. CV-04-5109, 
2005 WL 8158778, at *2–3 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 6, 2005). 
143 See, e.g., Sung Gon Kang v. Credit Bureau Connection, Inc., No. 18-CV-01359, 2020 
WL 1689708, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2020); Duhigg v. Indus., No. 15CV91, 2016 WL 4991480, 
at *2–4 (D. Neb. Sept. 16, 2016); Elkharwily v. Franciscan Health Sys., No. 15-CV-05579, 
2016 WL 4061575 at *2–4 (W.D. Wash. July 29, 2016); Wagoner v. Lewis Gale Med. Ctr., 
LLC, No. 15cv570, 2016 WL 3893135, at *3–4 (W.D. Va. July 14, 2016); United States ex rel. 
Carter, 305 F.R.D. at 240; Martin v. HAPO Cmty. Credit Union, No. CV-04-5109, 2005 WL 
8158778, at *3 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 6, 2005).   
144 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Earl Scheib, Inc., No. 11–CV–0788, 2013 WL 
485846, at *3–4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2013); Couch v. Wan, No. CV08–1621, 2011 WL 2551546, 
at *3–4 (E.D. Cal. June 24, 2011); OpenTV v. Liberate Technologies, 219 F.R.D. 474, 476–79 
(N.D. Cal. 2003). 
145 See, e.g., Couch, 2011 WL 2551546, at *3–4; E & J Gallo Winery v. Encana Energy Serv. 
Inc., No. CV-F-03-5412, 2004 WL 7342781, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2004) (“Taking into 
account defendant’s privilege claims, the requested material is not readily accessible.”). 
146 United States ex rel. Carter, 305 F.R.D. at 227; see also 3 ROBERT L. HAIG, BUSINESS 
AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION FEDERAL COURTS § 26:28 (4th ed. Supp. 2019); CAROLE BASRI 
& MARY MACK, EDISCOVERY FOR CORPORATE COUNSEL § 25:2 (2020); ADAM I. COHEN & 
DAVID J. LENDER, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.05 (2020). 
147 United States ex rel. Carter, 305 F.R.D. at 232. 
148 Id. at 242.   
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In addressing the remaining requests, it noted that the proliferation of ESI has 
prompted the courts to “reconsider their disinclination to authorize cost shifting.”149  
The court analyzed the rules discussed above and concluded that a balancing test 
weighing the benefits and burdens of the discovery applies “regardless of the 
documents’ original medium, whether it be code or pulp.”150 It analyzed Rowe, 
Zubulake, and their progeny and concluded that even as the distinction between 
accessible and inaccessible ESI has gained prominence, “this preference for cost-
shifting has been extended beyond merely inaccessible ESI.”151   
Citing the remaining discovery’s marginal relevance, the court applied the 
Zubulake factors to deny plaintiffs’ motion to compel restoration of additional backup 
tapes unless they paid for it.152  In defining price, the court held: “As to all ESI, whether 
accessible or inaccessible . . . Plaintiffs will bear the cost of searching and recovery.  
Defendants, however, will bear the cost of production.”153 In shifting the costs of 
restoration, as well as the costs to search for relevant information, it rejected earlier 
norms and articulated a “preference for cost-shifting . . . beyond merely inaccessible 
ESI.”154   
Shortly before publication of this Article, in a decision that may become the new 
“gold standard,” the court in Lawson v. Spirit Aerosystems, Inc. applied Rule 
26(b)(1)’s proportionality standard to cost shifting.155 In contesting an alleged breach 
of a non-compete, plaintiff sought discovery of accessible information relating to 
business overlap between defendant and a non-party.156 Plaintiff engaged in a 
“scattershot” approach, requesting defendant search over a hundred custodians’ 
ESI,157 using as many as 803 terms, including common terms like “paint”.158 When 
sampling showed few responsive documents, most “technically responsive” but 
“largely irrelevant,”159 plaintiffs demanded use of predictive coding.160 Defendant 
explained the issue of “business overlap” was so broad that traditional eDiscovery 
 
149 Id. at 237–38. 
150 Id. at 237. 
151 Id. at 240. 
152 Id. at 242–44, 247.   
153 Id. at 247. 
154 Id. at 240.   
155 Lawson v. Spirit AeroSystems, Inc., No. 18-1100-EFM-ADM, 2020 WL 3288058, at *1 
(D. Kan. June 18, 2020), aff'd, No. 18-1100-EFM, 2020 WL 6939752 (D. Kan. Nov. 24, 2020).  
156 Id.   
157 Id. at *3 (plaintiff demanded defendant search 69 custodians, plus each custodians’ 
assistant’s ESI). 
158 Id. at *3, *5, *17-18. 
159 Id. at *5. 
160 Id. at *6.   
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processes were ineffective and began more targeted collections based on custodian 
interviews. The court warned plaintiff, repeatedly, of the risk of cost shifting if they 
pursued their original eDiscovery requests, but plaintiff persisted.161 After a search of 
its original collection using predictive coding yielded few relevant documents, 
defendant filed its motion to shift costs, pursuant to Rule 26(c).162  
In ruling on the motion, the court applied Rule 26(b)(1)’s proportionality 
factors.163 Each factor pointed to cost shifting, but the court, in two separate decisions, 
emphasized the final two factors: When the court examined whether the discovery 
sought information “at the very heart of the litigation,”164 the court found the 
predictive coding that plaintiff demanded, as predicted by three earlier sampling 
efforts, added nothing of value.165 At the same time, plaintiff exacerbated the problem 
by demanding a “bloated ESI collection” from custodians unlikely to have relevant 
information, resulting in large volumes and low responsiveness rates, which plaintiff 
sought to remedy by demanding a high recall rate.166 The result is not surprising: After 
warning plaintiff three times about shifting costs, the court shifted costs, $754,029.46 
for the predictive coding review.167 The court’s analysis is, however, remarkable for 
its careful application of the proportionality factors, and its adherence to the default 
 
161 Id. at *22. 
162 Id. at *8.   
163 It found the parties’ breach of contract claim did not implicate any broad societal issues, 
and the amount in controversy large but less relevant because the defendant had already borne 
significant discovery expenses and produced significant discovery. In examining the parties’ 
relative access to information, the court noted defendant had produced relevant information 
regarding contended areas of business overlap, while plaintiff had not pursued any necessary 
third-party discovery. Regarding resources, it found defendant a Fortune 500 company enduring 
massive layoffs, while an investment company, pursuant to an indemnification agreement, had 
a subrogated interest in plaintiffs claim and funded plaintiff’s litigation costs. Id. at *3, *11-14.  
164 Id. at *15 (citing Oxbow Carbon & Minerals LLC v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 322 F.R.D. 1, 
8 (D.D.C. 2017)). 
165 Id. at * 7; Lawson v. Spirit AeroSystems, Inc., No. 18-1100-EFM-ADM, 2020 WL 
6343292, at *1 (D. Kan. Oct. 29, 2020), aff'd, No. 18-1100-EFM, 2020 WL 6939752 (D. Kan. 
Nov. 24, 2020). 
166 Lawson, 2020 WL 3288058, at *20. Recall is defined as: “The fraction of Relevant 
Documents that are identified as Relevant by a search or review effort.” Maura R. Grossman & 
Gordon V. Cormack, The Grossman-Cormack Glossary of Technology Assisted Review, 7 FED. 
CT. L. REV. 1, 27 (2013).     
167 The court “mindful of the default rule that the producing party should ordinarily bear the 
costs of production [found] good cause to require both parties to bear some portion of the 
expenses for the overall ESI/TAR process.” It went on to find defendant had already borne 
approximately $150,000 through the ESI sampling exercises and imposed the remainder, 
approximately $750,000 in costs associated with plaintiff’s request defendant utilize predictive 
coding on plaintiff. Lawson, 2020 WL 3288058, at *1, *22; Lawson, 2020 WL 6343292, at *1; 
Lawson, 2020 WL 6939752, at *1.  
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rule for core discovery: the requesting party bore the costs of sampling and the more 
targeted collections that produced relevant documents.168   
The courts’ increased willingness to shift costs is also embodied in decisions that 
spend little time applying proportionality factors and focus instead on fairness. In 
Boeynaems v. L.A. Fitness, Int’l, LLC, putative class plaintiffs sought accessible ESI, 
including email from seven custodians, and “member notes” from a customer 
database, which the defendant estimated would cost almost $600,000 to produce.169  
In ruling on the requests, the court focused on fairness: “Discovery need not be perfect, 
but discovery must be fair.”170 The court noted discovery in this case was 
asymmetrical, with the defendants producing many more documents than plaintiffs, 
and allowing the requested discovery would “dramatically increase the economic 
pressure on the defendant.”171   
 The court held that “where the cost of producing documents is very significant, 
the Court has the power to allocate the cost of discovery, and doing so is fair.”172 The 
court mandated “fair and appropriate” cost allocation concluding that “where (1) class 
certification is pending, and (2) the plaintiffs have asked for very extensive discovery, 
compliance with which will be very expensive, that absent compelling equitable 
circumstances to the contrary, the plaintiffs should pay for the discovery they seek.”173   
This general fairness inquiry extends beyond discovery related to class 
certification. One sees the same analysis in breach of contract and breach of warranty 
actions; gender discrimination and retaliation cases, whether brought by individuals 
or commercial entities.174   
Courts have split the costs of producing email from two hard drives because 
“fairness and efficiency” require it.175 Without any legal analysis, courts will “share 
equally” the cost of a forensic examination or the costs to obtain documents because 
 
168 Lawson, 2020 WL 3288058, at *22. 
169 Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int’l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331, 340 (E.D. Pa. 2012); see also Craig 
B. Shaffer, The “Burdens” of Applying Proportionality, 16 SEDONA CONF. J. 55, 90–91 n.97 
(2015).  
170 Boeynaems, 285 F.R.D. at 333. 
171 Id. at 334.   
172 Id. at 335. 
173 Id. at 341. Compare Schweinfurth v. Motorola, Inc., No. 1:05CV0024, 2008 WL 
4449081, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2008) (“Because the sheer size of the discovery already 
produced . . . and the immense size of the discovery now ordered to be produced . . . the Court 
finds cost shifting is reasonable and fair.”), with Fleisher v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., No. 11 Civ. 
8405, 2012 WL 6732905, at *3–5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2012) (“The presumption created by 
Boeynaems has never been adopted in this circuit.”).   
174 See, e.g., Juster Acquisition Co. v. N. Hudson Sewage Auth., No. 12-3427, 2013 WL 
541972, at *3–6 (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 2013); Couch v. Wan, No. CV08–1621, 2011 WL 2551546, 
at *3–4 (E.D. Cal. June 24, 2011). 
175 Haka v. Lincoln Cnty., 246 F.R.D. 577, 579 (W.D. Wis. 2007).   
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“it seems fair to assume [they] will entail some cost.”176 Courts will split the costs of 
producing ESI because the parties didn’t cooperate and the disputed discovery would 
cost “at least $10,000 and produce gigabytes of ESI.”177 Courts will shift costs of 
future discovery because previous discovery was unproductive.178 Courts will reject 
cost shifting because of the “extravagance” of the litigation.179 Courts will reject cost 
shifting after finding the discovery to date was “reasonable.”180 Courts will also deny 
discovery outright because it is just too expensive: $35,000 is “too high of a cost for 
the production of the requested ESI in this type of action,” i.e. a gender discrimination 
claim.181 Accessibility is no longer the touchstone in many cases. “Fairness” is.   
District courts confront cost-shifting issues in the context of either a motion for 
protective order or a motion to compel discovery.182 In either context, the courts 
exercise broad discretion, with appellate review limited to abuse of that discretion, or, 
in some cases, a “gross abuse of discretion.”183 An analysis of the courts’ application 
of that broad discretion shows an evolution. First, for decades, cost-shifting motions 
came rarely and fell on deaf ears. The presumption that the responding party pay the 
cost of the response, apart from copying charges, was enforced. Now, cost shifting is 
“no longer rare.”184 Research for this Article suggests that it is routine. Second, the 
standard applied by the courts to evaluate cost shifting has evolved. It has shifted from 
consideration of the “cost of doing business”; to marginal utility; to multi-factor cost-
shifting analyses; and now inquiries into proportionality and whether cost shifting just 
 
176 URS Corp. v. Isham, No. 09–2955, 2010 WL 2428841, at *3 (D.S.C. June 11, 2010); 
Verigy US, Inc. v. Mayder, No. C07-04330 RMW, 2008 WL 4786621, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 
30, 2008).   
177 Lubber, Inc. v. Optari LLC, No. 11–0042, 2012 WL 899631, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 15, 
2012); Covad Commc’ns Co. v. Revonet, Inc., 254 F.R.D. 147, 151 (D.D.C. 2008) (splitting 
costs of review “[s]ince both parties went through the same stop sign” in failing to collaborate 
regarding ESI productions). 
178 Self v. Equilon Enters. LLC, No. 00CV1903, 2007 WL 427964, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 2, 
2007). 
179 E & J Gallo Winery v. Encana Energy Servs. Inc., No. CV-F-03-5412, 2004 WL 7342781, 
at *3 (E.D. Cal. 2004).  
180 Robert v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Brown Cnty., No. 08–2150, 2009 WL 1362530, at *1 
(D. Kan. May 14, 2009). 
181 Rodriguez-Torres v. Gov’t Dev. Bank of P.R., 265 F.R.D. 40, 44 (D.P.R. 2010) (rejecting 
production of ESI in employment discrimination claim); accord Complaint at 19, Rodriguez-
Torres, 265 F.R.D. 40 (No. 09–1151) (seeking reinstatement and damages in excess of $1 
million). 
182 See, e.g., Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630, 634 (D. Kan. 2006); Zubulake v. 
UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  
183 Kilpatrick v. King, 499 F.3d 759, 766 (8th Cir.2007); see, e.g., Seattle Times, Co. v. 
Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984); Dove v. Atl. Cap. Corp., 963 F.2d 15, 19 (2d Cir. 1992); 
FTC v. Shaffner, 626 F.2d 32, 38 (7th Cir. 1980).  
184 Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int’l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331, 336 (E.D. Pa. 2012).  
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seems “fair.” The majority of decisions reviewed for this Article offer more than a 
generalized fairness inquiry: they consider the factors identified in McPeek, Rowe, and 
Zubulake, and the proportionality factors now found in Rule 26(b)(1). And those 
factors form the basis of a reasoned inquiry, but they remain problematic.   
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE APPLICATION 
This Part describes the remarkable variability in the courts’ application of the 
factors outlined in Rowe, Zubulake, and the revised proportionality standard in Rule 
26(b)(1). Scholars examining these factors in the context of Rule 26(b)(1) have 
concluded that “implementing the proportionality standard will in many cases require 
quantifying benefits implicated by intrinsically nonquantifiable factors.”185 The 
factors provide judges with explicit “equitable discretion to consider normative 
issues” subject to the same advantages and disadvantages of other balancing tests: it 
allows judges to consider case-specific issues; it also involves “subjectivity and a 
reduction of predictability.”186 As set out below, that puts it mildly. These factors have 
come to serve as little more than a Rorschach test for litigants and the courts.187   
A. The Importance of the Issues  
Zubulake described the “importance of the issues at stake in the litigation” as a 
“critical consideration” albeit “one that will rarely be invoked.”188 After widespread 
debate, the 2015 revisions to the proportionality factors now suggest that the courts 
should consider this factor first and foremost.189   
Examining the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation makes sense. The 
Sedona Conference Principles on Proportionality recognize that “nonmonetary factors 
should be considered.”190 Common sense suggests that resolving a contract dispute 
between two parties,191 while important to the parties, is less important to society than 
 
185 Jonah B. Gelbach & Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Law and Economics of Proportionality in 
Discovery, 50 GA. L. REV. 1093, 1117 (2016). 
186 Id. at 1118. 
187 This Part follows the language and order of the factors set out in revised Rule 26(b)(1), 
with the remaining Zubulake factors addressed as part of the cost-benefit analysis.   
188 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
189 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. 
190 Sedona Conference, Commentary on Proportionality in Electronic Discovery, 18 SEDONA 
CONF. J. 141, 168 (2017) [hereinafter Sedona Conference, Commentary on Proportionality]. 
191 See, e.g., Xpedior Creditor Tr. v. Credit Suisse First Bost. (USA), Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 
459, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“This litigation involves a contract dispute between sophisticated 
commercial entities, and therefore does not raise the kind of public policy issues that might 
affect cost-shifting.”); OpenTV v. Liberate Techs., 219 F.R.D. 474, 479 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (“This 
is an infringement action. While parties certainly have an interest in protecting their intellectual 
property rights, there is no indication that this case presents novel issues. As such, this factor is 
neutral.”) 
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litigation over civil rights, health care, the environment, and other instances where the 
civil justice system immediately shapes the world in which we live.192   
The problem is that there is no consensus on what should be considered public 
interest litigation. Judge Scheindlin suggests that some cases have the potential for 
broad public impact: “Cases of this ilk might include toxic tort class actions, 
environmental actions, so-called ‘impact’ or social reform litigation, cases involving 
criminal conduct, or cases implicating important legal or constitutional questions.”193   
Judge Scheindlin does not include discrimination in the workplace: “Claims of 
discrimination are common, and while discrimination is an important problem, this 
litigation does not present a particularly novel issue. If I were to consider the issues in 
this discrimination case sufficiently important to weigh in the cost-shifting analysis, 
then this factor would be virtually meaningless.”194 Some courts agree with this.195   
Some do not. In Chen-Oster v. Goldman Sachs & Co., a putative class action 
alleging gender discrimination in the workplace, Judge Francis applied the 
proportionality factors in Rule 26(b)(2)(C) and concluded “the importance of this 
litigation is not measured in dollars alone; the plaintiffs seek to vindicate the civil 
rights of the class members, and thus further an important public interest.”196 Judge 
Francis cited to the 1983 Advisory Committee Notes discussing adoption of the 
proportionality standard: The rule “recognizes that many cases in public policy 
spheres, such as employment practices, free speech, and other matters, may have 
importance far beyond the monetary amount involved.”197 As Judge Francis notes, the 
very first example given by the Advisory Committee is employment litigation.198   
So, is discrimination in the workplace an important issue for which broad 
discovery should be permitted? Should it depend on whether the litigants appeared 
before Judge Francis in the Southern District of New York or Judge Scheindlin in the 
Southern District of New York? Should it depend on whether the responding party 
invokes the proportionality standard under Rule 26(b)(1), the accessibility standard in 
Rule 26(b)(2)(B), or undue burden under Rule 26(c)?   
 
192 See Lawson v. Spirit AeroSystems, Inc., No. 18-1100-EFM-ADM, 2020 WL 3288058, 
at *11 (D. Kan. June 18, 2020); Adam Liptak & Alicia Parlapiano, Major Supreme Court Cases 
in 2015, N.Y TIMES (June 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/us/major-
supreme-court-cases-in-2015.html?_r=0.    
193 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 321. 
194 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
195 Quinby v. WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94, 110 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Semsroth v. City of 
Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630, 638–41 (D. Kan. 2006); OpenTV v. Liberate Techs., 219 F.R.D. 474, 
479 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 
196 Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 285 F.R.D. 294, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); see also 
Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, No. 05-3091, 2009 WL 3446761, at *4, *6 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2009), 
aff’d, 720 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D.N.J. 2010) (“This case involves allegations of racial 
discrimination by public employees. In such an instance, it is not unreasonable to permit broad 
discovery. . . . [P]laintiffs are pursuing issues of paramount public importance.”). 
197 Chen-Oster, 285 F.R.D. at 306.   
198 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee’s notes to 1983 & 2015 amendments. 
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Recent qui tam cases offer another example of disparate outcomes. In United 
States ex rel. Carter v. Bridgepoint Education, Inc., discussed above, the court 
summarily rejected plaintiff’s suggestion that a potential $2 billion recovery going to 
the federal treasury warranted broad discovery.199 The court ordered plaintiff to forgo 
discovery of disputed backup tapes or bear its costs, and it split the costs for all future 
discovery whether accessible or not.200   
In contrast, in United States ex rel. Guardiola v. Renown Health, the court rejected 
defendant’s cost-shifting request related to production of email from backup tapes.  
“Because liability and corresponding recovery will recompense the public, this factor 
weighs against cost shifting.”201 The court rejected notions “that this case is simply 
about a transfer of wealth from one party to another. Instead, qui tam actions are an 
important means of addressing fraud claims on behalf of taxpayers and the United 
States. That fact imbues this case with heightened importance.”202      
One finds the same variability elsewhere. In Hawa v. Coatesville Area School, a 
federal judge sitting in Pennsylvania found a retaliation claim against a local 
government involved important issues that weighed against cost shifting.203 In Haka 
v. Lincoln Co., a federal judge sitting in Wisconsin attached no significance to 
plaintiff’s retaliation claim against a local government, finding neither plaintiff nor 
the local government had a lot of money so cost-sharing was warranted.204 In Couch 
v. California, the court omitted all reference to the importance of the issues in a 
retaliation claim involving allegations of prison management-condoned drug 
trafficking and assault. 205    
Are retaliation claims important in Pennsylvania but not Wisconsin or California?  
Is qui tam litigation important in Nevada but not California? Do employment cases or 
qui tam litigation or retaliation claims have greater “significance . . . as measured in 
philosophic, social, or institutional terms”206 than anti-trust or environmental or 
products liability litigation? Is there any way to determine the importance of the issues 
at stake during the litigation? This factor, as currently stated, defies uniform 
 
199 United States ex rel. Carter v. Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., 305 F.R.D. 225, 235 (S.D. Cal. 
2015).  
200 Id. at 242, 244, 247; see also United States ex rel. Garbe v. Kmart Corp., No. 12-CV-881, 
2014 WL 12787823, at *4 (S.D. Ill. May 2, 2014). 
201 United States ex rel. Guardiola v. Renown Health, No. 3:12–cv–00295, 2015 WL 
5056726, at *11 (D. Nev. Aug. 25, 2015).    
202 Id. at *8.  
203 Hawa v. Coatesville Area Sch. Dist., No. 15-4828, 2017 WL 1021026, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 
Mar. 16, 2017). 
204 Haka v. Lincoln Cnty., 246 F.R.D. 577, 578–79 (W.D. Wis. 2007).   
205 Couch v Wan, No. CV08–1621, 2011 WL 2971118, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 20, 2011); 
Couch v. Wan, No. CV08–1621, 2011 WL 2551546, at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 24, 2011); Second 
Amended Complaint at 2, Couch v. California, No. CV08–1621, 2010 WL 3708821, at ¶ 1 (E.D. 
Cal. July 8, 2010). 
206 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment. 
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application. Yet, with the 2015 revisions elevating the importance of this factor, its 
importance has grown, and along with it the need to develop more objective measures.     
B. The Amount in Controversy 
What is the “amount in controversy”? This seemingly easy question begets more 
difficult ones. How do you objectively measure the amount in controversy early in a 
case? How do you meaningfully compare that amount to the total cost of production?  
This factor has been characterized as the most objective of the factors in the cost-
shifting analysis,207 but the courts’ discussion of this factor is dominated by conclusory 
statements. 
In some cases, there is a clear, objective measure of the amount in controversy, i.e. 
a dispute over a $100 million insurance policy or a settlement agreement.208 In most 
other cases, estimates have become tools of  advocacy and a poor measure of 
proportionality.   
Courts routinely confront high-ball, low-ball estimates and paint broad-brush 
strokes from them. In Zubulake, the court asked the parties to estimate damages 
assuming a verdict for plaintiff: defendant estimated a high of $1.3 million; plaintiff 
estimated $19.2 million.209 The court found it impossible to assess the accuracy of 
either assessment, but concluded that the case had the potential for a multi-million 
dollar recovery and “[w]hatever else might be said, this is not a nuisance value case, 
a small case or a frivolous case.”210   
Other courts end up in a similar place. In United States ex rel. Guardiola, plaintiffs 
suggested a “multimillion dollar recovery;” defendants suggested it is “impossible to 
analyze this factor because the amount in controversy is not certain.” 211 The court was 
left to conclude: “this is not a nuisance value case, a small case, or a frivolous case,” 
and “assuming this to be a multi-million-dollar case” the cost of the discovery is not 
disproportionate.212    
Many litigants simply ignore the issue, leaving the court to guess. In OpenTV v. 
Liberate Technologies, the court concluded: 
While the parties failed to provide the Court with any of the necessary figures 
to analyze the total cost of production compared with the amount in 
controversy . . . the Court has no doubt that this infringement action has the 
 
207 Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note 185, at 1096. 
208 Clean Harbors Env’t Servs., Inc. v. ESIS, Inc., No. 09 C 3789, 2011 WL 1897213, at *3–
6 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2011); Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. NWI-I, Inc., 240 F.R.D. 401, 
412 (N.D. Ill. 2007).  
209 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 287–88 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
210 Id. at 288; see also United States ex rel. Guardiola v. Renown Health, No. 3:12–cv–
00295, 2015 WL 5056726, at *10 (D. Nev. Aug. 25, 2015). 
211 United States ex rel. Guardiola, 2015 WL 5056726, at *10. 
212 Id.; see also Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 575 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
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potential for recovery in the hundreds of thousands of dollars” and “the cost 
of production is likely to pale in comparison.213   
In Semsroth v. City of Wichita, neither party addressed plaintiffs’ possible 
recovery, leaving the court to examine the record, and conclude “the costs of restoring 
and searching the e-mail back-up tape does not seem excessive when compared to the 
possible amount in controversy.”214   
Some courts just ignore the issue, discuss the cost of production without reference 
to the amount in controversy, and conclude that cost shifting is appropriate.215 Other 
courts hold the parties’ inability to determine the amount in controversy weighs in 
favor of cost shifting, “unknown damages cannot justify exorbitant discovery 
requests.”216   
In other cases, courts adopt without analysis one party’s estimate of compensatory 
damages, without reference to other requested relief. In Haka, discussed supra, the 
court cited only defendant’s briefs suggesting the potential recovery was less than six 
figures and concluded “the potential damages are low, so that the cost of engaging in 
the ESI search . . . is disproportionate.”217 The court omitted any reference to plaintiff’s 
claim for injunctive relief, reinstatement to his former position, or his claim for 
statutory damages and attorney’s fees.218 In Rodriquez-Torres v. Government 
Development Bank of Puerto Rico, another retaliation claim, the court found $35,000 
to produce ESI from active email accounts would create an undue burden.219 In doing 
so, the court omitted reference to plaintiff’s complaint seeking $1.4 million in damages 
and her request for injunctive relief, reinstatement to her former position, as well as 
 
213 OpenTV v. Liberate Techs., 219 F.R.D. 474, 478 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 
214 Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630, 638 (D. Kan. 2006) (emphasis added); see 
also Fleisher v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., No. 11 Civ. 8405, 2012 WL 6732905, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 27, 2012) (“[Defendant] has not discussed either the amount in controversy or its own 
resources.”); Hawa v. Coatesville Area Sch. Dist., No. 15-4828, 2017 WL 1021026, at *2 (E.D. 
Pa. Mar. 16, 2017); Black Love Resists in the Rust ex rel. Soto v. City of Buffalo, 334 F.R.D. 
23, 31 (W.D.N.Y. 2019); Zeller v. S. Cent. Emergency Med. Servs., Inc., No. 13–CV–2584, 
2014 WL 2094340, at *10 (M.D. Pa. May 20, 2014). 
215 Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int’l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331, 341 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (citing 
estimated total cost of production of $579,000 without discussion of the amount in controversy 
other than “if, as Plaintiffs anticipate, their class action motion is granted, this case will suddenly 
turn from a routine case to a major financial exposure for Defendant”); Rodriguez-Torres v. 
Gov’t Dev. Bank of P.R., 265 F.R.D. 40, 44 (D.P.R. 2010) (citing $35,000 estimated cost of 
production without reference to $1.4 million demand set out in plaintiff’s complaint). 
216 First Niagara Risk Mgmt., Inc. v. Folino, 317 F.R.D. 23, 28 (E.D. Pa. 2016). 
217 Haka v. Lincoln Cnty., 246 F.R.D. 577, 579 (W.D. Wis. 2007); see also Novick v. AXA 
Network, LLC, No. 07 Civ. 7767, 2013 WL 5338427, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2013) (simply 
concluding that “the amount in controversy is small”). 
218 Complaint at 12, Haka, 246 F.R.D. 577 (No. 06—594–c). 
219 Rodriguez-Torres, 265 F.R.D. at 44. 
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attorney’s fees.220 In Couch v. Wan, the court concluded that the estimated cost of 
$54,000 to produce relevant ESI imposed a sufficient burden to warrant cost shifting, 
again without reference to plaintiff’s request for declaratory and injunctive relief.221   
Courts will determine the value of a request for injunctive relief to decide if there is 
subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity, but they will ignore it when deciding 
cost shifting.222   
The question remains: are these broad-brush conclusions sufficient? Should the 
proportionality and cost-shifting analysis depend on whether Zubulake was a $1.3 
million case or ten times that much? Is it sufficient for the courts to find the cost of 
production likely to “pale in comparison?“223 Can a court, in the midst of discovery, 
reasonably adopt one party’s estimate or consider only one of the remedies sought?  
In analyzing this factor, courts end up offering cursory assessments based on litigants’ 
highball-lowball estimates and incomplete information.  
C. The Parties’ Relative Access to Information 
In response to public comments, the Advisory Committee added a new factor to 
the proportionality standard in the 2015 revisions: the analysis now considers “the 
parties’ relative access to relevant information.”224 The Advisory Committee Notes 
suggest the factor is intended to address the “asymmetric distribution of information” 
found in some cases, which “often mean[s] that the burden of responding to discovery 
lies heavier on the party who has more information, and properly so.”225     
There is little case law specifically analyzing this factor, and the courts that do 
analyze it, do not struggle with it. In Oxbow Carbon & Minerals LLC v. Union Pacific 
Railroad Co., the court that found neither party disputed that plaintiff’s CEO 
possessed “relevant, unique information, and there appears to be no other way for 
Defendants to obtain this information.”226 The factor favored granting defendant’s 
motion to compel and denying plaintiffs attempts to shift costs.227 The court in First 
Niagara Risk Management, Inc. v. Folino adopted similar reasoning: Defendant “has 
 
220  Civil Cover Sheet, Rodriguez-Torres, 265 F.R.D. 40 (No. 09–1151). Cf. Disability Rts. 
Council of Greater Wash. v. Wash. Metro. Transit Auth., 242 F.R.D. 139, 148 (D.D.C. 2007) 
(ordering production of ESI based on importance of the issues and requested injunctive relief.). 
221 Couch v. Wan, No. CV08–1621, 2011 WL 2551546, at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 24, 2011); 
Second Amended Complaint at 1, Couch v. California, No. CV08–1621, 2010 WL 3708821, at 
¶ 8 (E.D. Cal. July 8, 2010). 
222 Compare McCarty v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 595 F.2d 389, 3890–95 (7th Cir. 1979); 
Rodriguez-Torres v. Gov't Dev. Bank of Puerto Rico, 265 F.R.D. 40, 44 (D.P.R. 2010). 
223 OpenTV v. Liberate Techs., 219 F.R.D. 474, 476–79 (N.D. Cal. 2003); Fleisher v. 
Phoenix Life Ins. Co., No. 11 Civ. 8405, 2012 WL 6732905, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2012). 
224 2014 Judicial Conference Summary Report, supra note 21, at Rules App. B-8. 
225 Id. at B-40–B-41. This means recognizing that in such cases “one party must bear greater 
burdens in responding to discovery than the other party bears.” Id. at B-8. 
226 Oxbow Carbon & Mins. LLC v. Union P.R.R., 322 F.R.D. 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2017). 
227 Id. 
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access to the information on his emails and text messages while First Niagara does 
not, so the third factor weights in favor of First Niagara.” 228   
At the same time, this factor raises more difficult issues. Courts regularly consider 
the availability of the information from other sources.229 In Wiginton v. CB Richard 
Ellis, Inc., for example, the court held “there is reason to believe that the requested 
discovery would assist in resolving the issues . . . but because there is also other 
evidence to support Plaintiffs’ claims, we find that this factor weighs slightly in favor 
of cost-shifting.”230    
In many respects this is a commonsense inquiry into whether the disputed cost is 
necessary in the first place and whether the information can be obtained more 
efficiently from other sources. The Sedona Conference Proportionality Principles 
suggest that discovery should be “obtained from the most convenient, least 
burdensome, and least expensive source.”231 The 2006 Advisory Committee Notes 
addressing inaccessible sources suggest examining “the quantity of information 
available from other and more easily accessed sources.”232    
This commonsense approach falters because courts interpret “availability from 
other resources” in very different ways. Rowe and Zubulake state the question 
narrowly: they ask about “availability of such information from other sources.”233 The 
discussion makes clear that they are looking for the same document from a more 
accessible source.   
According to Rowe, courts have shifted costs “because equivalent information 
either has already been made available or is accessible in a different format.”234 Rowe 
cites to cases where the information was originally produced in hard copy and the 
requesting party sought the same information again in electronic form. Courts 
following Rowe and Zubulake do the same.235   
Other courts ask a different question. Is the same type of information available 
from a less expensive source? In Byers v. Illinois State Police, the court agreed with 
defendants that “depositions would be a more practical method” for obtaining the 
 
228 First Niagara Risk Mgmt., Inc. v. Folino, 317 F.R.D. 23, 28 (E.D. Pa. 2016).  
229 Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 574–75 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
230 Id. at 577. 
231 Sedona Conference, Commentary on Proportionality, supra note 190, at 154. 
232 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C) advisory committee’s note to the 2006 amendment.  
233 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(emphasis added); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (emphasis added); Rowe Ent., Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (emphasis added). 
234 Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 430 (emphasis added). 
235 Xpedior Creditor Tr. v. Credit Suisse First Bos. (USA), Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 459, 466 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“The documents sought are unavailable from any other source. Although hard 
copies may exist of some requested information . . . the critical pricing, valuation, and customer 
correspondence that Xpedior has requested . . . is only available from the DLJ servers. This 
factor does not favor cost-shifting.”). 
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information.236 In Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Earl Scheib, Inc., the 
court found the costs of email discovery disproportionate, because plaintiff would 
receive “a significant amount of relevant financial data” from other sources and have 
“the opportunity to depose Defendant’s employees.”237 In patent litigation, courts 
direct the parties elsewhere by restricting email discovery in order “to address the 
imbalance of benefit and burden resulting from email production.”238 
Other courts reject the idea that the requesting party should look to other 
documents or take depositions because they are cheaper. They find that “efficiency” 
comes at too high a price:   
Defendant argues that plaintiffs can more efficiently secure pertinent 
information concerning defendant's “practices” or “policies” through 
interrogatories and Rule 30(b)(6) depositions. However, defendant fails to 
explain how it can prepare complete interrogatory answers or Rule 30(b)(6) 
deposition answers without reviewing defendant's email correspondence. 
Moreover, documents and correspondence are powerful evidence and a party 
is generally entitled to review relevant documents rather than “take an 
opposing party's word.”239   
In rejecting claims that the same information can be obtained from cheaper 
sources, some courts acknowledge that “email has become the principal form of 
workplace communication”240 and because it “contains the precise words used by the 
author” it is “a particularly powerful form of proof at trial when offered as an 
admission of a party opponent.”241 Litigants suggest the same for social media—
 
236 Byers v. Ill. State Police, No. 99 C 8105, 2002 WL 1264004, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 
2002). 
237 Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Earl Scheib, Inc., No. 11–CV–0788, 2013 WL 485846, at *4 
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2013); see also Martin v. HAPO Cmty. Credit Union, No. CV-04-5109, 2005 
WL 8158778, at *3 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 6, 2005); Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, No. 05-3091, 
2009 WL 3446761, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2009), aff'd, 720 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D.N.J. 2010); 
Navajo Nation Hum. Rts. Comm’n v. San Juan Cnty., No. 16-cv-00154, 2016 WL 3079740, at 
*2, *4 (D. Utah May 31, 2016); Wood v. Cap. One Servs., LLC, No. 09–CV–1445, 2011 WL 
2154279, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2011). 
238 See, e.g., Hoist Fitness Sys. Inc. v. TuffStuff Fitness Int’l, No. EDCV 17-1388, 2019 WL 
121195, at *3, *5–6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2019) (requiring defendant to pay for the cost of 
production of the first 5,000 emails and shifting the remainder to plaintiff).  
239 Spieker v. Quest Cherokee, LLC, No. 07–1225, 2009 WL 2168892, at *4 (D. Kan. July 
21, 2009); see also Kipperman v. Onex Corp., 260 F.R.D. 682, 691 (N.D. Ga. May 27, 2009) 
(“The court believes that some of the most interesting evidence in this matter has come from e-
mail production.”); Hawa v. Coatesville Area Sch. Dist., No. 15-4828, 2017 WL 1021026, at 
*2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2017) (rejecting responding party’s argument that an investigative grand 
jury report provided an adequate substitute for plaintiff’s conducting their own investigation). 
240 United States ex rel. Guardiola v. Renown Health, No. 12–cv–00295, 2015 WL 5056726, 
at *7 (D. Nev. Aug. 25, 2015). 
241 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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deposition testimony does not replace social media discovery.242 And courts have 
reached the same conclusion with regard to tangible evidence, finding that 
photographs don’t replace inspections, even if they cost more.243   
In cases involving information asymmetry, litigants routinely argue about a related 
point—the responding party has already produced a lot of information; it shouldn’t 
have to produce more. 244 Some courts accept that argument: “In the Court’s view the 
most important considerations are the fact that defendants have already produced tens 
of thousands of relevant documents”245 or defendant “has already produced many 
documents in response to plaintiffs’ request” and further production would be “unduly 
burdensome.”246 Some courts reject that logic.247 In Juster Acquisition Co., LLC v. 
North Hudson Sewerage Auth., for example, the court held that if the information is 
relevant and the request proportional, it is “irrelevant” that the responding party has 
already turned over 8,000 pages.248     
This again raises the question: have they produced the “equivalent information”?  
Is this a question of seeking the same document from a more accessible location or the 
same type of information? Does production of some relevant information, excuse 
production of other relevant information?    
D. The Parties’ Resources 
Analysis of the parties’ resources compared to the cost of production presents 
similar challenges. Rowe notes that “the ability of each party to bear the costs of 
discovery may be an appropriate consideration.”249 Zubulake examines “the total cost 
 
242 See, e.g., Charles W. Cohen & Ignatius A. Grande, The New Constant–Death, Taxes, and 
… Social Media?, BLOOMBERG LAW (Apr. 3, 2013), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/tech-and-
telecom-law/the-new-constantsdeath-taxes-andsocial-media.  
243 Guadet v. GE Indus. Servs., No. 15-795, 2016 WL 2594812, at *4 (E.D. La. May 5, 
2016).  
244 Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., No. 97–2307, 1999 WL 462015, at *6 (Mass. Super. June 16, 
1999); Juster Acquisition Co., LLC v. N. Hudson Sewerage Auth., LLC, No. 12–3427, 2013 
WL 541972, at *2, *5 (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 2013); Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int’l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 
331, 340 (E.D. Pa. 2012); Fleisher v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., No. 11 Civ. 8405, 2012 WL 
6732905, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2012); In re XPRT Ventures, LLC v. eBay, Inc., No. 10–
cv–00595, 2011 WL 13142141, at *14 (D. Del. June 15, 2011).   
245 Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, No. 05-3091, 2009 WL 3446761, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 
2009), aff’d, 720 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D.N.J. 2010). 
246 Linnen, 1999 WL 462015, at *6; see also Fleisher, 2012 WL 6732905, at *1; Juster 
Acquisition Co., LLC, 2013 WL 541972, at *3–6; Boeynaems, 285 F.R.D. at 334; Cognex Corp. 
v. Electro Sci. Indus., Inc., No. Civ.A. 01CV10287, 2002 WL 32309413, at *5 (D. Mass. July 
2, 2002). 
247 See, e.g., Linnen, 1999 WL 462015, at *6. 
248 Juster Acquisition Co., 2013 WL 541972, at *3–6. 
249 Rowe Ent., Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
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of production, compared to the resources available to each party.”250 The accessibility 
factors discussed in the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 26(b)(2)(B), and the 
proportionality factors now in Rule 26(b)(1) each examine “the parties’ resources.”251  
There is uniform agreement that the relative resources of the parties is a relevant 
consideration. There is no uniformity in how the courts apply this factor.   
How do you define the scope of the parties’ resources? The 1983 Advisory 
Committee Notes make clear that examination of “the parties’ resources” was intended 
to protect the “financially weak litigant” from excessive discovery.252 Some courts 
have expressly cited this factor to do so: courts have declined to shift the costs of 
depositions where “the financial burden on the individual plaintiff . . . were he to be 
required to pay defendants’ expenses, could seriously thwart his ability to pursue his 
case.”253 Similarly, courts have shifted copying costs to the requesting party where the 
respondent was indigent.254   
Rowe incorporates this focus examining “the ability of each party to bear the costs 
of discovery” noting that in some cases, the cost even if modest in absolute terms 
might outstrip the resources of one of the parties, justifying an allocation of those 
expenses to the other.255 Rowe went on to examine the parties’ individual resources, 
without reference to those of counsel, insurance companies, or other interested 
parties.256     
The language in Zubulake is more expansive. In contrast to Rowe’s inquiry into 
the parties’ ability to bear the costs, Zubulake examines the resources “available to 
each party.”257 Doing so allows consideration of the resources of the parties’ law firms, 
insurance companies, and third-party financing: 
While Zubulake is an accomplished equities trader, she has now been 
unemployed for close to two years. . . . On the other hand, she asserts . . . a 
$19 million claim against UBS. So while UBS’s resources clearly dwarf 
Zubulake’s, she may have the financial wherewithal to cover at least some of 
the cost of restoration. In addition, it is not unheard of for plaintiff’s firms to 
front huge expenses when multi-million dollar recoveries are in sight.258 
 
250 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
251 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) advisory committee note to 2006 
amendment. 
252 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) advisory committee note to 1983 amendment. 
253 Stillman v. Nickel Odeon, S.A., 102 F.R.D. 286, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
254 Simms v. Ctr. for Corr. Health & Pol’y Stud., 272 F.R.D. 36, 40 (D.D.C. 2011). 
255 Rowe Ent., Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(emphasis added). 
256 Id. 
257 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
258 Id. at 287–89.  
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Judge Scheindlin speculates as to plaintiff’s ability to finance the litigation, as well 
as the resources of plaintiff’s counsel, but gives this information limited weight 
finding “this factor weighs against cost shifting, it does not rule it out.”259    
Some courts follow this example by considering the resources of the requesting 
party’s counsel but assigning it limited weight.260 Some have considered the resources 
of the requesting party’s counsel and declined to shift costs.261 Others, however, assign 
this factor great weight. In Boeynaems, the court found:   
Plaintiffs are represented by [a] very successful and well regarded 
Philadelphia firm . . . which has had outstanding successes for many years in 
prosecuting class actions, winning hundreds of millions of dollars for their 
clients, and undoubtedly and deservedly, substantial fees for themselves. If 
the . . . firm believes that this case is meritorious, it has the financial ability 
to make the investment in discovery, to the extent the Court finds that cost 
sharing is otherwise appropriate.262 
Others refuse to consider the resources of counsel altogether. In Fleisher v. 
Phoenix Life Insurance Co., the court noted:  
[The defendant] alluded in general terms to the resources of the plaintiffs or, 
more precisely, the resources of their counsel. However, it is far from clear 
why the resources of counsel should be taken into consideration. Certainly, 
Phoenix has not suggested that the wherewithal of the law firms that it has 
engaged should be weighed in the balance. More importantly, if the assets of 
counsel were to be taken into consideration, the ability of clients to engage 
an attorney of their choice would likely be hampered. 263   
On the whole, there is asymmetrical application of this factor. Courts either 
consider the resources of the plaintiff’s law firm or those of the parties alone. None 
have considered the resources of the responding parties’ counsel or an interested third 
party.   
Regardless of whose resources the courts consider, valuation remains a problem.  
Conclusory statements are again common, and courts vary in deciding how much 
further to go. What sort of objective financial data should the courts require?  Should 
the analysis require more than generalities?   
 
259 Id. 
260 See, e.g., Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 574–77 (N.D. Ill. 2004); 
Xpedior Creditor Tr. v. Credit Suisse First Bos. (USA), Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 459, 465–67 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
261 Hallmark v. Cohen & Slamowitz, LLP, No. 11-CV-842, 2016 WL 1128494, at *15–18 
(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2016). 
262 Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int’l , LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331, 335 (E.D. Pa. 2012). 
263 Fleisher v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., No. 11 Civ. 8405, 2012 WL 6732905, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 27, 2012) (internal citations omitted). 
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Litigants commonly argue about resources in generalities, and some courts reject 
them.264 Many do not: In Open TV v. Liberate Technologies, plaintiffs made 
“conclusory statements” that the cost of production is small compared to the resources 
of the parties, and the court simply found “no reason . . . to believe that either party 
has a lack of resources in the case.”265 In Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 
the defendant simply argued plaintiff was “a large profitable company,” without 
providing any comparison of his own worth or income. The court was left to surmise 
“[b]ased on the voluminous pleadings in the court” that both parties have spent a lot 
on legal services and must be able to bear the cost.266 In Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 
the court observed: 
The parties . . . failed to present any evidence as to the relative financial 
position of the parties, but the court can properly assume that the four 
Plaintiffs have significantly less financial capability to pay these costs than 
does the City. However . . . the City’s ability to shoulder significant discovery 
costs is not comparable to the investment banking organizations in both 
Zubulake and Quinby[.]267   
Other courts go into greater detail. In cases involving individual litigants and small 
businesses, courts have considered affidavits describing the litigants’ living 
circumstances and expenses and the businesses’ profits, losses, and debt loads.268  
With publicly traded companies, they examine annual reports, financial statements, 
and SEC filings to determine assets and net revenue.269 In Hagemeyer North America, 
Inc. v. Gateway Data Sciences Corp., the court reviewed the requesting party’s annual 
reports, annual sales, loss, and equity information and compared that with evidence 
suggesting the responding party had “few, if any, liquid assets,” with “this factor 
favoring cost-shifting.”270 In Xpedior Creditor Trust v. Credit Suisse First Boston, the 
court examined SEC filings to review defendant’s net revenues with those of plaintiffs, 
 
264 See, e.g., Almont Ambulatory Surgery Ctr. LLC., v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., No. CV 14-
03053, 2018 WL 5816108, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2018); Escamilla v. SMS Holdings Corp., 
No. 09-2120, 2011 WL 5025254, at *5 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2011). 
265 OpenTV v. Liberate Techs., 219 F.R.D. 474, 478 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 
266 Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 558 (W.D. Tenn. 2003). 
267 Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630, 639 (D. Kan. 2006). 
268 See, e.g., Bailey v. Brookdale Univ. Hosp. Med. Ctr., No. CV 16-2195, 2017 WL 
2616957, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 16, 2017); Symons Int'l Grp., Inc. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., No. 01cv-
00799, 2015 WL 4392933, at *6 (S.D. Ind. July 15, 2015). 
269 Quinby v. WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94, 110 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Wiginton v. CB Richard 
Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 575–76 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Decision and Order at 7, Hagemeyer N. 
Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Scis. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (No. 97-C-635); 
Xpedior Creditor Tr. v. Credit Suisse First Bos. (USA), Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 459, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003). 
270 Decision and Order at 7, Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc., 222 F.R.D. 594 (No. 97-C-635). 
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to find defendant’s assets “clearly dwarf” plaintiff’s, which weighed against cost 
shifting.271      
In each of these cases, the question remains: what do you do with the numbers?  
Courts look for a large disparity in resources, and, absent that, decline to utilize this 
factor to shift the presumption that the responding party pays. In cases where business 
entities’ resources are more evenly matched, there is little discussion of those 
resources and the courts hold this factor neutral.272   
The more difficult question arises where both parties have limited resources. Is 
that neutral or does that favor cost shifting? In Haka, discussed above, plaintiff was 
unemployed after the defendant county government terminated him and argued that 
he did not have the resources to search the defendant’s ESI. The court found that the 
local county government had limited resources as well and split the costs 50/50.273   
Examining the parties’ resources, like other factors, presents judgment calls.  
Whose resources do you consider, how do you value them, and what do you do with 
that information? This factor, like others, raises more questions than it answers.   
E. The Importance of the Discovery 
The next factor, the importance of the discovery, raises additional questions.  As 
discussed above, courts inquire whether the information sought is available from other 
sources. They reasonably ask, will the discovery uncover relevant information?  Does 
it go to the heart of the matter? Courts, however, answer these questions applying very 
different standards.    
In evaluating the importance of the discovery in dispute, litigants and the courts 
usually don’t know if the information contained in the disputed source is important.  
In Kipperman v. Onex Corporation, the responding party sought to preclude discovery 
of backup tapes or shift its costs because “we don’t know whether there is . . . a single 
e-mail in any way related to this case . . . what we have is a pig in a poke.”274   
Some courts take this uncertainty as a reason to shift costs—there is no proof the 
discovery will produce important information; some courts take this as a reason not to 
shift costs—there is no proof it will not. In Johnson v. Neiman, the court found “it 
most significant that the plaintiff has no idea what, if any, discoverable information 
may be obtained by cataloging, restoring, and searching the . . . e-mails that are stored 
on the backup tapes.”275 In Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, the court found: “Plaintiffs 
 
271 Xpedior Creditor Tr., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 466; see also Wiginton, 229 F.R.D. at 576. 
272 Clean Harbors Env’t Servs., Inc. v. ESIS, Inc., No. 09 C 3789, 2011 WL 1897213, at *4 
(N.D. Ill. May 17, 2011); PSEG Power N.Y., Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., No. 05-CV-
657, 2007 WL 2687670, at *11 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007). 
273 Haka v. Lincoln Cnty., 246 F.R.D. 577, 579 (W.D. Wis. 2007).   
274 Kipperman v. Onex Corp., 260 F.R.D. 682, 689–90 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (requiring the 
responding party search a sample of two tapes, resulting in production of thousands of relevant 
documents); see also Cargill Meat Sols. Corp. v. Premium Beef Feeders, LLC, No. 13-CV-
1168, 2015 WL 3937410, at *4 (D. Kan. June 26, 2015) (asserting, without offering proof, that 
the importance of the discovery was minimal and would “add nothing”).  
275 Johnson v. Neiman, No. 09CV00689, 2010 WL 4065368, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 18, 2010); 
see also Elkharwily v. Franciscan Health Sys., No. 15-cv-05579, 2016 WL 4061575, at *3 
(W.D. Wash. July 29, 2016); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wilkins, No. 10-cv-00674, 2012 WL 570048, at 
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have not produced evidence that the backup or archived e-mails contain relevant 
information that is not otherwise available or cumulative of other evidence. There is, 
of course, a possibility that some of the requested e-mails contain ‘smoking gun’ 
information. However, this is pure conjecture.”276 This supported cost shifting.    
Compare these findings with the decision in Juster Acquisition Co. v. North 
Hudson Sewerage Authority:   
[U]ntil NHSA actually runs the requested searches, neither NHSA nor 
anybody else can know whether the ESI word searches will turn up 
information that would have been available from any other source. . . . NHSA 
fails to show how it would be unreasonably cumulative or duplicative to 
perform the requested ESI discovery. As such, the Court is not compelled to 
impose such a limitation on plaintiff’s requested ESI discovery.277 
The court in Semsroth similarly noted that Defendant had not attempted to view 
any the email on the back-up tapes, despite having restored them, such that 
“Defendants, like Plaintiffs, are merely speculating about the results of any e-mail 
search.”278 Courts deal with uncertainty about unsearched sources very differently.    
In analyzing the importance of the discovery, courts are consistent in asking, do 
the requests go to the heart of the matter? The standard for determining the substantive 
relevancy of the requests, however, varies.  Should it matter if the discovery relates to 
class certification as opposed to merits discovery? In Boeynaems it did: the court held 
that “[w]here the burden of discovery expense is almost entirely on the defendant, 
principally because the plaintiffs seek class certification, then the plaintiffs should 
share the costs.”279 Other courts handling putative class actions have made no 
distinction between cost shifting for discovery relating to certification as opposed to 
merits discovery.280   
Some courts addressing individual claims have rejected Boeynaems because it 
addressed discovery related to class certification.281 In these cases, a more general 
 
*6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2012); Haka, 246 F.R.D. at 578–79; Helmert v. Butterball, LLC, No. 
08CV00342, 2010 WL 2179180, at *9 (E.D. Ark. May 27, 2010). 
276 Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, No. 05-3091, 2009 WL 3446761, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 
2009), aff’d, 720 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D.N.J. 2010). 
277 Juster Acquisition Co. v. N. Hudson Sewerage Auth, No. 12-3427, 2013 WL 541972, at 
*5 (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 2013).  
278 Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630, 638–41 (D. Kan. 2006).   
279 Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int’l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331, 341 (E.D. Pa. 2012); see also Wood 
v. Cap. One Servs., LLC, No. 09-CV-1445, 2011 WL 2154279 at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2011); 
Schweinfurth v. Motorola, Inc., No. 05CV0024, 2008 WL 4449081, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 
2008). 
280 See, e.g., Sung Gon Kang v. Credit Bureau Connection, Inc., No. 18-cv-01359, 2020 WL 
1689708 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2020); Xpedior Creditor Tr. v. Credit Suisse First Bos. (USA), Inc., 
309 F. Supp. 2d 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  
281 Cochran v. Caldera Med., Inc., No. 12-5109, 2014 WL 1608664, at *3 n.3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 
22, 2014). 
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question remains: do the requests seek core or marginally relevant information? It is 
not uncommon for parties to seek cost shifting right out of the starting gate. Litigants 
routinely seek to shift the cost of responding to first requests for production of 
information directly relevant to the action. Rowe dealt with a first request for 
production of documents seeking, e.g., internal communications relating to selection 
of concert promoters where plaintiffs claimed discrimination on the basis of race.282  
The Zubulake opinions dealt with plaintiff’s first request for production of documents 
relating to “communication by or between UBS employees concerning Plaintiff,” 
where plaintiff alleged gender-based discrimination.283 Both courts shifted costs 
associated with these requests.284 Other courts have rejected cost shifting for first 
requests, specifically noting that “defendant has produced no discovery to date.”285   
In some instances, courts analyze specific categories of documents and label them 
“critical,” of “grave importance,” or  
“very important” and this weighs against cost shifting.286 In United States ex rel. 
Carter v. Bridgepoint Education, Inc., the court distinguished between “important” 
discovery and marginally relevant discovery.287 In adjudicating an alleged violation of 
the ban on compensating university recruiters based on enrollment, the court ordered 
production, without cost shifting, of the restoration of the tape that provided access to 
email between recruiters and their supervisors and managers.288 It declined to order 
production of email between recruiters.289   
Yet, other courts shift the cost of discovery going to the heart of the dispute. The 
class in Boeynaems alleged deceptive practices regarding termination of a health club 
membership, and the court held that Plaintiffs must pay 100% of the cost of producing 
“[c]orporate documents stating Defendant’s practices and policies applicable to . . . 
cancellation of memberships.”290 In Multitechnology Services, L.P. v. Verizon 
Southwest, the dispute centered on defendant’s refusal to pay access fees for customers 
utilizing plaintiff’s phone network. Plaintiff propounded discovery that required 
searching defendant’s database to confirm who those customers were, in order to 
determine the scope of the dispute and the amount of damages, yet the court shifted 
 
282 Rowe Ent., Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).   
283 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
284 Id.; see also Cochran, 2014 WL 1608664, at *1; Quinby v. WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94, 
111 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 433.   
285 Cochran, 2014 WL 1608664, at *3 n.3 (emphasis added). 
286 Id.; First Niagara Risk Mgmt., Inc. v. Folino, 317 F.R.D. 23, 28 (E.D. Pa. 2016); 
Unknown Parties v. Johnson, No. CV-15-00250, 2017 WL 7520603, at *7 (D. Ariz. Dec. 19, 
2017). 
287 United States ex. rel. Carter v. Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., 305 F.R.D. 225, 246–47 (S.D. 
Cal. 2015). 
288 Id. at 242.   
289 Id. 
290 Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int’l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331, 342 (E.D. Pa. 2012). 
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half of the costs of the production.291 In these cases, courts identify discovery of 
specific categories of highly relevant information, yet order cost shifting.   
There is, once again, tremendous variability among the courts. In analyzing the 
importance of the discovery in the dispute, some courts penalize litigants for not 
knowing what is on unsearched sources of ESI; some do not. Some courts apply cost 
shifting to requests for production seeking core discovery; some do not. Some courts 
examine whether there is equivalent information more readily accessible; some 
require only the same type of information from cheaper forms of discovery such as 
depositions.   
F. Whether the Burden Outweighs the Benefit 
Most cases ultimately engage in a cost-benefit analysis. Yet, measuring costs 
remains problematic. Courts vary widely in their analysis of the “total cost of 
production.” Some courts consider the cost of the initial request; other courts consider 
the cost of the request as modified after the parties meet and confer. Some courts 
consider only the cost of producing the disputed discovery. Other courts consider the 
total cost of the production to date. When examining the disputed discovery, some 
courts consider only the cost of restoring and searching the data; others consider all 
costs, including the cost of attorney review for responsiveness and privilege. In all 
cases, there are valuation problems: the estimates are tools of advocacy.   
1. Cost of Production – Estimates as Advocacy 
Whether one includes the total cost of discovery or only the cost of the disputed 
discovery, whether one includes the cost of restoration and searching or the total cost 
of production, courts are confronted with responding parties who have an incentive to 
inflate costs to show burden and requesting parties with an incentive to do the 
opposite. And both do so with abandon.   
In Rowe, one defendant estimated the cost of cataloguing, restoring, and 
processing eight backup tapes at $400,000; plaintiffs estimated the same defendant 
could produce responsive information for as little as $24,000.292 Another Rowe 
defendant estimated a cost of $403,000 to produce ESI responsive to plaintiffs’ first 
request for production.293 Plaintiffs’ expert estimated they could produce the same ESI 
for approximately $64,000.294    
In Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., defendants estimated a cost of production in 
the “millions of dollars.” Plaintiffs estimated as low as $183,500.295 In PSEG Power 
New York, Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., defendant estimated a cost of $206,000 
 
291 Multitechnology Servs., L.P. v. Verizon Sw., No. Civ.A. 4:02-CV-702, 2004 WL 
1553480, at *1–2 (N.D. Tex. July 12, 2004); Multitechnology Servs., L.P. v. Verizon Sw., No. 
4:02-CV-702, 2004 WL 594112, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 2004).  
292 Rowe Ent., Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 425, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002). 
293 Id. at 426.   
294 Id. at 427–28.   
295 Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 575 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
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to reproduce its emails. Plaintiff estimated $37,500.296 In Escamilla v. SMS Holdings 
Co., defendant estimated that restoration and searching of relevant backup tapes would 
cost $36 million.297 Plaintiff’s expert estimated one to two percent of that total.298   
Litigants estimate costs based on unrealistic assumptions like assuming “every 
document on the existing database comes up with search terms,”299 or estimating costs 
for “all of its offices nationwide . . . ignoring the fact that discovery has been limited 
to only a small fraction of the 125 offices,”300 or estimating $1.2 – $3.6 million to 
search all of defendant’s servers rather than searching the email of a few key 
custodians,301 or assuming it will take six times longer to complete quality assurance 
than it takes to complete the underlying task.302  
In Boeynaems, when defendant objected to production of records from a database 
containing records of member inquiries and complaints, it estimated a cost to produce 
of $360,000.303 The court found, without analysis, that this represented “a very 
elaborate and expensive undertaking.”304 The briefs showed that it required querying 
a Microsoft SQL database.305 In a more recent example, the responding party 
estimated as much as 300 employee hours to pull individual wage statements for 
employees from a commercial payroll software. 306 The requesting party estimated 
three hours if one used the software’s administrative functions to batch export the 
 
296 PSEG Power N.Y., Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., No. 05-CV-657, 2007 WL 
2687670, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007). 
297 Escamilla v. SMS Holdings Corp., No. 09-2120, 2011 WL 5025254, at *8 (D. Minn. Oct. 
21, 2011).  
298 Id. at *9; see also Haka v. Lincoln Cnty., 246 F.R.D. 577, 578–79 (W.D. Wis. 2007) 
(defendant estimated a cost of $49,000 to produce email contained on two hard drives; Plaintiff 
estimated $27,000). 
299 Universal Del., Inc. v. Comdata Corp., No. 07-1078, 2010 WL 1381225, at *7 (E.D. Pa. 
Mar. 31, 2010). 
300 Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 575 (N.D. Ill. 2004).  
301 Hock Foods, Inc. v. William Blair & Co., No. 09-2588, 2011 WL 884446, at *9 (D. Kan. 
Mar. 11, 2011). 
302 Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 285 F.R.D. 294, 306–07 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2012). 
303 Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int’l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331, 340 (E.D. Pa. 2012). 
304 Id. 
305 Defendant’s Estimate of the Cost to Comply with the Discovery Plaintiffs Propose at 3, 
Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int’l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (No. 10-CV-2326), ECF 
No. 58; Transcript of Ben Deposition at 18, Boeynaems, 285 F.R.D. 331 (No. 10-CV-2326), 
ECF No. 58-1. 
306 Brum v. MarketSource, Inc., No. 17-CV-241, 2018 WL 3861558, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 
14, 2018); Further Joint Statement Re Discovery Disagreement in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion 
to Compel Defendant to Serve Responses to Plaintiffs’ Special Interrogatories and Requests for 
Production, Set One at 16, Brum, 2018 WL 3861558 (No. 17-CV-241), ECF No. 46 [hereinafter 
Joint Statement on Discovery Disagreement]. 
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statements.307 In another recent case, defendant estimated a cost of $3.125 million to 
produce relevant information from a database of consumer credit files.308 It assumed 
eight hours to review each file.309 The court noted the record contained an alternative 
estimate of two minutes per file, which would reduce the cost of review to 
$12,500.25.310 
For decades, courts have stated that “the expense and burden to the responding 
party should not only be balanced against the relative expense and burden to the 
requesting party, but such should be scrutinized for possible excessiveness.”311 At this 
point, if the courts inquire, they routinely find cost estimates are “greatly 
exaggerated”312 or “overblown.”313 The problem is that courts often do not make the 
inquiry.314   
2. Cost of Production – Who Does What Work? 
Some courts recognize that the cost of the discovery is, in large part, driven by the 
choice of vendor. Zubulake was one of the first, finding that UBS had complete control 
over selection of the vendor and noting the possibility that a less-expensive vendor 
could have been found.315 In Wiginton and Clean Harbors, the courts again found that 
the ability to control costs “pivots around the selection of the vendor.”316 
Nowhere is the significance of that choice more apparent than in the small value 
cases where litigants choose high-dollar vendors and then claim undue burden. In 
Haka, discussed above, the defendant argued it would cost $60,000 to search and 
produce email and other routine ESI from two hard drives. 317 Defendant valued the 
case at less than six figures, and the court found “fairness and efficiency” required the 
parties to split the cost. In shifting costs, the court noted defendant’s estimates, but not 
 
307 Joint Statement on Discovery Disagreement supra note 306, at 8, 10.  
308 Sung Gon Kang v. Credit Bureau Connection, Inc., No. 18-CV-01359, 2020 WL 
1689708, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2020). 
309 Id.  
310 Id. at *6 n.7. 
311 Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 463 (D. Utah 1985).  
312 Spieker v. Quest Cherokee, LLC, No. 07-1225, 2009 WL 2168892, at *3–4 (D. Kan. July 
21, 2009). 
313 Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 285 F.R.D. 294, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
314 See supra notes 296–98 and accompanying text. 
315 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
316 Clean Harbors Env’t Servs. v. ESIS, Inc., No. 09 C 3789, 2011 WL 1897213, at *5; 
Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 576 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
317 Affidavit of Saul C. Glazer in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order and 
in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel at 4, Haka v. Lincoln Cnty., 246 F.R.D. 577 
(W.D. Wis. 2007) (No. 06-CV-0594-C), ECF No. 42 [hereinafter Glazer Affidavit]; see also 
Haka, 246 F.R.D. at 578. 
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the specifics.318 The county government defendant proposed outsourcing the search to 
a multi-national vendor, with the largest portion of the costs relating to creating TIFF 
images and a load file for all documents returned in the keyword search.319 Plaintiff 
estimated half the cost, $27,000.320  
In Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Earl Scheib, Inc., plaintiffs sought 
$120,000 in damages.321 Defendant estimated the cost of production at around 
$121,000.322 Defendant argued that discovery from nineteen email PST files for 
nineteen custodians was unduly burdensome and should be precluded or the costs 
shifted.323 The court agreed and precluded discovery unless plaintiff agreed to “absorb 
the incredible expense” associated with the requests.324 Defendant’s estimate came 
from a multi-national eDiscovery vendor, with separate charges for collection, 
processing, hosting, and other fees, including creating TIFF images of all documents 
to be reviewed.325    
In Couch v. Wan, the California Attorney General’s Office found it did not have 
the resources available to search 140 gigabytes of active data previously collected 
from sixteen hard drives.326 It would need to hire a vendor, at an estimated cost of 
 
318 Haka, 246 F.R.D. at 578–79. 
319 Id. at 578. 
320 Id. at 579; Defendants’ Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Production 
of Documents and to Compel Search of Backup Tape Drive at 11, Haka, 246 F.R.D. 577 (No. 
06-CV-00594), ECF No. 41 [hereinafter Haka Protective Order]. The Sedona Conference 
Glossary defines TIFF images as: “A widely used and supported graphic file format for storing 
bit-mapped images, with many different compression formats and resolutions.” A load file 
“relates to a set of scanned images or electronically processed files, and that indicates where 
individual pages or files belong together as documents, to include attachments, and where each 
document begins and ends. A load file may also contain data relevant to the individual 
documents, such as selected metadata, coded data, and extracted text. The Sedona Conference 
Glossary: eDiscovery & Digital Information Management, Fifth Ed., 21 SEDONA CONF. J. 263, 
332, 377–78 (2020). 
321 Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Earl Scheib, Inc., No. 11-CV-0788, 2013 WL 485846, at *1 
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2013); Complaint for Breach of Contract; Quantum Meruit; Unjust 
Enrichment at 8, Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 2013 WL 485846 (No. 11-CV-0788).  
322 Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 2013 WL 485846, at *1; Declaration of Saeid Ahmadian in 
Support of Supplemental Brief Regarding Cost of E-Mail Production at 8, Conn. Gen. Life Ins. 
Co., 2013 WL 485846 (No. ll-CV-0788), ECF No. 41-1 [hereinafter Ahmadian Declaration]. 
323 Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 2013 WL 485846, at *1. The Sedona Conference Glossary 
defines a PST file as “[a] Microsoft Outlook email storage file containing archived email 
messages in a compressed format. The Sedona Conference Glossary: eDiscovery & Digital 
Information Management, Fifth Ed., 21 SEDONA CONF. J. 263, 357 (2020). 
324 Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 2013 WL 485846, at *4. 
325 Ahmadian Declaration, supra note 322, at 6. 
326 Couch v. Wan, No. CV08–1621, 2011 WL 2551546, at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 24, 2011). 
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$54,000,327 based on an estimated “industry rate of $275 per hour.”328 The court 
concluded, as a result, that Plaintiffs’ discovery requests warranted cost shifting.329  
Compare these responses with Semsroth v. City of Wichita, where plaintiffs sought 
production of email from 117 email accounts from a back-up tape.330 Defendant 
proposed to restore the tape in-house using its Exchange server and sought to shift the 
costs of keyword searching the 117 restored PST files either manually or by 
purchasing an off-the-shelf product to search them.331 Defendant estimated the cost of 
the former at $1,950 and the latter at $2,624.95, and the costs associated with restoring 
and searching the email in-house at $50 an hour.332   
So, the cost is either $275 an hour or $50 an hour, depending. Email can be 
searched in-house for $2,000 or with a vendor for $121,000, depending. Should 
proportionality and cost-shifting determinations depend on which government agency 
plaintiff sues, and how technologically savvy its attorneys are? Does it pay to just 
throw up your hands and hire the most expensive vendor you can find if you are filing 
a proportionality or cost-shifting motion? The standard for discovery is 
reasonableness, not perfection.333 The exception comes when parties are choosing a 
means to produce ESI in the context of a cost-shifting or proportionality motion.   
3. Cost of Production – Choice of Process 
Principle 6 of the Sedona Conference’s Best Practices Commentary on the Use of 
Search and Information Retrieval Methods in E–Discovery states unequivocally that 
the “[r]esponding parties are best situated to evaluate the procedures, methodologies, 
and technologies appropriate for preserving and producing their own electronically 
stored information.”334 And the courts generally find that the party in possession of 
the data is best able to control the costs of discovery.335 But if a responding party seeks 
 
327 Id. at *3–4. 
328 Declaration of Sean Cotulla in Support of Motion to Modify Subpoenas at 2, Couch, 2011 
WL 2551546 (No. 08-CV-1621).  
329 Couch, 2011 WL 2551546, at *4. 
330 Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630, 632 (D. Kan. 2006). 
331 Id. at 632–33. 
332 Id. at 633.  
333 Agerbrink v. Model Serv. LLC, No. 14 Civ. 7841, 2017 WL 933095, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 8, 2017) (“The standard for evaluating discovery is reasonableness, not perfection.”); 
Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[T]he Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure do not require perfection.”). 
334 See Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Best Practices Commentary on the Use 
of Search and Information Retrieval Methods in E–Discovery, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 189, 193 
(2007). 
335 See, e.g., OpenTV v. Liberate Techs., 219 F.R.D. 474, 478–79 (N.D. Cal. 2003); Illiana 
Surgery & Med. Ctr. LLC v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., No. 07 CV 3, 2014 WL 1094455, at *14 
(N.D. Ind. Mar. 19, 2014).   
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to have the court preclude or shift the costs of discovery, should that presumption 
change?   
The issue shows up repeatedly in the case law with courts rubber-stamping the 
producing party’s form of production. In many cases, where litigants oppose discovery 
on the grounds of undue burden, significant costs arise from protocols that require 
production of static images of each electronic file produced.   
Producing parties commonly prefer to produce ESI as static images, usually TIFF 
or PDF images, instead of in their native format because static images facilitate control 
over the information.336 Static images readily permit bates stamping, redaction, and 
marking documents confidential.337 But that control comes at a cost. According to 
some, converting ESI from its native form “injects needless expense.”338   
One defendant in Rowe estimated it would cost $403,000 to produce ESI 
responsive to plaintiffs’ request.339 Of that amount, $126,000 was attributable to the 
cost of creating TIFF images.340 Of the $121,183.65 that defendant estimated in 
Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., $54,120 of “the incredible expense” that the 
court shifted to plaintiff was attributable to TIFF conversion and “image endorsing.”341  
In Haka, of the defendant’s $60,000 estimated cost, the largest portion of the costs, 
$27,000, related to creating the TIFF images and a load file for all documents returned 
in the keyword search. 342 In Spieker v. Quest Cherokee, LLC, creating TIFF images 
added $38,000 to the $82,500 charged by defendant’s vendor to process the requested 
email.343 In United States ex rel. Carter v. Bridgepoint Education, Inc., creating TIFF 
 
336 The Sedona Conference defines “native format” as an electronic document with its 
“associated file structure defined by the original creating application. The Sedona Conference 
Glossary: eDiscovery & Digital Information Management, Fifth Ed., 21 SEDONA CONF. J. 263, 
340 (2020). See supra note 320 defining TIFF images.  
337 United States ex rel. Carter v. Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., 305 F.R.D. 225, 246–47 (S.D. Cal. 
2015); see also CRAIG BALL, LAWYER’S GUIDE TO PRODUCTION 21 (2014), 
http://www.craigball.com/Lawyers%20Guide%20to%20Forms%20of%20Production_Ver.201
40512_TX.pdf. 
338 BALL, supra note 337, at 28 (explaining that converting native files to static images 
requires (1) retaining a vendor to convert and emboss Bates stamps (2) generating load files 
containing extracted text and metadata from the native ESI; (3) producing multiple copies of 
spreadsheets and other file types that are difficult to image; (4) paying vendors more to ingest 
and host the images and load files because they are larger in size than the native files); see also, 
e.g., Thorton v. Morgan Stanley, LLC, No. 12-CV-298, 2013 WL 1890706, at *1 (N.D. Okla. 
May 3, 2013) (“Defendants estimated $91,337 to produce ESI, $37,399 less if it produced native 
files.”).   
339 Rowe Ent., Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).   
340 Id.   
341 Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Earl Scheib, Inc., No. 11-CV-0788, 2013 WL 485846, at *4 
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2013); Ahmadian Declaration, supra note 322, at 6. 
342 Haka v. Lincoln Cnty., 246 F.R.D. 577, 578 (W.D. Wis. 2007). 
343 Spieker v. Quest Cherokee, LLC, No. 07-1225, 2009 WL 2168892, at *2 (D. Kan. July 
21, 2009). 
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images increased the cost of production from $83,700 to $358,209, depending on the 
number of backup tapes restored. 344     
If creating static images can add $358,209 in United States ex rel. Carter and 
double the cost of production in Haka or Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., is 
there undue burden or undue cost shifting? Courts have found producing TIFF images 
a “reasonable” form of production,345 but, for most commonly used productivity 
software, there are also well-established, alternative protocols for production of ESI 
in native file format.346  
There are choices along the way, of which form of production is but one. In one 
case study on collecting mobile ESI, an expert estimated the cost of collection from 
the mobile devices used by fifty-three sales representatives ranged from $30,000 to 
$60,000, depending on whether the party engaged local forensic examiners or not.347  
In the alternative, the parties could utilize free, off-the-shelf tools to collect the most 
commonly used files from mobile devices in-house and save $30,000 to $60,000.348   
In another case, the court gave the parties a choice: split the $20,000 costs for 
defendant to purchase forensic software to view forensic images obtained by plaintiff,  
or plaintiff could set up a work station, with the necessary software, and allow 
defendant to review the information on-site.349 There are usually choices to make 
between collecting the main sources of information and collecting it all; between an 
expensive process and one that requires more cooperation.     
Courts have long held that needless costs should not be part of a proportionality or 
cost-shifting analysis. In 1986, Delozier v. First National Bank of Gatlinburg stated 
plainly that “[a] court will not shift the burden of discovery . . . where the costliness 
of the discovery procedure involved is entirely a product of the defendant’s record-
keeping scheme over which the plaintiff has no control.”350 While the court in Delozier 
addressed the burdens of production from microfilm, the same rationale applies to ESI.    
In short, the courts do not consistently evaluate the estimates provided and the 
work proposed. The question remains, should a party be able to utilize a high-cost 
process, and then claim “extraordinary cost” and undue burden in responding to the 
requested discovery?   
 
 
344 United States ex rel. Carter v. Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., 305 F.R.D. 225, 229, 244 (S.D. 
Cal. 2015); see also Haka v. Lincoln Cnty., 246 F.R.D. 577, 578–79 (W.D. Wis. 2007); Haka 
Protective Order, supra note 320, at 11. 
345 Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., 305 F.R.D. at 244. 
346 BALL, supra note 337, at App. 2.  
347 Craig Ball, Custodian-Directed Preservation of iPhone Content, 
http://www.craigball.com/mobile_preservation_method_FINAL.pdf 3–4 (last visited Feb. 21, 
2019). 
348 Id. 
349 Robotic Parking Sys., Inc. v. City of Hoboken, No. 06-3419, 2010 WL 324524, at *10 
(D.N.J. Jan. 19, 2010). 
350 Delozier v. First Nat'l Bank of Gatlinburg, 109 F.R.D. 161, 164 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).  
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4. Cost of Production – The Costs of Review 
Nowhere is this inconsistency more evident than in disputes regarding the cost of 
review. In many cases, burden is defined by review.351 In Rowe, one defendant 
estimated costs between $40,000–$80,000 to produce the requested email, and an 
estimated cost of $247,000 to then review for privilege and work-product.352 In 
Zubulake, the defendant estimated costs of $165,000 to search for and restore 
responsive information, with an additional expense of $107,000 for attorney and 
paralegal review costs.353  
The discrepancy is often greater. In Shevlin v. Phoenix Life Insurance Co., the 
responding party estimated $3,000 – $4,500 to search for and retrieve ESI, and 
$250,000 – $300,000 to review it.354 In Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 
the responding party estimated $605,000 to restore ESI, and $16.5 – $70 million to 
review it.355 In General Electric Co. v. Wilkins, the responding party estimated $2.1 
million to restore, and $16 – $24 million to review.356 More recently, in United States 
ex rel. Carter, defendant estimated the cost of restoration and indexing at $263,000, 
and the cost of attorney review at $1.4 million.357 Adding the cost of review can 
multiply the cost 100 times and increase it by millions of dollars.358 Should that cost 
shift?   
In Zubulake, Judge Scheindlin held that “where cost-shifting is appropriate, only 
the costs of restoration and searching should be shifted,”359 but “the responding party 
should always bear the cost of reviewing and producing electronic data once it has 
 
351 PACE & ZAKARAS, supra note 28, at 41.   
352 Rowe Ent., Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
353 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  
354 Shevlin v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., No. 09-6323, 2012 WL 1981793, at *1 (D.N.J. June 1, 
2012). 
355 Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 557–58 (W.D. Tenn. 
2003). 
356 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wilkins, No. 10-CV-00674, 2012 WL 570048, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 
2012). 
357 Declaration of Michael Marks in Support of Defendant’s Supplemental Brief re 
Production of Documents from Backup Tapes at 9, United States ex rel. Carter v. Bridgepoint 
Educ., Inc., 305 F.R.D. 225 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 3:10-cv-01401), ECF No. 68-1[hereinafter 
Marks Declaration]; United States ex rel. Carter, 305 F.R.D. at 229, 244. 
358 In Johnson v. Charps Welding & Fabricating, Inc., the court assumed adding the cost of 
review would add $91.6 million to the cost of producing 6.7 million documents. Johnson v. 
Charps Welding & Fabricating, Inc., No. 14-cv-2081, 2017 WL 9516243, at *8 n.11 (D. Minn. 
Mar. 3, 2017). 
359 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
Judge Scheindlin further explained: “Restoration . . . is the act of making inaccessible material 
accessible. That ‘special purpose’ or ‘extraordinary step’ should be the subject of cost-shifting. 
Search costs should also be shifted because they are so intertwined with the restoration process.” 
Id. 
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been converted to an accessible form.”360 She offered two reasons: the responding 
party “unilaterally decides on the review protocol,” and “has the exclusive ability to 
control the cost of reviewing the documents” by deciding who does the review.361  
Some courts, including Rowe, have implemented protocols eliminating attorney 
review prior to production, or, in the alternative, if the producing party elects to review 
in advance requiring the producing party pay the costs of that review.362   
Other courts include the cost of attorney review, but on a limited basis, shifting the 
additional costs as “fairness dictates” and as “equitable” if plaintiffs elect to pursue 
discovery of redundant or marginally relevant sources of information.363 Others are 
more expansive, considering the entire cost of attorney review or, in some instances, 
the entire cost of the production. The court in Adair v. EQT Production Co., citing its 
authority to limit discovery when the burden outweighs its likely benefit, held:  
[T]he court may consider the cost of review of ESI for privileged or 
responsive information in deciding whether discovery imposes an undue 
burden . . . Furthermore, if the court were inclined to limit discovery based 
on the burden or cost of the review, I hold that the court could shift the costs 
of that review, either in whole or in part, to the requesting party.364 
Some courts add to the cost of review all costs attributable to producing the ESI, 
including the cost of “searches, negotiations, document review, copying, including 
time devoted by law firm employees and client employees.”365 United States ex rel. 
Carter added filtering, de-duping and hosting costs of $6 million and production costs 
of $360,000, raising the estimate to a total of $8.3 million.366    
The result is that, in a case like United States ex rel. Carter, if one follows the 
Zubulake standard, one considers whether $263,000 constitutes an undue burden. If 
one follows the courts considering review costs, the amount jumps to $1.6 million, 
and if one considers the total cost of production, one considers approximately $8.3 
 
360 Id. 
361 Id.   
362 In re Onglyza (Saxagliptin) & Kombiglyze XR (Saxagliptin & Metformin) Prods. Liab. 
Litig., No. 18-MD-2809-KCC, slip op. at 4 (E.D. Ky. May 26, 2020); Hudson v. AIH 
Receivable Mgmt. Servs., No. 10-2287, 2011 WL 1402224, at *2 (D. Kan. Apr. 13, 2011); 
Rowe Ent., Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).  
363 Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, No. 05-3091, 2009 WL 3446761, at *5–6 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 
2009), aff'd, 720 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D.N.J. 2010); Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 
229 F.R.D. 550, 562 (W.D. Tenn. 2003). 
364 Adair v. EQT Prod. Co., No. 10cv00037, 2012 WL 1965880, at *4 (W.D. Va. May 31, 
2012); see also Novick v. AXA Network, LLC, No. 07 Civ. 7767, 2013 WL 5338427, at *1–2 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2013); Rodriguez–Torres v. Gov’t Dev. Bank of P.R., 265 F.R.D. 40, 44 
(D.P.R. 2010). 
365 See Cannata v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10-cv-00068, 2012 WL 528224, at *5 (D. 
Nev. Feb. 17, 2012); Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int’l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331, 342 (E.D. Pa. 2012). 
366 United States ex rel. Carter v. Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., 305 F.R.D. 225, 229, 244 (S.D. 
Cal. 2015); Marks Declaration, supra note 357, at 9. 
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million, a sum thirty times larger. As with other factors, there is tremendous variability 
in how the courts define burden.  
G. Relative Ability of Each Party to Control Costs  
Finally, both Rowe and Zubulake specifically examine the parties’ “relative ability 
. . . to control costs and its incentive to do so.”367 The proportionality rule does not 
expressly consider this factor, but there is a question of control inherent in the 
consideration of “whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs 
its likely benefit.”368 So, it is worth examining here. 
The courts are uniform in finding that if the responding party created the problem 
and attendant costs, the responding party pays for it. This is so whether the additional 
expense is caused inadvertently or intentionally. Where a vendor inadvertently 
separates attachments from emails, basic fairness requires the responding party to pay 
to re-produce the information.369 Where defendant collects hard drives, but doesn’t 
index them, it bears the cost of producing user logs.370 Where a party converts to 
inaccessible format information that is likely to be requested in reasonably foreseeable 
litigation, it may not shift the costs of restoring and searching the data.371 If a party 
wipes a hard drive during pending litigation, it will bear the cost of the forensic 
search.372 In short, when the burden and expense of the discovery is “self-inflicted” 
the courts have little difficulty with the cost-shifting analysis. 373   
Control over costs and incentives get murky beyond that. A review of the case law, 
however, highlights one area almost all courts confront. Litigants routinely argue that 
the requesting party failed to control costs by limiting the scope of its request:374 
 
367 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); 
Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 429. 
368 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
369 PSEG Power N.Y., Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., No. 05-cv-657, 2007 WL 2687670, 
at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007). 
370 Radian Asset Assurance, Inc. v. Coll. of the Christian Bros. of N.M., No. CIV 09-0885, 
2010 WL 4928866, at *5 (D.N.M. Oct. 22, 2010). 
371 Quinby v. WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“[I]f a party creates its own 
burden or expense by converting into an inaccessible format data that it should have reasonably 
foreseen would be discoverable material at a time when it should have anticipated litigation, 
then it should not be entitled to shift the costs of restoring and searching the data.”); see also 
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); 
Escamilla v. SMS Holdings Corp., No. 09-2120, 2011 WL 5025254, at *10 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 
2011); Sedona Conference, Commentary on Proportionality, supra note 190, at 159 (“Principle 
3: Undue burden, expense, or delay resulting from a party’s action or inaction should be weighed 
against that party.”). 
372 Escamilla, 2011 WL 5025254, at *5. 
373 Id. 
374 Novick v. AXA Network, LLC, No. 07 Civ. 7767, 2013 WL 5338427, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 24, 2013); Clean Harbors Env’t Servs., Inc. v. ESIS, Inc., No. 09 C 3789, 2011 WL 
1897213, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2011). 
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Medtronic points out that Michelson has nearly unfettered ability to control costs 
by limiting the scope of his discovery requests. The court agrees and finds that this 
factor weighs in favor of Michelson bearing part of the production cost.375   
  
According to McPeek, “American lawyers engaged in discovery have never been 
accused of asking for too little. To the contrary, like the Rolling Stones, they hope that 
if they ask for what they want, they will get what they need.”376 Courts find the 
requesting party has every incentive to ask for overly broad discovery and little 
incentive not to. Some scholars agree: “the extent of a party’s discovery costs are 
determined not by the litigant himself but by the scope and content of the request filed 
by his opponent.”377   
Most courts attempt to sort discovery narrowly tailored to find relevant 
information from discovery that is not, preserving the presumption that the responding 
party pays for the former. The first factor that Zubulake examines is “the extent to 
which the request is specifically tailored to discover relevant information.”378 Rowe 
inquires of “the specificity of the discovery requests” and the “the likelihood of 
discovering critical information.”379 McPeek examines the “marginal utility” of the 
request.380 The 2006 Advisory Committee factors examine the “specificity of the 
discovery request” and “predictions as to the importance . . . of the further 
information.”381 Even those cases focused on “fairness” look to whether the request is 
narrowly tailored criticizing, for example, the breath of the search terms selected.382  
The inquiry makes sense. If one of the fundamental purposes of civil litigation is a 
“just” determination of the action,383 then examining whether the discovery requests 
are aimed at uncovering evidence directly relating to disputed facts should be a 
priority. It is the variability in the analysis, however, that limits its utility.   
As a starting point, courts uniformly decry overbroad discovery. Some courts 
preclude outright “[a]ny requests characterized by Plaintiffs as a demand for 
 
375 Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 558 (W.D. Tenn. 2003); 
see also Multitechnology Servs., L.P. v. Verizon Sw., No. 02-CV-702, 2004 WL 1553480, at 
*1–2 (N.D. Tex. July 12, 2004). 
376 McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 33–34 (D.D.C 2001); see also Rowe Ent., Inc. v. 
William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 432 (S.D.N.Y 2002); Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. 
Fluor Daniel, Inc., No. Civ.A. 99-3564, 2002 WL 246439, at *5 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2002). 
377 Redish & McNamara, supra note 8, at 779. 
378 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
379 Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 429–30 (“Where a party multiplies litigation costs by seeking 
expansive rather than targeted discovery, that party should bear the expense.”). 
380 McPeek, 202 F.R.D. at 34. 
381 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment.  
382 See, e.g., Haka v. Lincoln Cnty., 246 F.R.D. 577, 578–79 (W.D. Wis. 2007).  
383 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
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production of “all” documents of a general category.”384 Other courts state that a claim 
for any and all documents will “rarely suffice.”385 Commentary to the Sedona 
Principles routinely discourages use of “[s]o-called ‘any and all’ discovery 
requests.”386 
But the courts vary as to what is acceptable. Some courts find requests 
“appropriately tailored” simply because the email and word processing documents are 
“the likely source of information.”387 Some courts find requests reasonably specific if 
they are limited to searching for ESI relating to the plaintiff.388   
Other courts reject such limitations.389 Some courts analyze search terms, finding 
certain search criteria “appropriately fashioned” and, hence, the specificity 
requirement met.390 Conversely, they shift the costs of producing ESI where the 
requesting party goes beyond a reasonable number of search terms and sources or the 
estimated production is “clearly voluminous.”391   
Other courts find requests narrowly tailored where the parties have agreed to 
search terms and time frames.392 Some courts require requesting parties to narrow their 
search terms unilaterally.393 Others have required an iterative process and information 
exchange regarding search terms and sources, and then shifted a portion of the costs 
for discovery beyond an agreed threshold.394    
 
384 Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int’l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331, 343 (E.D. Pa. 2012).    
385 United States ex rel. Carter v. Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., 305 F.R.D. 225, 238–39 (S.D. Cal. 
2015). 
386 SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & 
PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION, at Comment 3(a) (2d ed. 
2007). See also The Sedona Conference, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(b)(2) Primer: 
Practice Pointers for Responding to Discovery Requests, 19 SEDONA CONF. J. 447, 464, 467, 
469, 484 (2018); Sedona Conference, Resources for the Judiciary, supra note 121. 
387 Xpedior Creditor Tr. v. Credit Suisse First Bos. (USA), Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 459, 465 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
388 Johnson v. Neiman, No. 4:09CV00689, 2010 WL 4065368, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 18, 
2010). 
389 Rodriguez-Torres v. Gov’t Dev. Bank of P.R., 265 F.R.D. 40, 43 (D.P.R. 2010). 
390 Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Scis. Corp., No. 97-CV-00635, at *6 (E.D. 
Wis. Dec. 27, 2004), ECF No. 173. 
391 Hoist Fitness Sys., Inc. v. TuffStuff Fitness Int’l, Inc., No. EDCV 17-1388, 2019 WL 
121195, at *3–4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2019); see also Remy Inc. v. Tecnomatic, S.P.A., No. 11-
CV-00991, 2013 WL 1310216, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 27, 2013); Cannata v. Wyndham 
Worldwide Corp., No. 10-CV-00068, 2012 WL 528224, at *5 (D. Nev. Feb. 17, 2012). 
392 Zeller v. S. Cent. Emergency Med. Servs., Inc., No. 13-CV-2584, 2014 WL 2094340, at 
*10 (M.D. Pa. May 20, 2014); Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, No. 05-309, 2009 WL 3446761, at 
*3 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2009), aff'd, 720 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D.N.J. 2010). 
393 Haka v. Lincoln County, 246 F.R.D. 577, 579 (W.D. Wis. 2007).  
394 Remy, 2013 WL 1310216, at *7; Cannata, 2012 WL 528224, at *4. 
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The leading cases look for well-defined parameters: lists of custodians, sources, 
and time frames, following a meaningful meet and confer process. Zubulake found 
plaintiff’s request for “[a]ll documents concerning any communication by or between 
UBS employees concerning Plaintiff,” as subsequently narrowed to five employees 
during a twenty-nine month period to be “a relatively limited and targeted request.”395  
The court in Cochran v. Caldera Medical, Inc. found requests seeking specific 
categories of data that the defendant was required by law to maintain were “narrowly 
tailored.”396 In Juster Acquisition Co. v. North Hudson Sewerage Authority, the court 
found requests narrowly tailored where they were limited to requests for ESI from 
identified actors involved in the transaction and “a reasonable and restricted” time 
period during which the parties were in negotiation.397   
In contrast, where the defendant in Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson 
had not “specifically limited his requests by date” despite an apparent understanding 
of the three year period most likely to have relevant information, the court found this 
factor weighed in favor of cost shifting.398 Similarly, Rowe looked for limitations, such 
as requesting email from only specific persons or seeking information about specific 
data sets, and finding none found plaintiffs requests “extremely broad.”399 Lawson 
looked for limited numbers of custodians and terms tailored to the custodians, and 
found “really broad search terms that end up in ridiculous numbers of unresponsive 
documents.”400     
Taken individually, the courts vary dramatically in how they define a narrowly 
tailored request. Taken as whole, one finds best practices. In defining specificity, some 
courts look for identification of a limited number of key custodians,401 sources of 
 
395 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
396 Cochran v. Caldera Med., Inc., No. 12-5109, 2014 WL 1608664, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 
2014). 
397 Juster Acquisition Co. v. N. Hudson Sewerage Auth., No. 12-3427, 2013 WL 541972, at 
*4 (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 2013). 
398 Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 554–55 (W.D. Tenn. 
2003); see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wilkins, No. 10-cv-00674, 2012 WL 570048, at *5–6 (E.D. 
Cal. Feb. 21, 2012); Quinby v. WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
399 Rowe Ent., Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429–30 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002).  
400 Lawson v. Spirit AeroSystems, Inc., No. 18-1100-EFM-ADM, 2020 WL 3288058, at *4 
(D. Kan. June 18, 2020). 
401 See, e.g., Crown Castle USA Inc. v. Fred A. Nudd Corp., No. 05-CV-6163, 2010 WL 
4027780 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2010); Siani v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Farmingdale, No. CV09-
407, 2010 WL 3170664, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2010). 
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ESI,402 a defined time period,403 with reasonably tailored subject matter inquiries or 
keywords.404 The problem is that not all courts follow their lead.   
V. INCREASING OBJECTIVITY 
This Part offers proposals that will reduce, though admittedly not eliminate, the 
remarkable subjectivity found in the cost-shifting case law. In general terms, it 
proposes three steps, all of which can be readily implemented through discovery 
orders: First, interpret the above factors to require verifiable information—make them 
objective measures. Second, mandate cooperation, in the form of disclosure of 
information, before cost shifting, and penalize its absence in the cost-shifting analysis.  
Finally, if the courts shift costs, share control over the process or limit those costs.  
Aligning abilities and incentives to control costs requires more than a single-minded 
focus on making sure the requesting party has “skin in the game.” It requires creating 
incentives to reduce costs rather than strategically inflate them. 
A. Defining the Importance of the Issues 
The courts can readily restore a measure of objectivity to their analysis of the 
importance of the issues. In examining this factor, one can simply ask, will the case 
impact more than the named litigants? 405 With employment discrimination, is the 
alleged discrimination limited to the named plaintiff or is it widespread? Will the 
proposed injunctive relief affect one person, e.g. reinstatement, or many, e.g., banning 
a workplace policy that discriminates on the basis of race or gender? Is the civil rights 
litigation about compensating a named party for a harm, or will it potentially change 
a law affecting many? In products liability litigation, does the injury arise from a 
manufacturing defect that affected only the named parties, or a design defect that 
potentially impacts the safety of many? In a dissolution of marriage, is the discovery 
about divvying up assets or custody of children?      
It is a standard that is easy to apply. It is also a standard that, in many cases, will 
result in the factor favoring the traditional presumption that the producing party bears 
the costs. Yet, there is logic to safeguarding that presumption where the discovery will 
affect the many as opposed to the few.406   
In analyzing the amount in controversy, courts and scholars have recognized that 
there “may be substantial external benefits to the general litigation in question; thus, 
 
402 See, e.g., Cannata v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., No. 10-CV-0068, 2012 WL 528224, 
at *4 (D. Nev. Feb. 17, 2012).  
403 See, e.g., Quinby, 245 F.R.D. at 98. 
404 See, e.g., Black Love Resists in the Rust ex rel Soto v. City of Buffalo, 334 F.R.D. 23, 31 
(W.D.N.Y. 2019). 
405 Other commentators have referenced fee-shifting statutes as a means to identify public 
interest litigation in the course of arguing for a user-pays system with government funding of 
discovery in litigation of broader societal importance. Redish & McNamara, supra note 8 at 
815. 
406 Compare Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1281, 1284 (1976), with Richard Marcus, “Looking Backward” to 1938, 162 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1691, 1718 (2014). 
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discovery costs that seem exorbitant when only the instant litigants are considered can, 
in context, be justifiable.”407 Some private rights of action may deter unsafe or 
unlawful conduct. Other rights of action simply divide stakes.408 This distinction 
applies with equal force to the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation and 
can be used to objectively define importance.   
It is not that gender discrimination was an important issue for Judge Francis in his 
decision in Chen Oster but not for Judge Scheindlin in her decision in Zubulake. The 
real issue is that the discrimination affected one person in Zubulake and a workplace 
in Chen Oster.409 The real question to ask in analyzing this factor is, will the case 
impact more than the named litigants? 
B. Defining the Amount in Controversy 
This “most objective” of factors defies objective application because courts are 
confronted with either estimates as advocacy or silence. The courts are left to paint 
with broad strokes deciding whether the case is “a nuisance value case,” or not, and 
whether the discovery “seems” excessive, or not. There can be no certainty in the 
amount in controversy before final judgment, but there are means to value a case early.  
Attorneys do it all the time. The solution proposed here is to make them do it in the 
cost-shifting motion and response.   
Pursuant to Rule 11, plaintiffs must have a reasonable basis in fact and law for the 
ad damnum they state in their complaint.410 Courts could require them to provide such 
basis in their cost-shifting briefs. Defendants must have a reasonable basis for 
admitting or denying the ad damnum. Courts could require them to disclose this in 
their briefs. For both parties, courts could require substantiated estimates or weigh 
litigants’ silence against them in deciding proportionality or cost-shifting motions.   
Providing objective bases for this factor requires reference to other cases.  
Comparisons, whether in real estate or litigation, offer imperfect information, but 
better than no information. Litigants reference comparable cases in settlement 
discussions. The same can be done in a cost-shifting analysis. For some cases, 
attorneys could substantiate estimates by reference to jury verdict reporters. For 
complex litigation, there is data. Litigation analytics now estimate jury awards and 
settlement values in commercial litigation (the largest of all federal practice areas), 
class actions, antitrust cases, intellectual property, MDL litigation, securities, trade 
 
407 Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note 185, at 1112; see also Stephen B. Burbank, 
Proportionality and the Social Benefits of Discovery: Out of Sight and Out of Mind?,  34 REV. 
LITIG. 647, 654 (2015) (“[T]here is danger that case-by-case cost–benefit calculations will give 
short shrift to those elements of the analysis that. . . are difficult to quantify— in particular, 
social benefits.”). 
408 Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note 185, at 1102. Lawson v. Spirit AeroSystems, Inc., No. 
18-1100-EFM-ADM, 2020 WL 3288058, at *11 (D. Kan. June 18, 2020) (“the breach-of-
contract claim here does not implicate any broader societal impact. This is a case between 
private parties seeking money damages.”). 
409 Compare Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003), with Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 285 F.R.D. 294, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
410 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). 
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secrets, ERISA cases, and other areas.411 There is objective information that the courts 
could require to substantiate claims regarding compensatory damages.   
Equally important, there is objective information that the courts could require to 
evaluate the other remedies sought. While the “amount in controversy” factor 
encourages litigants and the courts to focus on claims for compensatory damages,412  
injunctive relief may come closest to making an injured party whole.413 Courts 
routinely place a value on requests for injunctive relief to determine subject matter 
jurisdiction in diversity cases: they do so by assessing the value of the injunction to 
the plaintiff or the cost to the defendant.414 Courts could do the same in cost-shifting 
cases.   
In short, courts should require more than unsubstantiated speculation regarding the 
amount in controversy and silence as to the value of other remedies requested. There 
is proof, albeit imperfect, that a court could require that would add objectivity. Doing 
so will not eliminate the subjectivity inherent in weighing this factor against the cost 
of production, but requiring a substantiated estimate for both compensatory and non-
compensatory remedies and, absent that weighing the factor against the litigant, 
promises better information than the silence commonly offered. Few cases are truly 
sui generis. The question to ask here is, what do comparable cases suggest regarding 
the amount in controversy and the importance of non-monetary remedies? 
C. Defining the Parties’ Relative Access to Information  
In Oxbow Carbon & Minerals LLC v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., the court set 
out an objective standard to be applied when defining the parties’ relative access to 
information: whether a key player possessed “relevant, unique information.”415 This 
standard recognizes that the inquiry is, as set out in Rowe and Zubulake, an inquiry 
into whether the same information, i.e., the same document or file, is more readily 
obtained from another source.   
If the inquiry is about whether the same ESI exists elsewhere, there is an objective 
answer, one that can be validated with a hash value. Once the inquiry becomes a 
 
411 Kirk Jenkins, Making Sense of the Litigation Analytics Revolution, CAL. SUP. CT. REV. 
(Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.californiasupremecourtreview.com/2017/10/making-sense-of-the-
litigation-analytics-revolution/; Jay W. Belle Isle, Lex Machina Expands Award-Winning Legal 
Analytics Platform to Commercial Litigation, LEGAL READER (June 21, 2017), 
https://www.legalreader.com/lex-machina-expands-analytics-platform/. 
412 Compare Complaints and Judicial Decisions in Haka v. Lincoln Cnty., 246 F.R.D 577 
(W.D. Wis. 2007), and Rodriguez-Torres v. Gov’t Dev. Bank of P.R., 265 F.R.D. 40 (D.P.R. 
2010), with Couch v. Wan, No. CV08–1621, 2011 WL 2551546 (E.D. Cal. June 24, 2011). 
413 See, e.g., Tracy A. Thomas, The Continued Vitality of Prophylactic Relief, 27 REV. LITIG. 
99 (2007); Tracy A. Thomas, Switching to Prophylactic Injunctions, 90 TEX. L. REV. 295, 297 
(2012). 
414  See, e.g., Ericsson GE Mobile Commc'ns, Inc. v. Motorola Commc'ns & Elecs., Inc., 120 
F.3d 216, 218 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Because [plaintiff] sought only declaratory and injunctive 
relief amount in controversy is measured by the value of the object of the litigation.”); McCarty 
v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 595 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1979); 14AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR 
R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE JURISPRUDENCE § 3703 (4th ed. 2020).  
415 Oxbow Carbon & Minerals LLC v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 322 F.R.D. 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2017). 
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question of whether the same type of information is more readily available, i.e., 
whether depositions offer a reasonable substitute, the inquiry becomes a subjective 
one, with some courts saying yes and some saying no.   
Attorneys in the Enron litigation stated over a decade ago, “when you’ve got the 
emails, people remember lots and lots of things.”416 Attorneys today recognize that 
discovery of social media precedes, and is not replaced by, plaintiff’s deposition in the 
personal injury case. The better reasoned judicial decisions recognize the unique value 
of ESI—that parties should not be required to forgo written discovery because the 
same subject can be addressed in a deposition. These courts interpret both factors 
relating to relative access and availability from other sources objectively to ask 
whether the same ESI is available elsewhere.   
As suggested in the Advisory Committee Notes, this factor is about information 
asymmetry.417 As shown in the cases, information asymmetry can be objectively 
defined at the file level. The question to ask here is, does one party have access to 
“relevant, unique” ESI?  
D. Defining the Parties’ Resources 
In defining resources, the better reasoned decisions again limit their inquiry to an 
objective determination of the parties’ resources. They do not consider concentric 
circles of potentially expanding resources.   
The standard first articulated in Rowe and now the plain language of revised Rule 
26(b)(1) supports this limitation. As a starting point, Rule 26 examines “the parties’ 
resources.”418 The rule does not provide for examination of “the resources available to 
each party” as suggested in Zubulake.419 The rule does use the plural possessive 
suggesting a comparison of both parties’ resources. Applying the plain language of 
the rule supports the more limited, verifiable interpretation given this factor by courts 
that decline to consider the resources of plaintiff’s counsel.   
The Advisory Committee Notes to the 1983 amendments support this 
interpretation as well. The original language in the rule examined the “limitations on 
the parties’ resources,” and the Committee notes explained that this factor sought to 
address discovery that is disproportionate given “the limitations on a financially weak 
litigant to withstand extensive opposition to a discovery program or to respond to 
discovery requests.”420 The Committee’s focus is on the “financially weak litigant,” 
not the financially weak litigant, as aided by counsel.   
Courts that go beyond this to consider the resources of counsel or other third parties 
raise intractable issues. What is the basis for examining only the resources of the 
requesting party, typically the plaintiff, as some courts do and some scholars 
 
416 Peter Geier, A Defense Win in the Heart of “Enron Country”; Use of an E-mail Trail 
Helps a Jury Acquit an Energy Trading Executive.; Houston, NAT. L.J., Jan. 23, 2006, at 2. 
417 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendments.  
418 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
419 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(quoting Rowe Ent., Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002)). 
420 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment. 
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advocate?421 If courts do include as “available resources” those of plaintiffs’ counsel 
or third-party litigation funding, does not fairness (and the plain language of the rule) 
require consideration of the resources of defense counsel, insurance companies, and 
related third parties? If so, how many law firms would agree to represent a client if 
they knew that doing so would require them to consistently reveal their income and 
net worth? What incentives would this create for those seeking counsel?   
The better course, as seen in some of the opinions discussed above,422 is for the 
courts to mandate substantive disclosures regarding the parties’ own resources.423  
Tying this analysis to a concrete comparison of the parties’ individual resources 
provides an objective, uniform measure. Individuals and small businesses submit 
affidavits or other proof of income, liabilities, and assets, the same type of information 
routinely produced in cases ranging from bankruptcy to dissolution of marriage.  
Publicly traded companies submit audited financial statements and documentation 
found in SEC filings, again information that is routinely generated and produced. 
Litigants provide objective information regarding their resources, in cases large and 
small. Courts could require the same in cost-shifting motions. The question to ask here 
is, what do the parties’ submissions say about their own resources?424 
E. Defining the Importance of the Discovery 
1. Sampling and “A Pig in a Poke”425 
 Donald Rumsfield infamously responded to a question about weapons of mass 
destruction in Iraq by stating: “there are known knowns . . . there are known unknowns 
. . . But there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we don’t know we don’t 
know.”426 Cost-shifting motions need not be based on known unknows or unknown 
unknowns.   
 
421 See Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Intern., LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331, 335 (E.D. Pa. 2012); Redish 
& McNamara, supra note 8, at 821–22. 
422 See supra notes 249–62.   
423 In this context, party should be defined to include those who have assumed control over 
the litigation because of a subrogation agreement or otherwise. See, e.g., Lawson v. Spirit 
AeroSystems, Inc., No. 18-1100-EFM-ADM, 2020 WL 3288058, at *14 (D. Kan. June 18, 
2020). 
424 Redish & McNamara, supra note 8, at 817, suggests “[p]erhaps the most feasible option 
would involve a system similar to the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (“FAFSA”), 
which takes account of all of an applicant's relevant financial data, including income, savings, 
investments, and property. It then calculates, according to a predetermined formula, an 
individual contribution representing the amount of money that the applicant can be reasonably 
expected to contribute toward his education.” 
425 See Kipperman v. Onex Corp., 260 F.R.D. 682, 689–90 (N.D. Ga. 2009) discussed supra 
in text accompanying note 274. 
426 News Briefing from U.S. Dep’t of Def., Sec’y Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers (Feb. 12, 2002). 
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Sampling is an established means to assess the importance of the discovery. It does 
not offer perfect information, but it does offer some objective information.427 The 
problem is: some courts require it;428 others do not.429    
The leading cases have long recognized the importance of sampling. In McPeek, 
the court “decided to take small steps and perform, as it were, a test run.”430 The court 
ordered restoration of email from the most important fact witness for a one-year 
period.431 Zubulake emphasized that “[w]hen based on an actual sample . . . [t]here 
will also be tangible evidence of the time and cost required.”432 In doing so, “the entire 
cost-shifting analysis can be grounded in fact rather than guesswork.”433    
The Sedona Conference Commentary on Proportionality encourages sampling. 
Extrinsic information and sampling may assist in determining whether the requested 
discovery is sufficiently important to warrant the potential burden or expense of its 
production.434 The Sedona Conference Cooperation Proclamation suggests that courts 
“[r]equire sampling of ESI that a party has been requested to produce from sources it 
deems not reasonably accessible, thus enabling the judge to ascertain the extent to 
 
427 See Mia Mazza et al., In Pursuit of FRCP 1: Creative Approaches to Cutting and Shifting 
the Costs of Discovery of Electronically Stored Information, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11, 69–75 
(2007); see also Davis v. E. Idaho Health Servs., Inc., No. 16-CV-00193, 2017 WL 1737723 
(D. Idaho May 3, 2017); Michael Levine et al., EDRM Statistical Sampling Applied to 
Electronic Discovery, EDRM, https://edrm.net/resources/project-guides/edrm-statistical-
sampling-applied-to-electronic-discovery/ (last updated Feb. 18, 2015). 
428 See, e.g., Brum v. MarketSource, Inc., No. 17-CV-241, 2018 WL 3861558, at *4 (E.D. 
Cal. Aug. 14, 2018) (ordering sampling); City of Rockford v. Mallinckrodt ARD Inc., 326 
F.R.D. 489, 494 (N.D. Ill. 2018); Solo v. United Parcel Serv. Co., No. 14-12719, 2017 WL 
85832, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 10, 2017); Juster Acquisition Co. v. N. Hudson Sewerage Auth., 
No. Civ.A. 12-3427, 2013 WL 541972, at *3–6 (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 2013); United States ex rel. 
Carter v. Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., 305 F.R.D. 225, 233–34 (S.D. Cal. 2015); Gen. Elec. Co. v. 
Wilkins, No. 10-cv-00674, 2012 WL 2376940 (E.D. Cal. June 22, 2012); Kipperman v. Onex, 
260 F.R.D. 682, 690 (N.D. Ga. 2009); Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Scis. Corp., 
222 F.R.D. 594, 602–03 (E.D. Wis. 2004); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 
F.R.D. 309, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
429 See, e.g., CFPB v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 17-CV-80495, 2018 WL 6843629, at *2 (S.D. 
Fla. Dec. 21, 2018) (shifting costs after parties failed to reach agreement regarding sampling 
protocol); Rodriguez-Torres v. Gov’t Dev. Bank of P.R., 265 F.R.D. 40, 44 (D.P.R. 2010) 
(simply finding the requested discovery “too high of a cost . . . in this type of action.”). 
430 McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2001). 
431 Id. 
432 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 324. 
433 Id.; see also Lawson v. Spirit AeroSystems, Inc., No. 18-1100-EFM-ADM, 2020 WL 
3288058, at *7 (D. Kan. June 18, 2020); Kipperman, 260 F.R.D. at 691; King Pharm., Inc. v. 
EON Labs, Inc., No. 04-CV-5540, 2008 WL 11427890, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2008); 
Hagemeyer, 222 F.R.D. at 602–03.  
434 Sedona Conference, Commentary on Proportionality, supra note 190, at 64–65. 
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which relevant information resides within the ESI and the cost of retrieval of the entire 
data set.”435 
But many litigants and courts do not heed the advice. Courts instead criticize the 
requesting party for offering “pure conjecture” or “no idea” what the disputed ESI 
may hold.436 When courts deny discovery or shift its costs because the requesting party 
has not proven the disputed discovery contains new, relevant information, the courts 
speculate that the untapped source does not contain new, relevant information and 
ignore the burden of proof. Assuming a threshold showing of relevancy by the 
requesting party, well-established law provides that the moving party has the burden 
of establishing undue burden.437 Courts that find the requesting party offers nothing 
more than speculation without sampling the data in question flip that burden.   
Sampling does not bring certainty: it is biased towards quantity, not quality.438  
And sampling is difficult if there are few responsive documents in the collection, i.e., 
there is low richness or low prevalence.439 But those flaws can be addressed, at least 
in part, with techniques such as stratified and cluster sampling. 440 There may also be 
 
435 Sedona Conference, Resources for the Judiciary, supra note 121, at 41. 
436 Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, No. 05-3091, 2009 WL 3446761, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 
2009), aff'd, 720 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D.N.J. 2010); Johnson v. Neiman, No. 09CV00689 AGF, 
2010 WL 4065368, at *1–3 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 18, 2010); see supra text accompanying notes 267–
69. 
437 See, e.g., Black Love Resists in the Rust ex rel. Soto v. City of Buffalo, N.Y., 334 F.R.D. 
23, 28 (W.D.N.Y. 2019); Seger v. Ernest-Spencer Metals, Inc., No. 08CV75, 2010 WL 378113, 
at *3 (D. Neb. Jan. 26, 2010); Foreclosure Mgmt. Co. v. Asset Mgmt. Holdings, LLC, No. 07–
2388, 2008 WL 3822773, at *6 (D. Kan. Aug. 13, 2008). 
438 Patricia Groot, Electronically Stored Information: Balancing Free Discovery with Limits 
on Abuse, 2009 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 2, 30–31 (2009) 
(“the numerical test is biased toward quantity rather than quality . . . [m]arginal utility cannot 
measure the possibility of finding one key ‘smoking gun’”). 
439 “Prevalence” or “richness” or “yield” rates are defined as “the fraction of Documents in 
a Population that are Relevant to the Information Need.” Maura R. Grossman & Gordon V. 
Cormack, The Grossman-Cormack Glossary of Technology Assisted Review, 7 FED. CT. L. REV. 
1, 26 (2013). Regarding the difficulty of sampling with data sets containing low yield rates, see, 
e.g., Michael Levine et al., EDRM Statistical Sampling Applied to Electronic Discovery, EDRM 
(Feb. 18, 2015), https://edrm.net/resources/project-guides/edrm-statistical-sampling-applied-
to-electronic-discovery/; William Webber, What is the Maximum Recall in re Biomet?, 
EVALUATING E-DISCOVERY (Apr. 24, 2013, 10:00 AM), 
http://blog.codalism.com/index.php/what-is-the-maximum-recall-in-re-biomet/#more-1808. 
440 See Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 285 F.R.D. 294, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(stratified sampling “take[s] into account the heterogeneity of the population by dividing it into 
subgroups that are each homogeneous with respect to the relevant variables, after which a 
random sample would be drawn from each subgroup”); see also Mich. Dep’t of Educ. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Educ., 875 F.2d 1196, 1205 (6th Cir. 1989); Spears v. First Am. eAppraiseIT, No. C–
08–00868, 2012 WL 1438709, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2012); Feske v. MHC Thousand Trails 
Ltd. P’ship, No. 11–CV–4124, 2012 WL 1123587, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2012); Schafer v. 
State Farm & Fire Cas. Co., No. 06–8262, 2009 WL 799978, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar. 25, 2009); 
McReynolds v. Sodexho Marriott Servs., Inc., 349 F. Supp. 2d 1, 23 (D.D.C. 2004); Chavez v. 
IBP, Inc., No. CV–01–5093, 2004 WL 5520002, at *10–11 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2004); Levine 
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instances where sampling is not feasible, for example, where the principal cost of the 
discovery is licensing the software or building the hardware to search archived ESI.  
In such cases, the courts could require testimony and other evidence regarding the 
contents of the data set in question. But in most instances, sampling of some form is 
possible, and this Article argues that it should be presumptively part of each cost-
shifting motion to provide an objective basis for evaluating the importance of the 
discovery. Would it not make more sense to sample and decide, rather than have the 
court speculate based on the parties’ speculation?   
Well-reasoned judicial decisions acknowledge that the “pig in a poke” argument 
is, to mix metaphors, a red herring. They acknowledge that litigants can estimate the 
importance of the discovery, and the potential relevancy of an unsearched dataset, 
through sampling and other discovery. While some courts omit this step, the law is 
clear that the requesting party must demonstrate relevancy and the objecting party 
must prove burden. Sampling provides evidence of both.   
2. Sampling and Prevalence Rates 
Parties that have sampled the disputed ESI routinely argue that there are few 
responsive documents in the data set and that this supports precluding or shifting the 
costs of the discovery.441 The argument raises a second issue regarding the importance 
of the discovery: prevalence rates and the inherent limitations of sampling with key 
word search. “Prevalence” or “richness” or “yield” rates are defined as “the fraction 
of Documents in a Population that are Relevant to an Information Need.”442 While the 
terminology is clear, the minimum standards are not.   
In Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., plaintiffs alleged sexual harassment in the 
workplace. 443 At the court’s urging, plaintiffs selected a sample of three backup tapes 
for restoration. Following restoration, the court concluded that “the percentage of 
sexually objectionable e-mails is substantially lower than 4.5%.”444 The court held that 
“because the search also revealed a significant number of unresponsive documents . . 
. the marginal utility test weighs slightly in favor of cost-shifting.”445 In United States 
ex rel. Garbe v. Kmart Corp., the court found a two percent responsive rate too low 
and required the relator to narrow its request and then assume half the costs of 
defendant’s production.446 Similarly, in Quinby v. West LB AG, another gender 
discrimination case, the court analyzed the number of relevant email obtained from a 
 
et al., supra note 427; MICHAEL O. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 
257–60 (2d ed. 2001).   
441 See, e.g., Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 574 (N.D. Ill. 2004); 
Quinby v. WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); United States ex rel. Garbe v. 
Kmart Corp., Case No. 12-CV-881, 2014 WL 12787823, at *1 (S.D. Ill. May 2, 2014). 
442 Maura R. Grossman & Gordon V. Cormack, The Grossman-Cormack Glossary of 
Technology Assisted Review, 7 FED. CT. L. REV. 1, 26 (2013). 
443 Wiginton, 229 F.R.D. at 570. 
444 Id. at 571, 575. Plaintiffs argued it was 21.3%; defendants argued that it was 1.64%. Id. 
445 Id. at 575. 
446 Garbe, 2014 WL 12787823, at *1. 
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sample backup tape.447 The court found that the number was “quite low when 
compared to the volume of documents produced,” and required plaintiff assume thirty 
percent of the cost.448 Some courts have required that the sample contain admissible 
evidence. In Schweinfurth v. Motorola, Inc., the court found the discovery was 
relevant, “however . . . the Court, at this juncture, cannot say the material will be 
admissible at trial. Therefore, the Court orders Plaintiffs to pay 50% of the document 
production costs.”449   
In contrast, in Hagemeyer North America, Inc. v. Gateway Data Sciences Corp., 
the court ordered sampling, which showed approximately ten percent of the email 
searched contained keywords, of which an unidentified number were, in fact, 
relevant.450 The court held that the “existence of the e-mails on the five backup tapes 
is sufficient to establish that further discovery of the backup tapes may lead to the 
discovery of relevant evidence.” 451 In other words, finding some potentially relevant 
email was enough.   
The cases offer a wide spectrum for defining the importance of the discovery, with 
both ends creating perverse incentives. Hagemeyer North America, Inc. arguably sets 
the bar too low: keyword search can return any number of “hits” without returning any 
relevant documents.452 Schweinfurth sets the bar too high: modifying the rules of 
discovery to require proof of admissibility. Wiginton and Quinby offer a middle 
ground, yet the lines they draw are problematic.  
Low prevalence is not necessarily the result of a poorly tailored request, it is often 
an inherent characteristic of ESI collections. Practitioners suggest original collections 
have a prevalence rate that is usually less than five percent and often less than one 
percent.453 Scholars utilize “realistic document collection[s]” that have prevalence 
rates ranging from 0.34% to 3.92%, with a mean of 1.175% to study predictive coding 
 
447 Quinby v. WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
448 Id. at 109, 111.  
449 Schweinfurth v Motorola, Inc., No. 05CV0024, 2008 WL 4449081, at *2 (N.D. Ohio 
Sept. 30, 2008). 
450 Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Scis. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594, 597–98, 603 (E.D. 
Wis. 2004). 
451 Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Scis. Corp., No. 97-CV-00635, at *10 (E.D. 
Wis. Dec. 27, 2004), ECF No. 173 (emphasis added). 
452 Doug Austin, Sometimes, Your Wildcard May Not Be ‘Wild’ Enough, EDISCOVERY DAILY 
(Sept. 13, 2016), https://cloudnine.com/ediscoverydaily/electronic-discovery/sometimes-
wildcard-may-not-wild-enough-ediscovery-best-practices/ (noting a keyword search intending 
to retrieve variations on “mine,” “mines,” and “mining” retrieved over 300,000 files because 
there are 269 words in English that begin with “min”). 
453 Ralph Losey, Project Cost Estimation Is Key to Opposing ESI Discovery as 
Disproportionately Burdensome Under Rule 26(b)(1), L. & TECH. (May 6, 2018), https://e-
discoveryteam.com/2018/05/06/project-cost-estimation-is-key-to-opposing-esi-discovery-as-
disproportionately-burdensome-under-rule-26b1/.   
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algorithms.454 In other words, scholars and practitioners assume the number of 
relevant documents will be “quite low when compared to the volume.”455 
In analyzing sample results, courts should do the same. If they do so, the courts 
have an objective measure of both cost and benefit, as defined by the existence of 
relevant documents. The parties need not argue about, and the court need not rule on 
“a pig in a poke.”456 
3. Core Discovery 
In defining the importance of discovery, there is a second, objective alternative 
that incorporates the best practices found in some of the judicial decisions reviewed.  
Some courts have expressly recognized the benefits of tiered discovery. The court in 
Kleen Products, LLC v. Packaging Corp. of America noted, “[i]n pursuing a 
collaborative approach, some lessons have been learned . . . to the extent possible, 
discovery phases should be discussed and agreed to at the onset of discovery.”457 The 
Sedona Conference’s Commentary on Proportionality advocates conducting 
discovery in phases, “starting with discovery of clearly relevant information located 
in the most accessible and least expensive sources.”458   
Tiered discovery could be used in the cost-shifting analyses as well, not based on 
accessibility, but by distinguishing between core discovery and more marginally 
relevant discovery. Practitioners have negotiated discovery protocols for adverse 
employment and FLSA cases that provide for disclosure of “core discovery” at the 
beginning of the case.459 Arbitration bodies such as FINRA have identified core 
discovery that the parties are expected to produce, e.g., securities firms are expected 
 
454 Gordon V. Cormack & Maura R. Grossman, Evaluation of Machine-Learning Protocols 
for Technology Assisted Review in Electronic Discovery, in SIGIR ‘14: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
37TH INTERNATIONAL ACM SIGIR CONFERENCE ON RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT IN 
INFORMATION RETRIEVAL 154–55 (2014). 
455 Quinby v. WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
456  Kipperman v. Onex Corp., 260 F.R.D. 682, 690 (N.D. Ga. 2009).   
457 Kleen Prods. LLC v. Packaging Corp. of Am., No. 10 C 5711, 2012 WL 4498465, at *19 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2012), aff’d, 2013 WL 120240 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 9, 2013); see also Chen-Oster 
v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 285 F.R.D. 294, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 
287 F.R.D. 182, 184–85 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), adopted sub nom. Moore v. Publicis Groupe SA, 
2012 WL 1446534 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2012); Tamburo v. Dworkin, No. 04 C 3317, 2010 WL 
4867346, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 2010); Barrera v. Boughton, No. 07cv1436, 2010 WL 
3926070, at *3 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2010). 
458 Sedona Conference, Commentary on Proportionality, supra note 190, at 157. 
459 Steven S. Gensler & Lee H. Rosenthal, Breaking the Boilerplate Habit in Civil Discovery, 
AKRON L. REV. 683, 698 (2018). 
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to produce all agreements and all correspondence with the customer.460 The Federal 
Circuit has identified “core documentation” in patent litigation.461   
In many cases, there are commonly requested documents that support the claims 
and defenses in routinely litigated matters. There is “core discovery that reasonable 
lawyers know they will have to produce in any event,” and there is value in having it 
early in the case.462 An evaluation of “core discovery” in the case provides an objective 
basis for analyzing the importance of the discovery in dispute. If it is core discovery 
from key players, the traditional presumption should apply.463 If not, this factor should 
weigh in favor of cost shifting.   
Advance agreement regarding core discovery in a particular field is unnecessary.  
Judge Grimm has authored a trans-substantive discovery order that incorporates 
phased discovery.464 He suggests: 
[T]he logical starting place ought to be the causes of actions and defenses 
actually pleaded, the elements of proof that must be met for each, and the 
information that the party does not already have from sources other than their 
adversary. At a minimum, discovery should be phased to focus first on the 
actual evidence needed to prove the pleaded claims and defenses.465 
The focus here is on the claims and defenses, rather than accessibility or cost. This 
same distinction between core and more marginally relevant discovery could apply to 
the cost-shifting analysis.466   
Some courts have done just that. In Lawson v. Spirit AeroSystems, Inc., the court 
examined whether the disputed discovery went to “the very heart of the litigation,” 
and shifted costs after determining it did not.467 In United States ex rel. Bibby v. Wells 
 
460 Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Discovery Guide and Document Production 
Lists, FINRA CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE FOR CUSTOMER DISPUTES, 
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/ArbMed/p394527.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2018). 
461 Fed. Cir. Advisory Council, An E-Discovery Model Order, U.S. CT. APP. FOR FED. CIR., 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/announcements/model-e-discovery-order-adopted-federal-
circuit-advisory-counsel-0 (last visited June 18, 2020). 
462 Judicial Roundtable, supra note 75, at 33 (Judge Koeltl’s comments). 
463 See Elizabeth D. Laporte & Jonathan M. Redgrave, A Practical Guide to Achieving 
Proportionality Under New Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, 9 FED. CTS. L. REV. 19, 54 (2015) 
(“Core discovery will virtually always be proportional.”). 
464 See generally Paul W. Grimm, Discovery Order, U.S. DIST. OF MD., 
www.lfcj.com/uploads/3/8/0/5/38050985/grimm_discovery_order.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 
2019); see also Paul W. Grimm, Practical Ways to Achieve Proportionality During Discovery 
and Reduce Costs in the Pretrial Phase of Federal Civil Cases, 51 AKRON L. REV. 721, 734–35 
(2018). 
465 Grimm & Yellin, supra note 13, at 518. 
466 Id. at 523–24.   
467 Lawson v. Spirit AeroSystems, Inc., No. 18-1100-EFM-ADM, 2020 WL 3288058, at *15 
(D. Kan. June 18, 2020) (citing Oxbow Carbon & Minerals LLC v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 322 
F.R.D. 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2017)). 
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Fargo Bank, the court ordered relators to pay fifty percent of the costs of production 
for documents originated after a specified date because they were “far less likely to 
bear fruit.”468 It declined to shift the costs of production of documents that “constitute 
the meat of this lawsuit.”469 In Unknown Parties v. Johnson, the court declined to shift 
the costs of preserving a video recording given “the importance of the evidence.”470  
In Williams v. Angie’s List, the court declined to order cost shifting for information 
“critical” to plaintiff’s claims.471   
Similarly, in Solo v. United Parcel Service Co., where plaintiffs sought ten years 
of ESI, the court distinguished between time periods for which there were potentially 
dispositive contractual defenses and those for which there were not.472 It shifted costs 
for the former, but ordered defendant to pay for and produce data from a sample of the 
latter.473 In FDIC v. Brudnicki, the court adopted an ESI protocol shifting the cost of 
imaging and hosting charges for production requests at the “outer boundaries of 
relevant information,” because of its modest expense and the fact that plaintiff was 
producing “at no cost . . . the key documents” in the case.474     
Scholars have also suggested that the perverse incentives created by straight 
application of either the traditional presumption or a requester-pays rule can be 
mitigated by “having initial rounds of discovery under the traditional responder pays 
cost allocation rules” and then, “at some point the cost allocation rule is reversed and 
requester pays.”475 The hard part is identifying that point. Some have suggested a case-
by-case application.476 The Sedona Conference draws a line between accessibility and 
inaccessibility, encouraging the courts to address cost shifting only after all relevant 
reasonably accessible information has been produced and reviewed.477 The Federal 
Circuit Model Order Regarding E-Discovery in Patent Cases mandates disclosure of 
 
468 United States ex rel. Bibby v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 165 F. Supp. 3d 1340, 1355–56 
(N.D. Ga. 2015). 
469 Id. at 1356. 
470 Unknown Parties v. Johnson, No. CV-15-00250, 2017 WL 7520603, at *7 (D. Ariz. Dec. 
19, 2017). 
471 Williams v. Angie’s List, Inc., No. 16-CV-00878, 2017 WL 1318419, at *6 (S.D. Ind. 
Apr. 10, 2017). 
472 Solo v. United Parcel Service Co., No. 14-12719, 2017 WL 85832, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 
10, 2017). 
473 Id. at *3–4. If plaintiff then sought production of the entirety of the ESI from that period, 
plaintiff would have to pay for it. Id. 
474 F.D.I.C. v. Brudnicki, 291 F.R.D. 669, 677 (N.D. Fla. 2013). 
475 Kobayashi, supra note 14, at 1496–97. 
476 Id. at 1497. 
477 Sedona Conference, Resources for the Judiciary, supra note 121, at 41 ¶ 14.3.2. 
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core documents and then draws a line: no cost shifting for requests of up to five search 
terms directed to up to five custodians, and beyond that cost shifting.478   
Yet, case-by-case standards provide little guidance, and an accessible-inaccessible 
divide fails to recognize the growing pressure to make information inaccessible. With 
increasing cybersecurity risks, there are costs to maintaining information on active 
servers. With cost shifting for inaccessible information, there are incentives to 
“downgrade information” to “inaccessible forms” in order to avoid discovery or shift 
costs.479 At the same time, numerical limits discourage the use of narrowly defined 
terms and ignore the reality that the number of key players will vary, as will the 
accessible ESI they possess.  
A better line creates a presumption against cost shifting if the discovery relates to 
a core issue, as defined by the pleaded claims and defenses.480 Doing so acknowledges 
the truth-seeking function of discovery,481 and that “[d]ocuments create a paper reality 
we call proof.”482 Doing so enables a court to make legal decisions regarding 
relevancy, rather than technical decisions regarding accessibility and burden.   
Successfully defining “core discovery” will depend on cooperation, in the form of 
disclosure. Scholars suggest tailoring discovery is dependent on the judge or 
magistrate having sufficient information to evaluate the utility of the discovery.483 The 
Sedona Conference likewise urges disclosure and cooperation:   
Parties who wish to conduct phased discovery must communicate . . . about 
the issues relevant to the litigation and making meaningful disclosures about 
the repositories . . . that may contain relevant information. Moreover, the 
parties must cooperate with one another to prepare and propose to the court 
a phased discovery plan.484 
Cooperation and disclosure regarding “core discovery” focuses the discussion. It 
focuses the discovery, and, in most cases, it offers an objective basis for defining 
importance. The question to ask here is, have the parties disclosed the information 
necessary to define core discovery in the case? If so, and if the disputed discovery 
 
478 Fed. Cir. Advisory Council, supra note 461, at 3. 
479 Mast, supra note 13 at 1839; Kara A. Schiermeyer, Note, The Artful Dodger: Responding 
Parties' Ability to Avoid Electronic Discovery Costs Under 26(b)(2)(B) and 26(b(2)(C) and the 
Preservation Obligation, 42 CREIGHTON L. REV. 227, 261 (2009). 
480 Grimm & Yellin, supra note 13, at 517–18. 
481 United Consumers Club, Inc. v. Prime Time Mktg. Mgmt. Inc., No. 07 CV 358, 2009 WL 
3200540, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 25, 2009) (“Discovery is a search for the truth.”); Zubulake v. 
UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Harlem River 
Consumers Co-op., Inc. v. Associated Grocers of Harlem, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 551, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 
1972) (“The purpose of discovery is to provide an orderly, efficient and effective means for 
ascertaining the truth in order to expedite a determination of the controversy on the merits.”). 
482 Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 214. 
483 Kobayashi, supra note 14, at 1497. 
484 Sedona Conference, Commentary on Proportionality, supra note 190, at 159. 
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seeks information from key players about key facts, this factor should weigh in favor 
of the traditional presumption. If not, the courts should consider cost shifting.   
F. Defining Burden and Benefit 
Courts have struggled to define burden. There are two steps that would enable 
courts to move beyond estimates as advocacy and increase objectivity: first, require 
multiple estimates for any disputed discovery; and, second, if costs are shifted, share 
control of the process or limit cost shifting. The standard for cost shifting, like 
preservation, should be reasonableness, not perfection.   
1. Cooperation & Estimates 
Courts should require parties to follow common practice in obtaining bids for large 
projects—talk to more than one vendor. One court has done so: In Escamilla v. SMS 
Holdings Corp., the court held defendant “SMS has not met its burden of 
demonstrating that the costs to restore and search the data will create an undue burden 
or cost. SMS’s entire argument relies on the cost estimates provided by only one 
vendor.”485 The court emphasized the importance of this, noting that defendant 
“admits that it has only provided ‘comprehensive estimates from one vendor,’”486 and 
the estimates are speculative because defendant relied on “a number of industry 
standard assumptions” rather than case-specific variables determined by sampling.487  
Compare this to Verigy US, Inc. v. Mayder, where defendant failed to substantiate its 
ballpark estimate of “$50,000 – $100,000” in costs, and the court found 
“[n]evertheless, it seems fair to assume that obtaining the requested records . . . will 
entail some cost.”488 The court then found it fair to split the costs.489  
The common advice given to practitioners is to obtain three estimates before hiring 
an eDiscovery vendor to perform work.490 The same advice should apply to cost 
shifting. By requiring more than one estimate in cost shifting or proportionality 
disputes, courts encourage efficiency. One vendor will have every incentive to inflate 
an estimate to satisfy a client looking to argue undue burden. Competing vendors will 
 
485 Escamilla v. SMS Holdings Corp., No. 09–2120, 2011 WL 5025254, at *9 (D. Minn. Oct. 
21, 2011); see also Black Love Resists in the Rust v. City of Buffalo, N.Y., 334 F.R.D. 23, 29 
(W.D.N.Y. 2019); Best Buy Stores, L.P. v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp., No. 05–2130, 
2007 WL 333987, at *1 (D. Minn. Feb. 1, 2007).  
486 Escamilla, 2011 WL 5025254, at *9.  
487 Id.  
488 Verigy US, Inc. v. Mayder, No. C07-04330, 2008 WL 4786621, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 
2008). 
489 Id. 
490 See, e.g., SEDONA CONFERENCE, BEST PRACTICES FOR THE SELECTION OF ELECTRONIC 
DISCOVERY VENDORS: NAVIGATING THE VENDOR PROPOSAL PROCESS (2007), 
https://thesedonaconference.org/sites/default/files/publications/Navigating%20the%20Vendor
%20Proposal%20Process%20Bet%20Practices%20for%20the%20Selection%20of%20Electro
nic%20Discovery%20Vendors%20June%202007.pdf. See id. at Appendix E for a sample 
decision matrix that contemplates scoring and ranking three separate vendors. 
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have less incentive to do so if they know that the court will order work done by or 
reimbursed at the rate of the low-cost provider.    
The incentive to inflate estimates decreases further if courts require and consider 
a requesting party’s alternative proposal and estimate.491 Prior to hearing a cost-
shifting motion, courts should mandate disclosure of sufficient information to allow 
the requesting party to obtain an estimate for the work to be done. If the requesting 
party does not have enough information to obtain an estimate, there has not been 
enough cooperation, and the court should deny the motion.   
A court requiring at least two estimates from the producing party and one from the 
requesting party would alleviate many of the current problems with litigants using 
estimates as advocacy. It may be difficult to create apples-to-apples comparisons as 
the software and processes used by different vendors differ, but the information 
disclosed will ground the discussion in fact and offer the court options.   
2. Shared Expenses & Shared Control 
That range of options will inevitably include debates over use of “obsolete 
technology” and technology that is “an albatross around the neck of electronic data 
discovery.”492 The debate may focus today on forms of production or how to collect 
ESI from mobile devices and something else tomorrow. Rule 1 encourages the courts 
to focus on efficiency. If it orders cost shifting, courts should do so at rates utilizing 
the most cost-effective means available to produce the information.    
In thinking about process, litigants make choices regarding who performs the work 
and how they do it. In Spieker v. Quest Cherokee, when defendant sought to outsource 
the work and shift over $100,000 in costs, the court directed the parties “to consider . 
. . using defendant's recently installed software and in-house IT staff and . . . utilizing 
Rule 502 to minimize the expense of a detailed privilege review.”493 The court found 
defendant’s reliance on its vendor’s estimate “greatly exaggerated.”494 In Adair v. EQT 
Production Co. the court again found that in-house technology provided a 
“reasonable” means to facilitate review. The responding party had the ability to filter 
and keyword search email,495 and though keyword has its limitations, it was 
“reasonable under the circumstances.”496   
Compare Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Earl Scheib, Inc., discussed 
supra,497 where the amount in controversy was $120,000 and defendant’s estimate 
 
491 See N. Shore-Long Island Jewish Health Sys., Inc. v. MultiPlan, Inc., 325 F.R.D. 36, 53 
(E.D.N.Y. 2018) (inviting submission of estimates from both producing and requesting parties). 
492 BALL, supra note 337, at 21. 
493 Spieker v. Quest Cherokee, LLC, No. 07–1225, 2009 WL 2168892, at *2 (D. Kan. July 
21, 2009). 
494 Id. at *3. 
495 Adair v. EQT Prod. Co., No. 10cv00037, 2012 WL 1965880, at *3–5 (W.D. Va. May 31, 
2012), aff’d, 2012 WL 2526982 (W.D. Va. June 29, 2012). 
496 Id. 
497 See supra text accompanying notes 321–25.  
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from a multi-national eDiscovery vendor was that it would cost $121,000, exclusive 
of attorney review time, to produce email from nineteen employees.498 What if, instead 
of simply shifting these costs, the court had encouraged the parties to negotiate an 
alternative protocol for the three key custodians instead of all nineteen employees?  
Two hundred nineteen gigabytes would have been reduced to fifty-five gigabytes, and 
$121,183.65 to $32,294.53.499 Producing in native file format would have eliminated 
imaging costs and reduced that sum to $17,856.53.500 Purchasing a license for an 
eDiscovery tool, as defendant proposed in Semsroth, would have eliminated the data 
extraction fees, resulting in costs of less than $10,000 instead of $121,000.501   
There is still a cost to the discovery. Somebody has to do the work. Somebody has 
to review the documents. But tailored discovery and alternative workflows would have 
reduced the cost in the above example to a small fraction of the $121,000 estimated. 
The proportionality analysis becomes very different at that point. Is it worth spending 
several thousand dollars, exclusive of review time, to determine what three key players 
wrote?   
Some courts and scholars have proposed another alternative: provide the ESI to 
the opposing party to search. As discussed above, Rowe sets out a protocol for the 
requesting party to restore and then search the backup tapes in question.502 Other 
courts have required production of entire databases to the requesting party, despite 
objections that irrelevant information and confidential information may be included.503   
Scholars have suggested that assigning the responding party the task of defining 
keyword searches and training predictive coding tools creates “misaligned incentives” 
because of cross-party agency costs.504 It is the requesting party that has the incentive 
 
498 Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Earl Scheib, Inc., No. 11–CV–0788, 2013 WL 485846, at *1 
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2013). 
499 Ahmadian Declaration, supra note 322, at 2. 
500 Id. 
501 Id. 
502 Rowe Ent., Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 432–33 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002); see also In re Onglyza (Saxagliptin) & Kombiglyze XR (Saxagliptin & Metformin) 
Prods. Liab. Litig., No.18-MD-2809, 2020 WL 2739176, at *4–5 (E.D. Ky. May 26, 2020); 
Davis v. E. Idaho Health Servs. Inc., No. 16-CV-00193, 2017 WL 1737723, at *4 (D. Idaho 
May 3, 2017); Viet. Veterans of Am. v. CIA, No. 09–CV–0037, 2012 WL 2375490, at *3 (N.D. 
Cal. June 22, 2012); Fendi Adele S.R.L. v. Filene’s Basement, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 244, 2009 WL 
855955, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2009). 
503 Compare High Point SARL v. Sprint Nextel Corp., No. 09-2269-CM, 2011 WL 4526770, 
at *12 (D. Kan. Sept. 28, 2011) (requiring production of entire database), and Goshawk 
Dedicated Ltd. v. Am. Viatical Servs., LLC, No. 05-CV-2343, 2007 WL 3492762, at *1 (N.D. 
Ga. Nov. 5, 2007) (same), with Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 285 F.R.D. 294, 305 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (not requiring production of entire database), and Daugherty v. Murphy, No. 
06–CV–0878, 2010 WL 4877720, at *7 n.5 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 23, 2010) (same), and Nicholas J. 
Murlas Living Tr. v. Mobil Oil Corp., No. 93 C 6956, 1995 WL 124186, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 
20, 1995) (same). 
504 Kobayashi, supra note 14, at 1504.  
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to optimally invest in searching the ESI, and advanced search technologies can 
mitigate the asymmetric information problems that otherwise exist when a requesting 
party is searching a data set.505   
While concerns about privilege make turning over ESI to the requesting party 
unrealistic in many cases,506 doing some of the work in-house is not. Ninety-five 
percent of Fortune 1000 companies, along with over two billion smaller organizations, 
now use cloud-based productivity solutions with basic eDiscovery functionality.507  
There are also an increasing number of options for outsourcing work to vendors 
offering simplified workflows, including technology assisted review.508 The point is 
that litigants have choices. The question is, do they have the incentives to choose a 
“reasonable,” cost-effective option?   
Cases report “overblown” cost-shifting arguments estimating forty hours to extract 
the requested information and six times that for quality assurance.509 Litigants estimate 
costs based on a “page-by-page” review of 1.2 million electronic documents, without 
use of any search terms or “automated screening” technology.510 Or, they assume the 
need to decrypt an entire database and $3.125 million in costs to manually review each 
transaction, instead of using commercially available software to identify relevant 
files.511 Litigants then estimate review costs based on hourly rates charged by senior 
associates charging $410 an hour.512 Experts write about vendors projecting over 
$25,000 in costs for processing ordinary business data, work done in twelve hours of 
 
505 Id. at 1506. 
506 Lawson v. Spirit AeroSystems, Inc., No. 18-1100-EFM-ADM, 2020 WL 3288058, at *20 
(D. Kan. June 18, 2020) (sampling showed 95% of the corpus was expected to be non-
responsive and contain privileged and work-product communications, proprietary information 
unrelated to the case, and confidential third-party and customer information); Mast, supra note 
13, at 1830.   
507 See Michael Brown, Why Moving to the Cloud is a Legal Conversation, LIGHTHOUSE 
(July 23, 2019), https://blog.lighthouseglobal.com/why-moving-to-the-cloud-is-a-legal-
conversation; Mark Johnson et al., eDiscovery in Office 365, MICROSOFT, 
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/compliance/ediscovery?view=o365-
worldwide#ediscoverycases (last updated Jan. 12, 2021); Liam Tung, Google: G Suite Now Has 
2 Billion Users, ZDNET (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.zdnet.com/article/google-g-suite-now-
has-2-billion-users/. 
508 Rob Robinson, An eDiscovery Challenge: Pricing Consistency and Transparency, 
COMPLEXDISCOVERY (May 16, 2017), https://complexdiscovery.com/an-ediscovery-challenge-
pricing-consistency-and-transparency/.   
509 Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 285 F.R.D. 294, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).  
510 Almont Ambulatory Surgery Ctr., LLC v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., No. CV 14-03053, 
2018 WL 5816108, at *4 (C.D. Ca. Apr. 25, 2018). 
511 Sung Gon Kang v. Credit Bureau Connection, Inc., No. 18-CV-01359, 2020 WL 
1689708, at *3–4 (E.D. Ca. Apr. 7, 2020). 
512 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake II), 216 F.R.D. 280, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see 
also Covad Commc’ns Co. v. Revonet, Inc. 254 F.R.D. 147, 151 (D.D.C. 2008) (splitting the 
cost of privilege review costs of up to $4,000 based on the cost of paralegal review). 
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largely unattended machine time, and over $125,000 in costs to process data into a 
review tool, again work that could be done in a day and largely by a machine.513 Panels 
of experts have suggested that about seventy percent of the money spent on 
eDiscovery is wasted.514     
Even in cases with an engaged judge, well-versed in eDiscovery, the costs can be 
“overblown”. When the court in Lawson v. Spirit Aerosystems, Inc. shifted more than 
$750,000 in eDiscovery costs, industry analysts compared the costs with industry 
pricing surveys, and asked, were costs “shifted” or was the requesting party 
“shafted”?515 In Lawson, the court shifted processing costs that were over three times 
the reported industry average.516 It shifted attorney per document review costs that 
were almost three times the reported industry average.517 It shifted per gigabyte 
predictive coding/technology assisted review costs that were at least 2.8 times the 
reported industry average,518 and hosting costs double the reported industry average.519     
What is lacking are the incentives to find the most cost-effective solution. The 
responding party, presumed best situated to determine how to preserve and produce 
its information, confronts perverse incentives where finding the most cost-effective 
solution decreases the likelihood of prevailing in a proportionality motion seeking to 
preclude the discovery or, in the alternative, shift its costs. In cases where the courts 
shift costs after the fact, the parties are left to argue about the legally defined 
 
513 Craig Ball, Unconscionable, BALL IN YOUR COURT, (June 19, 2014), 
https://ballinyourcourt.wordpress.com/2014/06/19/unconscionable/. 
514 See Craig Ball, Ten Things That Trouble Judges About E-Discovery, BALL IN YOUR 
COURT (Aug. 9, 2013), https://craigball.net/2013/08/09/1370/. 
515 Greg Buckles, Nuggets of Gold from a TAR Fight – Pt 2, EDISCOVERY JOURNAL, 
https://ediscoveryjournal.com/nuggets-of-gold-from-a-tar-fight-pt-2/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2021) 
(citing Rob Robinson, Balancing Relevance and Reality? Winter 2021 eDiscovery Pricing 
Survey Results, COMPLEX DISCOVERY, https://complexdiscovery.com/balancing-relevance-and-
reality-winter-2021-ediscovery-pricing-survey-results/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2021)); Doug 
Austin, Shifted or Shafted? Greg Buckles Applies Rob Robinson’s Pricing Survey Results to the 
Lawson Case, EDISCOVERYTODAY, https://ediscoverytoday.com/2020/12/10/shifted-or-
shafted-greg-buckles-applies-rob-robinsons-pricing-survey-results-to-the-lawson-case-
ediscovery-trends/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2021). 
516 Buckles, supra note 515. Most survey respondents (53.2%) identified their per GB 
processing costs as falling in the range of $25-75, compared to $182 paid by Aerospirit and then 
shifted to Lawson. Id.     
517 Id. Most survey respondents (48.1%) identified their attorney cost per document as falling 
in the range of $.50 - $1.00, compared to $2.24 per document paid by Aerospirit and then shifted 
to Lawson. Id.    
518 Id. Most survey respondents (53.2%) identified their predictive coding/technology 
assisted review costs were “less than $75” per gigabyte, compared to the $214 per gigabyte 
price paid by Aerospirit and then shifted to Lawson. 
519 Id. Most survey respondents (54.4%) identified their monthly hosting costs as falling 
within a range of $10-20, compared to the $30 paid by Aerospirit and then shifted to Lawson. 
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“reasonableness” of the choice made,520 but “[t]here is a big difference between 
reasonable and competitive.”521  
At the same time, if courts approve of oversized cost estimates and then shift all 
or a portion of those costs, responding parties have little incentive to invest in 
technology to efficiently preserve and produce ESI. Deciding whether to perform 
some eDiscovery-related functions in-house depends, in part, on the investment the 
responding party makes in advance of the litigation. Entities that have chosen to 
upgrade to modern backup technology can search backup media with little to no extra 
cost over searching active servers. Entities that have chosen to upgrade to modern 
document management systems are able to preserve, collect, and complete basic 
search-related tasks, without engaging an outside vendor.   
All of which makes part of Judge Facciola’s analysis in McPeek less compelling.  
In McPeek, he wrote that a parties’ “choice” to use computers “assumes an alternative” 
and “[w]hat alternative is there? Quill pens?”522 Framed as a binary choice, to use 
computers or not, there is little alternative. But the choices are more complicated. 
Courts have long acknowledged that parties make choices about how to store 
information, and those parties are responsible for their choices.523 Courts do not 
hesitate to shift costs as a sanction when one party fails to comply with discovery 
obligations.524 Courts do not hesitate to shift costs when the responding party breaches 
a duty to preserve, requiring costly steps to restore or recover relevant information.525   
 
520 “To determine the amount of expenses to allocate to Lawson, the court must 
independently analyze the reasonableness of Spirit's expenses.” Lawson v. Spirit AeroSystems, 
Inc., No. 18-1100-EFM-ADM, 2020 WL 6343292, at *2 (D. Kan. Oct. 29, 2020), aff'd, No. 18-
1100-EFM, 2020 WL 6939752 (D. Kan. Nov. 24, 2020). 
521 Id.   
522 McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 33 (D.D.C. 2001). 
523 See, e.g., Baine v. Gen. Motors Corp., 141 F.R.D. 328, 330–32 (M.D. Ala. 1991); 
Christopher R. Chase, To Shred or Not to Shred: Document Retention Policies and Federal 
Obstruction of Justice Statutes, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 721, 724 (2003); R. Thomas 
Howell, Jr. & Rae N. Coger, Developing and Implementing A Record Retention Program, 50 
PRAC. L. 21, 28–29 (2004). 
524 See, e.g., Youngevity Int’l Corp. v. Smith, No. 16-cv-00704, 2017 WL 6541106, at *12 
(S.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017); Est. of Shaw v. Marcus, No. 14 Civ. 3849, 2017 WL 825317, at *6 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2017); Wingnut Films, Ltd. v. Katja Motion Pictures, Corp., No. CV 05–
1516, 2007 WL 2758571, at *20 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2007). 
525 See, e.g., Coyne v. Los Alamos Nat’l Sec., LLC, No. CIV 15-0054, 2016 WL 9488766, 
at *2–3 (D.N.M. Dec. 16, 2016); Sophia & Chloe, Inc. v. Brighton Collectibles, Inc., No. 
12cv2472, 2014 WL 12642170, at *8 (S.D. Cal. May 28, 2014); Stewart v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 
2014 WL 12600282, at *4 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 9, 2014); Quinby v. WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94, 106 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“[I]f a party creates its own burden or expense by converting into an 
inaccessible format data that it should have reasonably foreseen would be discoverable material 
at a time when it should have anticipated litigation, then it should not be entitled to shift the 
costs of restoring and searching the data.”).   
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The same issues arise with the choices parties make regarding document retention 
policies.526 In Wagoner v. Lewis Gale Medical Center, LLC, defendant implemented 
a three-day auto-delete policy and then argued its ESI was inaccessible and the 
opposing party’s discovery not proportional. The court rejected the argument, citing 
case law holding that “the Court cannot relieve Defendant of its duty to produce those 
documents merely because Defendant has chosen a means to preserve the evidence 
which makes ultimate production of relevant documents expensive.”527 Courts have 
drawn the same distinction in ruling on cost-shifting motions. In DeGeer v. Gillis, the 
court split the cost of producing some information, but refused to do so where a party 
had adopted a policy of immediately deleting emails to avoid production during 
discovery.528 
Judges have warned that “[t]he proliferation of electronically stored information 
and the resulting increasing reliance on retention policies make the concept of ‘willful 
blindness’ all the more acute.”529 Courts must ensure that companies cannot “blindly 
destroy documents and expect to be shielded by a seemingly innocuous document 
retention policy.”530   
While the current rules encourage parties to make their information inaccessible 
as quickly as possible, making the process more expensive and cost-shifting 
arguments more persuasive,531 investment in a “well-organized document 
management system will ultimately reduce litigation expenses through more efficient 
document retrieval during discovery requests.”532   
Courts considering cost shifting should consider the incentives they create. What 
this Article proposes, is that courts require and consider alternative processes, and if 
costs are shifted, shift the incentives. If costs are shifted, allow the requesting party to 
seek out and engage a lower cost provider or reimburse the responding party at a 
competitive rate, assuming sound information governance and cost-effective 
 
526 See, e.g., In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 295 S.W.3d 309, 312 (Tex. 2009) (noting that a 
thirty-day document retention policy for email resulted in only one responsive email); Connor 
v. Sun Tr. Bank, 546 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1366–68, 1375–77 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (observing that a 
thirty-day document retention policy for email resulted in deletion of relevant email and 
spoliation claim). 
527 Wagoner v. Lewis Gale Med. Ctr., LLC, No. 7:15CV570, 2016 WL 3893135, at *3 (W.D. 
Va. July 14, 2016) (internal quotations omitted); see also Starbucks Corp. v. ADT Sec. Servs., 
Inc., No. 08-CV-900, 2009 WL 4730798, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 30, 2009) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
528 DeGeer v. Gillis, 755 F. Supp. 2d 909, 930 (N.D. Ill. 2010). 
529 Brookshire Bros. v. Aldridge, 438 S.W.3d 9, 37 (Tex. 2014) (Guzman, J., dissenting). 
530 Id. 
531 Schiermeyer, supra note 479, at 227–28; Mast, supra note 13, at 1839; Groot, supra note 
438, at 2. 
532 Jessica Lynn Repa, Adjudicating Beyond the Scope of Ordinary Business: Why the 
Inaccessibility Test in Zubulake Unduly Stifles Cost-Shifting During Electronic Discovery, 54 
AM. U. L. REV. 257, 297 (2004). 
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eDiscovery practices. If a responding party chooses a preferred process or vendor in 
lieu of a more cost-efficient one, it should bear the added expense.    
Absent that, the current legal standard will continue to reward those who create 
undue burden: those who do not invest in technology that enables the efficient 
production of information, and those who hire the highest price vendor. There are 
choices to be in made in responding to requests for ESI, and the courts’ decisions 
regarding cost shifting influence those choices.   
3. Costs of Review & Other Costs 
Nowhere are those choices more evident than with the cost of review. Most of the 
surveyed decisions that consider whether to shift the cost of review shift the cost of 
restoration and or search, but not the cost of review.533 In Zubulake, the court 
emphasized that the parties could reach an agreement “and thereby avoid any cost of 
reviewing . . . for privilege.”534 Rowe reached the same conclusion: “the sanctity of 
defendants’ documents can be adequately preserved at little cost by enforcement of a 
confidentiality agreement and . . . a protocol” that contained claw-back and non-
waiver provisions.535   
 
533 See., e.g., OptoLum Inc v. Cree Inc., No. 1:17CV687, 2018 WL 6834608, at *9 
(M.D.N.C. Dec. 28, 2018); Almont Ambulatory Surgery Ctr., LLC v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc, 
No. CV 14-03053, 2018 WL 5816108, at *7 (C.D. Ca. Apr. 25, 2018); EQT Prod. Co. v. Terra 
Servs., LLC, No. 14-1053, 2017 WL 10457417, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2017); Estate of Shaw 
v. Marcus, No. 14 Civ. 3849, 14 Civ. 5653, 2017 WL 825317, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2017); 
Elkarwily v. Franciscan Health Sys., No. 3:15-cv-05579-RJB, 2016 WL 4061575, at *3 (W.D. 
Wash. July 29, 2016); United States ex rel. Guardiola v. Renown Health, No. 3:12-cv-00295, 
2015 WL 5056726, at *4 (D. Nev. Aug. 25, 2015); Hausman v. Holland America Line-USA, 
No. 13cv00937, 2015 WL 11234152, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 17, 2015); United States ex rel. 
Garbe v. Kmart Corp., No. 12-CV-881, 2014 WL 12787823, at *3–4 (S.D. Ill. May 2, 2014); 
Cochran v. Caldera Med., Inc., No. 12-5109, 2014 WL 1608664, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2014); 
Thornton v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, No. 12-CV-298, 2013 WL 1890706, at *2–3 
(N.D. Okla. May 3, 2013); Remy Inc. v. Tecnomatic, S.P.A., No. 1:11-cv-00991, 2013 WL 
1310216, at *8 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 27, 2013); Adair v. EQT Prod. Co., No. 1:10cv00037, 2012 WL 
1965880, at *4–5 (W.D. Va. May 31, 2012); Fleisher v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., No. 11 Civ. 
8405, 2012 WL 6732905, at *4 (Dec. 27, 2012); Couch v. Wan, No. CV08–1621, 2011 WL 
2551546, at *4 (June 24, 2011); Clean Harbors Env’t Servs., Inc. v. ESIS, Inc., No. 09 C 3789, 
2011 WL 1897213, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2011); Radian Asset Assurance, Inc. v. Coll. of the 
Christian Bros. of N.M., No. CIV 09-0885, 2010 WL 4928866, at *5 (D.N.M. Oct. 22, 2010); 
Universal Del., Inc. v. Comdata Corp., No. 07-1078, 2010 WL 1381225, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 
31, 2010); Byers v. Ill. State Police, No. 99 C 8105, 2002 WL 1264004, at *11–12 (N.D. Ill. 
June 3, 2002); Foreclosure Mgmt. Co. v. Asset Mgmt. Holdings, LLC, No. 07-2388, 2008 WL 
3822773, at *7, *10 (D. Kan. Aug. 13, 2008); Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630, 
638–41 (D. Kan. 2006); Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 574–77 (N.D. Ill. 
2004); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); 
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Murphy 
Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., No. Civ.A. 99-3564, 2002 WL 246439, at *5–8 (E.D. La. 
Feb. 19, 2002); Rowe Ent., Inc. v. William Morris Agency., Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002); Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 462–63 (D. Utah 1985). 
534 Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 290–91 (emphasis added).  
535 Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 432. 
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The costs are significant. The 2012 RAND study Where the Money Goes found 
attorney review for relevance, responsiveness, and privilege accounted for seventy-
three percent of the total cost of the discovery.536 Empirical studies suggest that 
discovery costs account for between twenty and fifty percent of total litigation costs.537  
Impressionistic studies suggest that discovery costs in cases that do not go to trial are 
closer to seventy percent of total costs. If less than one percent of all federal cases now 
go to trial,538 seventy percent of the costs of those cases are attributable to discovery, 
and seventy-three percent of those costs are generated by attorney review, then shifting 
review costs to the opposing party potentially shifts the majority of litigation costs.   
Since 1796, the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the American Rule, so that 
those with limited resources “should not be unjustly discouraged from vindicating 
their rights.”539 Shifting the costs of review does just that. It penalizes those who 
cannot pay, and it undermines Supreme Court jurisprudence, not by congressionally 
enacted statute, but by interlocutory discovery order. Yet, the cost of review is 
logically part of the burden of discovery. At the end of the day, somebody must pay 
for it. Framed as a binary choice between who should bear that burden, the issue 
presents harsh choices. The question to ask first is, is there a better way?   
The Sedona Conference’s Commentary on Protection of Privileged ESI 
acknowledges that “the procedure and process for protecting privileged ESI from 
production is broken,” and preparation of a privilege log alone can consume hundreds 
of thousands of dollars.540 The solution is not to shift the costs of a broken system onto 
the requesting party; the solution is to re-evaluate the methodology.   
In the context of cost shifting, this means evaluating different methods of review 
when assessing the burden, and, if courts ultimately choose to shift costs then 
determining how much to shift. If a party seeks to shift costs, it should not dictate the 
costs by controlling the methodology. Instead, the courts should limit the costs shifted 
to those associated with the least expensive means of review aided by technology and 
a Rule 502(d) order.   
Some courts have already done this. Judge Francis’s protocol in Rowe allowed the 
requesting party to designate an expert to restore the backup tape in question and 
offered the responding party a choice: produce that tape to the requesting party without 
 
536 PACE & ZAKARAS, supra note 28, at xiv–xv. 
537 Emergy G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil 
Litigation, 60 DUKE L. J. 765, 781 (2010). 
538 Id. 
539 Fleishmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967) (“[S]ince 
litigation is at best uncertain one should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a 
lawsuit . . . the poor might be unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their 
rights if the penalty for losing included the fees of their opponents’ counsel.”). 
540 Sedona Conference, Commentary on Protection of Privileged ESI, 17 SEDONA CONF. J. 
95, 103, 155 (2016). 
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review, subject to a claw-back agreement, or review at its own expense the restored 
email communications.541 Other courts have adopted similar protocols.542   
Still, others have explored options between linear review and no review.543 The 
Sedona Conference discusses the use of “general and matter- or entity-specific 
privilege ontology searches” and the use of email addresses and domain names to 
identify counsel.544 Email threading and concept engines can also be used to identify 
privileged documents.545 The court in Good v. American Water Works Co. encouraged 
the use of technology assisted review for privilege in lieu of the manual review,546 and  
there is now machine learning-based “attorney-client privilege detection” built into 
widely used productivity software.547 Elsewhere, practitioners have proposed 
streamlined privileged log protocols utilizing automated metadata logs and 
sampling.548 In short, the producing party has choices when it comes to review.549    
Traditionally, the producing party “unilaterally decides on the review protocol,”550 
and some have objected to attempts to encourage use of technology assisted review 
that forgoes linear review. They argue that this infringes on attorney-client privilege 
and work product protections.551 The concern is “that electronic searching is not 
adequate to protect its rights.”552   
 
541 See Rowe Ent., Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 432–33 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002).    
542 Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., No. Civ.A. 99-3564, 2002 WL 246439, at 
*8–9 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2002); see also Remy Inc. v. Tecnomatic, S.P.A., No. 1:11–CV–00991, 
2013 WL 1310216, at *8 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 27, 2013); Radian Asset Assur., Inc. v. Coll. of the 
Christian Bros. of New Mexico, 2010 WL 4928866, at *4–5 (D.N.M. Oct. 22, 2010). 
543 See, e.g., Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 574–77 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
544 Sedona Conference, Commentary on Protection of Privileged ESI, supra note 540, at 169. 
545 Id. at 170. 
546 Good v. Am. Water Works Co., No. 2:14-01374, 2014 WL 5486827, at *2–3 (S.D. W. 
Va. Oct. 29, 2014). 
547 Set up attorney-client privilege detection in Advanced eDiscovery, MICROSOFT, 
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/compliance/attorney-privilege-
detection?view=o365-worldwide (last visited Feb. 4, 2021).  
548 EDRM Streamlined Privilege Log Protocol, EDRM, https://edrm.net/wp-
content/uploads/2020/11/EDRM_Privilege-Log-Protocol_Draft-as-of-11_30_20.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2021). 
549 See, e.g., Sun Gon Kang v. Credit Bureau Connection, Inc., No.1:18-cv-01359, slip op. 
at 6–7 (E.D. Ca. Apr. 7, 2020); Almont Ambulatory Surgery Ctr., LLC v. UnitedHealth Grp., 
Inc, No. CV 14-03053, 2018 WL 5816108, at *4–5 (C.D. Ca. Apr. 25, 2018). 
550 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
551 Almont, 2018 WL 5816108, at *4–5; Adair v. EQT Prod. Co., Nos. 1:10CV00037, 
1:10CV00041, 2012 WL 2526982, at *3–4 (W.D. Va. June 29, 2012). 
552 Adair, 2012 WL 2526982, at *3–5. 
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Yet, courts have long recognized manual review is no longer realistic, and perfect 
review is impossible. Fifteen years ago, Judge Grimm acknowledged “the unavoidable 
truth” that discovery may encompass millions of electronic records that are 
discoverable and “to insist in every case upon ‘old world’ record-by-record pre-
production privilege review . . . would impose upon parties costs of production that 
bear no proportionality to what is at stake in the litigation.”553 As a result, the rules 
now “encourage” the requesting party to agree not to assert waiver where a responding 
party agrees to produce ESI without doing “a full-fledged privilege review.”554   
Some courts now find cost shifting unnecessary “because those costs could be 
mitigated by the use of electronic searching and production, together with the 
protections of the Protective and Clawback Orders.”555 Other courts decline to shift 
the costs of review because of the protections now afforded by Fed. R. Evid. 502:  
while defendant “is, of course, free to engage in as exacting a privilege review as it 
wishes, entry of a Rule 502(d) order will protect against waiver if it opts to conduct a 
more economical analysis.”556   
The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 502 make the same points: analytics 
facilitate review,557 and 502(d) “enable[s] a court to enter an order . . . that will allow 
the parties to conduct and respond to discovery expeditiously, without the need for 
exhaustive pre-production privilege reviews, while still preserving each party’s right 
to assert the privilege.”558   
Courts acknowledge this means “errors will be made and privileged documents 
will sometimes be produced inadvertently.”559 Yet, the risk of such inadvertent 
production is present regardless of “whether the documents are searched and reviewed 
electronically or by human eyes.”560   
Litigants may reasonably choose to lay eyes on each document prior to production.  
The added cost may be worth it. However, given Rule 502(d) and the technology 
available to reduce costs, the cost of a traditional review—the cost of a “broken” 
system—is not reasonably imposed on the requesting party in a cost-shifting 
 
553 Hopson v. Mayor of Balt., 232 F.R.D. 228, 244 (D. Md. 2005).  
554 Id. at 234–35. 
555 Adair, 2012 WL 2526982, at *3–5. 
556 Fleisher v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., No. 11 Civ. 8405, 2012 WL 6732905, at *3–5 (S.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 27, 2012); see also Almont Ambulatory Surgery Ctr. LLC v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., LLC, 
No. CV 14-03053, 2018 WL 5816108, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2018); Thornton v. Morgan 
Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, No. 12-CV-298, 2013 WL 1890706, at *2–3 (N.D. Okla. May 3, 
2013). 
557 FED. R. EVID. 502, advisory committee’s note to 2007 amendment. 
558 FED. R. EVID. 502, add. to advisory committee’s note to 2007 amendment, quoted in 
Adair, 2012 WL 2526982, at *5. 
559 MVB Mortg. Corp. v. F.D.I.C., No. 2:08-CV-771, 2010 WL 582641, at *4 (S.D. Ohio 
Feb. 11, 2010); accord Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini-Hohberger Dhimantec, 529 F.3d 
371, 388 (7th Cir. 2008).   
560 Adair, 2012 WL 2526982, at *4. 
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motion.561 For those courts that shift the cost of review, an inquiry into the most 
efficient means, with the understanding that Rule 502(d) is designed to obviate the 
need for exhaustive review, should be part-in-parcel of any analysis.    
Note the incentives this creates. Computers are good at finding key words like 
“work product,” and “attorney-client.” They are good at using metadata to create 
communication maps and pattern recognition to create subject matter clusters and 
rankings. If those maintaining large stores of information know in advance that their 
ability to assert privilege or protection over material depends on use of technology 
assisted review and that such review is bolstered by properly labeling the material in 
the first place, they are more likely to do so.562   
Failure to label work product as work product and confidential attorney 
communications as confidential communications creates expense. It is a variation on 
the same failure to organize that courts have for decades held lies with the party who 
created the expense. In Rowe, the court found “defendants retained privileged or 
confidential documents in electronic form but failed to designate them to specific 
files,” and this was “analogous to where a company intermingles confidential 
documents with non-confidential, discoverable papers.” 563 Rowe found “the expense 
of sorting such documents is properly borne by the responding party.”564 Courts “will 
not shift the burden of discovery onto the discovering party where the costliness of the 
discovery procedure involved is entirely a product of the defendant’s record-keeping 
scheme over which the plaintiff has no control.”565 A legal norm that suggests “if you 
 
561 Litigants have testified that total privilege review costs exceeding $7 million could have 
been avoided using Rule 502 and technology to cull out and prioritize privilege review. See 
Committee on Rules of Prac. & Proc. of the Jud. Conf. of the U.S., Report of the Advisory 
Committee on Evidence Rules, U.S. CTS. 27–28 (May 15, 2007), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/2007-05-Committee_Report-
Evidence.pdf (summarizing joint testimony of Patrick Oot & Anne Kershaw), quoted in Sedona 
Conference, Commentary on Protection of Privileged ESI, supra note 541, at 102 n.1. 
562 Work product, by definition, is limited to documents and tangible things “prepared in 
anticipation of litigation or for trial” by or for a party or its representative. FED. R. CIV. P. 
26(b)(3)(A). If the party or its representative “anticipates” litigation, there is an opportunity to 
label work product accordingly. Assertion of attorney-client privilege generally requires a 
confidential communication made to get or give legal advice between an attorney and a client.  
See, e.g., United States v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 119 F.3d 210, 214 (2d Cir. 1997); 
United States v. White, 950 F.2d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 1991). Again, this standard presupposes 
intentional action, again offering an opportunity to label the communications as confidential.  
What precludes parties from better organizing privileged or protected information in the first 
place?    
563 Rowe Ent., Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).  
564 Id.; see also Davis v. E. Idaho Health Servs., Inc., 2017 WL 1737723, at *4 (D. Idaho 
May 3, 2017). 
565 Delozier v. First Nat’l Bank of Gatlinburg, 109 F.R.D. 161, 164 (E.D. Tenn. 1986); see 
also Sun Gon Kang v. Credit Bureau Connection, Inc., No. 1:18-cv-01359, 2020 WL 1689708, 
at *6 (E.D. Ca. Apr. 7, 2020) (“[T]he fact that there are numerous files, or Defendant has stored 
them in an unorganized fashion, does not excuse their production.”); Kozlowski v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 73 F.R.D. 73, 77 (D. Mass. 1976). 
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want protect a privileged document, label it properly” would save untold sums over 
the long term.   
Litigation costs will decrease, and so will profits, for some. While litigants use 
estimates as advocacy, reports suggest law firms use discovery as a profit center. In 
one survey, ninety-three percent of the firms surveyed reported revenue from 
eDiscovery “exceeded expectations.”566 Some law firms have marked up contract 
attorney review rates 513 percent.567 Some law firms have sought $550 - $1,000 per 
hour for contract attorneys doing review work paid at $40-$60 per hour.568   
Commentators worry about “stratospheric” mark-ups taking “advantage of the client 
by taking a low-priced resource and billing them as a high-priced resource.”569  
Attorneys have defended the markup as necessary to cover overhead costs.570 But 
should profit margins and overhead costs be shifted to an opposing party or used to 
preclude otherwise relevant discovery? 
The Sedona Conference Commentary on Protection of Privileged ESI 
acknowledges that the parties should make use of processes and technologies to reduce 
the cost associated with the assertion of privilege.571 Courts can, through the legal 
standards they adopt, provide incentives to do so. Refusal to shift the cost of review 
will, over the long run create incentives for better document management and more 
efficient review.   
G. Relative Ability of Each Party to Control Costs 
There is little dispute that the specificity of the request defines its costs. The real 
question is, how do you get to narrowly tailored discovery? In short, it is an iterative 
process, and it requires cooperation.  
The party asserting undue burden has the burden to support its motion with 
affidavits and evidentiary proof, or at least “detailed explanations.”572 The requesting 
 
566 HBR Releases Results of Law Firm e-Discovery Strategy Survey, BUSINESSWIRE (May 
27, 2015), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20150527006283/en/HBR-Releases-
Results-Law-Firm-e-Discovery-Strategy. 
567 Doug Austin, This Firm Marked Up Reviewer Billings over 500 Percent and that’s Not 
the Worst Part, EDISCOVERYDAILY (June 3, 2015), https://www.edrm.net/2015/06/this-firm-
marked-up-reviewer-billings-over-500-percent-and-thats-not-the-worst-part-ediscovery-
trends/. 
568 Martha Neil, Does Legal Fees Motion in $590M Citigroup Case Include $1K Per Hour 
for Low-Paid Contract Lawyers?, A.B.A.  J. (Jan. 3, 2013), 
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/does_legal_fees_motion_in_590m_citigroup_case_i
nclude_1k_per_hour_for_low-p.  
569 Gina Passarella, Are Contract Attorney Markups of Any Concern to Clients?, LEGAL 
INTELLIGENCER (June 2, 2015), https://plus.lexis.com/api/permalink/6f80d68f-c152-4f40-89ec-
d15c2a37fd26/?context=1530671. 
570 Austin, supra note 567. 
571 Sedona Conference, Commentary on Protection of Privileged ESI, supra note 540, at 154 
(Principle 4). 
572 Foreclosure Mgmt. Co. v. Asset Mgmt. Holdings, LLC, No. 07-2388, 2008 WL 3822773, 
at *6 (D. Kan. Aug. 13, 2008); Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630, 633 (D. Kan. 
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party has the burden to rebut that showing.573 Yet, the case law shows, time and again, 
that litigants fail to provide even basic information about burden, and they fail to 
cooperate to narrowly tailor the discovery in dispute. The solution proposed here is to 
require both: as a pre-requisite to motion practice, require cooperation in the form of 
disclosure of sufficient information to narrowly tailor discovery and obtain an 
independent estimate of the costs.   
The case law shows responding parties failing to provide “any evidence showing 
the expenditure of time, effort or money that would be necessary to produce the 
requested documents.”574 Courts find, “frankly, the parties’ broad claims about their 
respective discovery proposals are too speculative . . . this is less a situation where the 
scales are evenly balanced, and more one where the court has been given nothing to 
place on either side.”575 Courts lament “ipse dixit assertions by counsel that requested 
discovery of electronic records is overbroad, burdensome or prohibitively expensive 
[that] provide no help at all to the court.”576   
Litigants will pointedly refuse to provide information about the operating systems 
in question, the number of drives, the size of each, and the database management 
software. 577 They refuse to list employees or key players. 578 They refuse to identify 
 
2006); Quinby v. WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Wiginton v. CB Richard 
Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 573 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake 
III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
573 See United States ex rel. Carter v. Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., 305 F.R.D. 225, 243 (S.D. 
Cal. 2015). 
574 Foreclosure Mgmt. Co., 2008 WL 3822773, at *7; see also Hoist Fitness Sys., Inc. v. 
TuffStuff Fitness Int’l, Inc., No. EDCV 17-1388, 2019 WL 121195, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 
2019); Cooper Clinic, P.A. v. Pulse Sys., Inc., No. 14-1305, 2017 WL 396286, at *7 (D. Kan. 
Jan. 30, 2017); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Healthcare Chiropractic Clinic, Inc., No. 15-cv-
2527, 2016 WL 9330708, at *3 (D. Minn. Sept. 2, 2016); Nogle v. Beech St. Corp., No. 2:10-
cv-01092, 2012 WL 3687570, at *8 (D. Nev. Aug. 27, 2012); Dahl v. Bain Cap. Partners, LLC., 
655 F. Supp. 2d 146, 149 (D. Mass 2009). 
575 W Holding Co. v. Chartis Ins. Co. of Puerto Rico, 293 F.R.D. 68, 74 (D.P.R. 2013). 
576 In re Coventry Healthcare, Inc., ERISA Litig., 290 F.R.D. 471, 475 n.5 (D. Md. 2013) 
(citations omitted); Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 98–99 (D. 
Md. 2003); see also Nehad v. Browder, No. 15-CV-1386, 2016 WL 3769807, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 
July 15, 2016); Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., 305 F.R.D. at 243; Cochran v. Caldera Med., Inc., No. 
12-5109, 2014 WL 1608664, at *2–3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2014); Stewart v. Cont’l Cas. Co., No. 
12-00532, 2014 WL 12600282, at *4 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 9, 2014); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass'n v. 
GreenPoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., 939 N.Y.S.2d 395, 400 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012); Mikron 
Indus., Inc. v. Hurd Windows & Doors, Inc., No. C07-532RSL, 2008 WL 1805727, at *1–2 
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 21, 2008); S. Cap. Enters., Inc. v. Conseco Servs., LLC, No. 04-0402, 2005 
WL 8155415, at *3 (M.D. La. Oct. 6, 2005). 
577 Willett v. Redflex Traffic Sys., Inc., No. 1:13-CV-1241, 2015 WL 13662593 (D.N.M. 
May 8, 2015). 
578 DeGeer v. Gillis, 755 F. Supp. 2d 909, 929–30 (N.D. Ill. 2010). 
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the search terms to be used.579 Litigants refuse to define what is inaccessible, or how 
they arrive at their cost estimates.580 In other cases, litigants refuse to answer questions 
regarding the content of the hard drives in question, provide access to any of them, 
explain whether any of the data might be derived from other sources, or discuss the 
costs of alternatives.581 Litigants will argue undue burden, but “keep[] its computer 
systems secret.”582 Litigants will seek to shift the cost of converting documents to 
searchable form, without identifying the number of documents or custodians; they will 
“fail[] to provide any support whatsoever” for their estimate.583 Litigants look for the 
court to “rubberstamp” assertions of burden.584   
Some courts are critical of this failure to cooperate. They find the responding party 
“should have been up-front . . . regarding its proposed custodians and search terms 
and then receptive to defense counsel’s input. . . . The requesting party should not have 
had to file a motion to compel to obtain disclosure of this information.”585 They expect 
the parties to work together to arrive at reasonable search terms and cooperate to refine 
them.586 Some courts acknowledge that the “most important ingredient for the 
analytical process to produce a fair result is a particularization of the facts to support 
any challenge to discovery of electronic records.”587   
Some courts reject cost shifting and undue burden arguments because of a failure 
to cooperate. Judge Grimm’s standing order makes clear that a parties’ lack of 
cooperation will be held against them.588 In Pippins v. KPMG LLP, Judge Francis 
found defendant’s refusal to “engage in good faith negotiations over the scope of the 
preservation” unreasonable and defendant “hoist on its own petard.”589      
 
579 Id.; Burd v. Ford Motor Co., No. 3:13-CV-20976, 2015 WL 4137915, at *2 (S.D.W. Va. 
July 8, 2015).   
580 Hallmark v. Cohen & Slamowitz, LLP, No. 11-CV-842, 2016 WL 1128494, at *3 
(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2016). 
581 Pippins v. KPMG LLP, 279 F.R.D. 245, 250–51 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).   
582 Labrier v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 314 F.R.D. 637, 642 (W.D. Mo. 2016) (refusing 
to shift cost based on responding party’s refusal to provide information regarding its databases), 
order vacated on other grounds sub nom. In re State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 872 F.3d 567, 577 
(8th Cir. 2017). 
583 Proctor & Gamble Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., No. 9:08-CV-143, 2009 WL 440543, 
at *1 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 2009). 
584 Hallmark, 2016 WL 1128494, at *3. See generally Cargill Meat Sols. Corp. v. Premium 
Beef Feeders, LLC, No. 13-CV-1168, 2015 WL 3937410 (D. Kan. June 26, 2015). 
585 DeGeer v. Gillis, 755 F. Supp. 2d 909, 929–30 (N.D. Ill. 2010). 
586 UnitedHealthcare of Fla., Inc. v. Am. Renal Assocs., No. 16-cv-81180, 2017 WL 
4785457, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 20, 2017). 
587 Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 98 (D. Md. 2003). 
588 Grimm, Discovery Order, supra note 464, at 2. 
589 Pippins v. KPMG LLP, 279 F.R.D. 245, 254, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); see also Pyle v. 
Selective Ins. Co. of Am., No. 2:16-cv-335, 2016 WL 5661749, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2016) 
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In some cases, there is an iterative process where disclosure is followed by more 
narrowly tailored discovery during litigants’ motion practice. The discovery that gave 
rise to the seminal Zubulake opinions did not start narrowly tailored. Plaintiff’s first 
request sought production of “[a]ll documents concerning any communication by or 
between UBS employees concerning Plaintiff.”590 Defendant’s objections gave rise to 
a motion to compel, an exchange of letters with the court, and a telephone conference 
before a magistrate judge.591 Following that telephone conference, defendant agreed 
to produce email from the accounts of five individuals named by plaintiff over a 
twenty-nine month period.592 Judge Scheindlin went on to find, as revised, “[t]his is a 
relatively limited and targeted request.”593 
Compare this to plaintiff’s request in Rodriguez-Torres v. Government 
Development Bank of Puerto Rico, an employment discrimination case seeking “all e-
mail communications and calendar entries describing, relating or referring to plaintiff” 
for a three-year period.594 In Rodriguez-Torres, the record shows no hearing and 
exchange of information enabling the parties to limit the request to key custodians.  
The court simply found the discovery presented “too high” a cost and was “a fishing 
expedition.”595 The very same discovery resulted in one case in production of relevant 
email from key custodians and in another no production at all. The difference was that 
one court required cooperation, which allowed the parties to agree on key custodians.  
The second court simply found the discovery overly broad.   
The solution proposed here is to mandate cooperation before the motions get filed.  
Courts should require disclosure of information sufficient to narrowly tailor the 
discovery in question and allow the requesting party or the court to obtain an 
independent estimate of the cost of that more narrowly tailored discovery. Courts 
should require joint submissions, as part of a Rule 26(c) or 37(a) certification, and in 
them require the parties disclose information regarding information systems, key 
 
(internal quotations omitted) (“Among the items about which the court expects counsel to ‘reach 
practical agreement’ without the court having to micro-manage e-discovery are ‘search terms, 
date ranges, key players and the like.’”); Romero v. Allstate Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. 96, 109 (E.D. 
Pa. 2010); Wachtel v. Health Net, Inc., 239 F.R.D. 81, 94 (D.N.J. 2006) (finding that the meet 
and confer process was “compromised by [a] willful failure to identify to the Plaintiffs the full 
range of documents that were responsive to Plaintiffs' document requests.”). 
590 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 312–13 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); 
see also Schachter v. Sunrise Senior Living Mgmt., Inc., No. 3:18 CV 953, 2020 WL 486880, 
at *6 (D. Conn. Jan. 30, 2020); Webasto Thermo & Comfort N. Am. v. BesTop, Inc., 326 F.R.D. 
465, 469 (E.D. Mich. 2018); Cooper Clinic, P.A. v. Pulse Sys., Inc., No. 14-1305, 2017 WL 
396286, at *2 (D. Kan. Jan. 30, 2017); Hawa v. Coatesville Area Sch. Dist., No. 15-4828, 2017 
WL 1021026, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2017).  
591 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 312–13.  
592 Id. 
593 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
594 Rodriguez-Torres v. Gov’t Dev. Bank of P.R., 265 F.R.D. 40, 43 (D.P.R. 2010).  
595 Id. at 43–44. 
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custodians, key sources of ESI, key terminology, and date ranges in order to 
specifically tailor the discovery.596   
Any evaluation of burden, including the “extent to which the request is specifically 
tailored to discover relevant information,” should be preceded by an evaluation of the 
extent to which the parties have cooperated. If the responding party has not disclosed 
information necessary to specifically tailor the discovery, that fact should weigh 
against cost shifting. If there is a meaningful exchange of information, then a 
requesting party’s refusal to cooperate in tailoring the discovery to that information 
should weigh the analysis in favor of cost shifting.597   
Litigants can propound discovery and depose their way to understanding who the 
key players are, where the key sources of data are, how it is stored and the like. Or the 
courts can create incentives for early case assessment and an iterative process of 
disclosure leading to narrowly tailored requests, by conditioning cost-shifting analyses 
upon it. The question to ask here is, has there been meaningful cooperation, i.e., a 
meaningful exchange of information to enable a narrowly tailored request? 
H. The Factors from A to G 
At the end of the day, all of these factors boil down to a cost-benefit analysis. Is 
the discovery worth it? The answer remains elusive. How courts answer the question 
varies dramatically, though the analysis is now often skewed in favor of cost shifting.  
Moreover, there is little indication that these factors address all that needs to be 
addressed. What if the requesting party offers to pay all or a portion of the costs?  
Some courts consider this a factor favoring permitting the discovery; others do not.598  
 
596 See Seventh Circuit Council on eDiscovery and Digital Information, Model Discovery 
Plan, EDISCOVERYCOUNCIL.COM 6–7, https://www.ediscoverycouncil.com/content/model-
discovery-plan-and-privilege-order (last visited June 19, 2020) (proposing disclosure of this 
type of information as part of the Rule 26(f) meet and confer).   
597 See, e.g., Lawson v. Spirit AeroSystems, Inc., No. 18-1100-EFM-ADM, 2020 WL 
3288058, at *21 (D. Kan. June 18, 2020) (shifting costs after warning the requesting party three 
times to cooperate in narrowly tailoring discovery requests); Surplus Source Grp., LLC v. Mid-
Am. Engine, Inc., No. 4:08-cv-049, 2009 WL 961207 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2009) (shifting costs 
of repeated search to requesting party given failure to timely communicate regarding search 
terms).  
598 Compare Estate of Boles v. Nat'l Heritage Realty, Inc., No. 4:07-CV-99, 2010 WL 
2038611, at *5 (N.D. Miss. May 20, 2010), aff’d, 2010 WL 3087472 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 6, 2010), 
and Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 94CIV.2120, 1995 WL 649934, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 3, 1995), and Nat'l Union Elec. Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1257, 
1262 (E.D. Pa. 1980), and PSEG Power N.Y., Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-
657, 2007 WL 2687670, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007), with Cognex Corp. v. Electro Sci. 
Indus., Inc., No. Civ.A 01CV10287, 2002 WL 32309413, at *5 (D. Mass. July 2, 2002) (“There 
is something inconsistent with our notions of fairness to allow one party to obtain a heightened 
level of discovery because it is willing to pay for it. There are limits on the number of 
depositions and interrogatories even though more might well produce relevant information. 
There is no exception to those limitations based upon one party's willingness to pay. The sense 
of fairness underpinning our system of justice will not be enhanced by the courts participating 
in giving strategic advantage to those with deeper pockets.”), and 2006 Advisory Committee 
Note to Rule 26(b)(2)(B) (“A requesting party's willingness to share or bear the access costs 
may be weighed by the court in determining whether there is good cause.”). 
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What if a party seeks to shift costs after the fact, after the discovery is complete? Some 
courts permit this; some do not.599 If cost shifting is warranted, how much of the costs 
should be shifted? Courts struggle to articulate more than a suggestion that twenty-
five, fifty, or seventy-five percent seems fair.600   
What can be said here, with regard to the factors the courts do examine, is that cost 
shifting should be predicated on cooperation. Judge Grimm does this in his discovery 
orders: “the parties and counsel are expected to work cooperatively during all aspects 
of discovery. . . . The failure of a party or counsel to cooperate will be relevant in 
resolving any discovery disputes [and] who shall bear the cost of that discovery.”601  
And there are courts that have followed suit.602  
The proposal here is to go further. Courts should require cooperation before 
considering a motion to shift the costs of or say no to otherwise relevant discovery.  
The cooperation required by the courts should include disclosure by both parties of 
the information necessary for the parties to narrowly tailor the discovery and 
accurately estimate its costs and benefits. Only after the parties have exchanged this 
information, should the court consider the motion.   
When it does hear the motion, courts should require from the parties objectively 
verifiable information for each factor. If cost shifting is warranted, courts should share 
control over the process or limit shifting of costs to those associated with efficient 
information governance, review, and production.   
The responding party has choices, and not all choices are created equal. Analyzing 
these choices may tax a court with a crowded docket and limited resources, but it can 
be managed through a joint submission process. As with a joint case management plan, 
it forces the parties to talk, and, if the template is sound, exchange specific information 
that bears directly on the costs of the discovery and means to reduce it.   
 
599 Compare Cason-Merenda v. Detroit Med. Ctr., No. 06-15601, 2008 WL 2714239 (E.D. 
Mich. 2008), with State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Healthcare Chiropractic Clinic, No. 15-cv-
2527, 2016 WL 9330708, at *3 (D. Minn. Sept. 2, 2016), and Am. Water Heater Co. v. Taylor 
Winfield Corp., No. 2:16-CV-00125, 2017 WL 7732713, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 17, 2017), 
objections overruled sub nom. Am. Water Heater Co. v. Taylor-Winfield Techs., Inc., No. 2:16-
CV-125, 2018 WL 3339189 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 23, 2018). 
600 See, e.g., First Fin. Bank, N.A. v. Bauknecht, No. 12-CV-1509, 2013 WL 3833039, at *4 
(C.D. Ill. July 23, 2013); Clean Harbors Env’t Servs., Inc. v. ESIS, Inc., No. 09 C 3789, 2011 
WL 1897213, at *2, *6 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2011);  Habtegiorgis v. OIC of Wash., No. CV-08-
3077, 2010 WL 11618662, at *3 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 29, 2010), on reconsideration in part,  2010 
WL 2232142 (E.D. Wash. June 2, 2010); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 
F.R.D. 280, 284, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Other courts simply pick a number, an amount of costs 
to shift, without discussion. Zeller v. S. Cent. Emergency Med. Servs., Inc., No. 1:13-CV-2584, 
2014 WL 2094340, at *10–11 (M.D. Pa. May 20, 2014). 
601 Grimm, Discovery Order, supra note 464, at 2 (citing Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. 
Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 356 (D. Md. 2009)). 
602 Design Basics, LLC v. Carhart Lumber Co., 2014 WL 6669844, at *5 (D. Neb. Nov. 24, 
2014). 
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As John Adams famously noted, “facts are stubborn things.”603 The case law 
makes clear that “facts” are commonly absent from cost-shifting motions.604 The goal 
here is to require them and base decisions on them.   
VI. CONCLUSION  
Of the 178 judicial decisions analyzed for this research, seventy decisions, thirty-
nine percent, ordered some form of cost shifting. Eighty-four decisions, forty-seven 
percent, denied requests to shift costs, and the remainder either denied the discovery 
outright or denied the request pending additional discovery or motion practice. Of the 
fifty decisions handed down since the 2015 amendments, the court shifted all or a 
portion of the costs in thirty percent of the cases.605 The actual numbers are higher, as 
this excludes an increasing number of decisions where the discovery is denied 
outright, or the motion is denied pending additional discovery or motion practice.   
There are those who argue that this percentage should be higher still: The courts 
should flip the presumption that the responding party pays to a presumption that the 
requesting party pays all or part of the costs of responding to discovery, i.e., switch to 
a user-pays model.606 Practitioners, and some of the courts, have argued that absent 
cost sharing the requesting party does not have “skin in the game.”607 Courts and 
commentators note that, “[a]side from the comparatively minimal costs of drafting 
their discovery requests and considering the responses, litigants bear none of the costs 
of producing the information that they demand.”608 As the argument goes, this creates 
incentives to propound broad-brush discovery.609 There is “no economic incentive for 
the party asking for information to moderate its requests to ensure that they are 
proportional to the issues at stake and not excessively expensive to the producing 
party.”610 According to some, “[t]he American rule is perhaps the greatest single 
catalyst of discovery abuse,” because it allows plaintiffs to impose tremendous costs 
on defendants at virtually no cost to themselves.611   
 
603 DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 68 (2001). 
604 See supra notes 574–95. 
605 Research for the Article excluded decisions addressing cost-shifting requests by non-
parties responding to a subpoena and cost-shifting imposed as a sanction because the legal 
standards are different. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37, 45(d)(1).   
606 See, e.g., Redish & McNamara, supra note 8, at 773; Beisner, supra note 13, at 586. 
607 Grimm & Yellin, supra note 13, at 521. 
608 Redish & McNamara, supra note 8 at 800; accord Mast, supra note 13, at 1830;  Pulver, 
supra note 13, at 1401–02. 
609 See, e.g., Lubber, Inc. v. Optari LLC, No. 3:11-0042, 2012 WL 899631, at *2 (M.D. 
Tenn. Mar. 15, 2012); Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, No. 05-3091, 2009 WL 3446761, at *6 
(D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2009), aff'd, 720 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D.N.J. 2010). 
610 Grimm & Yellin, supra note 13, at 521. 
611 Beisner, supra note 13, at 587 (noting contrary views found in Emery G. Lee III & 
Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 
765, 787 (2010)); accord Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of 
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The solution, it is said, is to require “skin in the game.”612 If requesting parties are 
required to pay the expense of producing the discovery, they will internalize its costs 
and ask for only what they are willing to pay to obtain.613 Some advocate adopting a 
user pays rule for all discovery.614 Some propose such a rule for all discovery, but with 
government subsidies for the financially weak in public interest litigation.615 Some 
propose one-way fee-shifting if plaintiff’s case is dismissed on summary judgment,616 
and some a presumption in favor of reimbursing the responding party for some or all 
costs, depending on “the resources of the plaintiffs’ attorneys.”617 Some propose a “co-
pay” for discovery where the requesting party is assessed ten percent of the costs of 
the responding party.618 Some propose special rules just for eDiscovery: a user-pays 
rule for all eDiscovery; or increased cost shifting for eDiscovery;619 or cost shifting 
when seeking inaccessible ESI;620 or cost shifting if the discovery doesn’t turn up 
anything.621   
The problem is that the “invisible hand of incentives” moves whether the 
responding or requesting party pays. Experiments with loser-pay regimes suggest that 
routine cost shifting can dramatically increase overall spending: when Florida 
experimented with a loser pays regime in medical malpractice cases, defendant’s cost 
rose 100%.622 With cost shifting motions, the case law shows, time and again, that the 
 
Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 
1393, 1398–99 (1994); Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., Disclosure Under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(a)—‘Much Ado About Nothing?, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 679, 701 (1995);  Peggy E. 
Bruggman, Reducing the Costs of Civil Litigation: Discovery Reform, PUB. L. RSCH. INST. 
(1995), http://w3.uchastings.edu/plri/fal95tex/discov.html; Amelia F. Burroughs, Comment, 
Mythed It Again: The Myth of Discovery Abuse and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), 
33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 75, 91–92 (2001). 
612 Grimm & Yellin, supra note 13, at 521. 
613 Id.; see also Laethem Equip. Co. v. Deere & Co., 261 F.R.D. 127, 146 (E.D. Mich. 2009). 
614 Beisner, supra note 13, at 587–88; Grimm & Yellin, supra note 13, at 521–22.    
615 See Redish & McNamara, supra note 8, at 815–16. 
616 Cameron T. Norris, One-Way Fee Shifting After Summary Judgment, 71 VAND. L. REV. 
2117, 2119 (2018). 
617 Redish & McNamara, supra note 8, at 822. 
618 Robert D. Owens & Francis X. Nolan, Skin in the Game: A Proposed Co-Pay 
Requirement for Discovery-Requesting Parties, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Oct. 6, 2017, at 3. 
619 Redish, supra note 13; Mast, supra note 13, at 1837–38. 
620 See, e.g., Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Scis. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594, 601–03 
(E.D. Wis. 2004); Beisner, supra note 13, at 584–86; Pulver, supra note 13, at 1424. 
621 OptoLum Inc. v. Cree Inc., No. 17CV687, 2018 WL 6834608, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 28, 
2018). 
622 Edward A. Snyder & James W. Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: 
Evidence Confronts Theory, 6 J.L., ECON., & ORG. 345, 355–78 (1990). 
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responding party has “every incentive to respond extravagantly to discovery 
requests.”623  
These incentives to “respond extravagantly to discovery requests” to argue undue 
burden align with the incentives of law firms and vendors to use the discovery process 
as a profit center. As discussed supra, court filings show law firms marking up the 
costs of attorney review over 500%, and the Sedona Conference finds the process for 
protecting privileged ESI from production simply “broken.”624 Industry insiders 
describe an eDiscovery industry where vendors “racked up immense bills without 
delivering immense value.”625 Others in the industry have described eDiscovery as “an 
insanely inefficient process” that involves “a lot of nickel-and-diming.”626   
Those nickels and dimes add up. Litigants spent an estimated $10.11 billion on 
eDiscovery in 2018.627 Analysts predict that will grow to $18.7 billion by 2023.628  
Reversing the presumption for who pays for discovery simply shifts the burden of 
funding industry growth from $10.1 billion to $18.7 billion. Focusing only on 
proportionality and cost shifting codifies the waste inherent in an “insanely inefficient 
process.” It ensures that costs remain high. It ensures that relevant discovery takes a 
back seat to “discovery wars” aided by a multi-billion-dollar industry.629   
As Judge Grimm notes, reversing the presumption that the producing party must 
pay its own costs in responding to proper discovery requests would be “a radical 
departure from the method by which civil cases have been litigated in federal court 
since the adoption of the discovery rules in 1938.”630 Similarly, the Advisory 
 
623 Norris, supra note 616, at 2119. 
624 Sedona Conference, Commentary on Protection of Privileged ESI, supra note 540, at 103, 
155 (Principle 4).  
625 Ansel Halliburton, Modus Is Trying to Shake Up the Fat eDiscovery Industry, 
TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 3, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/04/03/modus-is-trying-to-shake-up-
the-fat-ediscovery-industry/. 
626 Matt Weinberger, How One Startup Wants to Solve an 'Insane' Problem for a $400 Billion 
Industry, BUS. INSIDER, http://www.businessinsider.com/logikcull-is-trying-to-fix-ediscovery-
2015-5#ixzz3e0YnJAH9 (last visited June 24, 2015); Erin E. Harrison, E-Discovery a ‘Stain’ 






627  Rob Robinson, An eDiscovery Market Size Mashup: 2018-2023 Worldwide Software and 
Services Overview, COMPLEX DISCOVERY (Aug. 29, 2017), https://complexdiscovery.com/an-
ediscovery-market-size-mashup-worldwide-software-and-services-overview-2018-2023/. 
628 Id. 
629 Practitioners used the term “Discovery Wars” when writing about Rule 30(b)(6) 
depositions. Madhavi K. Seth & Vikram S. Arora, Discovery Wars, 108 ILL. BAR J. 38, 38 
(2020). 
630 Grimm & Yellin, supra note 13, at 522.   
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Committee Notes to the 2015 amendments to Rule 26 suggest the change “does not 
imply that cost-shifting should become common practice” and the former chair of the 
committee cautioned, “[c]ost shifting is now and should be in the future a rare 
occurrence.”631 Yet, cost shifting has, in fact, become common practice.632   
This Article proposes an alternative to this radical shift: make the cost-shifting 
analysis more objective and the process cheaper. Require cooperation before cost 
shifting. Cooperation will lead to “just, speedy, and efficient” discovery methods that 
simply shifting costs will not, because asking “can it be done more efficiently” results 
in a different answer than asking “is the discovery unduly burdensome”?   
Change starts with courts interpreting the proportionality and cost-shifting factors 
to require objective information to answer both questions. As set out above, the courts 
should interpret each factor to call for verifiable information. One can objectively 
determine the importance of the issues, by analyzing whether the case impacts more 
than the named litigants. One can more objectively define the value of the case, by 
requiring submission of evidence regarding the amount in controversy and the non-
monetary relief requested. One can objectively define the parties’ relative access to 
information by examining access at the file level, as opposed to the type of 
information. One can objectively define the parties’ resources by requiring evidence 
of the same, rather than exploring resources theoretically available to the parties. One 
can objectively analyze the importance of the discovery by requiring disclosure of 
information necessary to define core discovery in that case. One can more objectively 
define the burden and benefit of this discovery by mandating cooperation in the form 
of disclosure of information sufficient to enable both parties to obtain cost estimates 
and explore alternatives.   
This last step allows the courts to ask, is there a better way, prior to considering 
whether the discovery is unduly burdensome. In doing so, this Article suggests that 
courts follow the best practices of practitioners when they outsource work: require 
multiple proposals.633 Require the responding party obtain and submit more than one 
proposal. Require the responding party share sufficient information to enable the 
requesting party to obtain an estimate. If the parties are required to obtain multiple 
estimates in advance of the discovery, vendors, knowing there is competition, have 
incentives to propose efficient alternatives, and the courts have choices.   
Mandating this type of cooperation means requiring disclosure of key information.  
As a precondition to reviewing a cost-shifting or proportionality motion, courts should 
require an exchange of information regarding the information technology systems at 
issue, key custodians, key terms, key sources of ESI, and date ranges in order to 
specifically tailor the discovery.634 There is nothing new about requiring the exchange 
of this type of information: it is supposed to happen in the Rule 26(f) conference. But 
the case law suggests that litigants routinely fail or refuse to provide this information 
regarding contested discovery.   
 
631 See Sedona Conference, Commentary on Proportionality, supra note 190, at 166 n.45.  
632 See Judicial Roundtable, supra note 75, at 30. 
633 See generally Sedona Conference, Guidance for the Selection of Electronic Discovery 
Providers, 18 SEDONA CONF. J. 55, 136 (2017). 
634 See supra notes 574–95. 
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This Article argues a responding party’s failure to cooperate by timely sharing this 
information should serve as a basis for denying requests to preclude discovery or shift 
its costs.635 Equally important, a requesting party’s failure to cooperate by failing to 
engage in an iterative process to narrowly tailor discovery should serve as a basis for 
shifting costs.636 As early as the 1980s, courts emphasized the importance of 
cooperation in producing ESI.637 Decades later, courts still lament the “discovery 
slugfest”638 and practitioners still write about “discovery wars.”639 Cooperation has 
not happened by proclamation or exhortation. It will, if discovery depends on it.   
Finally, if costs are shifted, courts should share control over the process or limit 
reimbursement. As discussed above, from preservation to production, litigants have 
options, and the standard for cost shifting, as with discovery, should be reasonableness 
not perfection.640   
Costs are determined by process, and courts have long held that a burden 
voluntarily undertaken is not an undue burden.641 Yet, the courts continue to approve 
use of high-priced vendors and processes, doubling the costs in some cases, and then 
shifting them.642 If the responding party chooses to employ a more expensive process, 
e.g., producing static images instead of native files, that party should pay for it. If the 
responding party has adopted information governance practices that require expensive 
discovery, e.g., short auto-delete periods and inaccessible backup media, that party 
should pay the costs associated with producing information from those sources.   
Creating incentives to utilize efficient processes should include incentives to limit 
the seventy-three percent of the discovery costs spent on attorney review.643 One way 
is to exclude them from the cost-shifting analysis.644 The majority of cases on cost 
shifting do so, citing the American Rule and the responding party’s exclusive ability 
to control the cost of review.645 This Article suggests that, if courts do shift the costs 
of review based on proportionality considerations, they should allocate only those 
costs associated with the least expensive means of review aided by technology and a 
 
635 See supra notes 585–97. 
636 See supra notes 601–04. 
637 Daewoo Elecs. Co. v. United States, 650 F. Supp. 1003, 1006 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1986).   
638 UnitedHealthcare of Fla., Inc. v. Am. Renal Assocs. LLC, No. 16-CV-81180, 2017 WL 
4785457, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 20, 2017). 
639 Seth & Arora, supra note 629, at 38. 
640 See Hon. Craig B. Shaffer, Deconstructing "Discovery About Discovery", 19 SEDONA 
CONF. J. 215, 220 (2018) (“discovery is governed by a standard of reasonableness, not 
perfection.”).   
641 See supra notes 101–02, 369–73. 
642 See supra notes 317–32. 
643 PACE & ZAKARAS, supra note 28, at xiii- xv. 
644 See supra notes 533–35. 
645 See supra notes 533–39. 
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Rule 502(d) order.646 If the responding party chooses linear review for all or a portion 
of the production set, the traditional cost-allocation rules should apply.647 If the 
responding party chooses to review ESI unlikely to contain privileged material, e.g. a 
customer calls database, the traditional cost-allocation rules should apply.648 Doing so 
not only minimizes costs in litigation, it encourages sound information governance 
practices. Parties that properly label and organize information in advance will have 
higher recall rates. In short, the cost-shifting analysis can encourage efficiency. 
As set out above, in 2010, the Duke Conference concluded that cooperation, 
proportionality, and sustained, hands-on judicial case management were needed.649  
The 2015 revisions to the federal rules codified two legs of that three-legged stool, 
with amendments to the rules addressing proportionality and case management.650 A 
two-legged stool, however, is a precarious perch—one almost impossible to balance.  
Mandating cooperation to produce better information, better processes, and better 
incentives provides the third leg. Doing so does not require a rule change; it does 
require consistent application of the best practices now found in some of the case law.  
Focusing solely on cost shifting or proportionality will not result in a “just, speedy, 
























646 See supra notes 555–65. 
647 See supra Part IV.F.4.  
648 Id.; Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int’l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331, 341–43 (E.D. Pa. 2012).   
649 2014 Judicial Conference Summary Report, supra note 21, at Rules App. B-2–B-3. 
650 Id. at B-11–B-12. 
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